THE GERMAN FAMINE.

Pukekohe & Waiuku Times, Volume 5, Issue 177, 26 May 1916, Page 2 (Supplement)

THE GERMAN FAMINE.

DISASTER THAT EVEN PSACE COULD NO'l AVERT. % FRANCIS CRIBBLE. (-Mr. I - ram is Cribble, the famous n°\°i all( ' was interned at Juinlchoii for ovor a year. That lio u*ed Ims eyes and ears to good purpose the following remarkable article convincingly shows.) The reticent Colonel House is said to ha\e stated that, so far as h j could judge when lie was in Berlin, there still was plenty of food in Cermanv. Evidently the Germans did the* Colonel well and the Lord made him trulv thaukf ill. At about tlio same time, however, Lieutenant Berg, of the Mocwe, told an American friend of mine that ititel.igent German recognised that the. game w up, tnough they meant to do some more mischief before they abandoned it: and that is the view of the matter which the tacts support. lhe game is up because Cermanv is heading fast for a famine which has lieen foreseen ever since last si mmer by those who knew the truth abcut that summer's harvest. That harvest—or what theie was of it—was both sown and reaped while i was behind the barbed wires of Ruhleben Camp. Weather was naturally an important consideration to us there, and when we had finished enjojying ,t on our own account we considered its hearing 011 tlio crops. There was practically no rain from the end of March until the beginning of July, and we used to point to the brass-bound sky, assuring each other that the curse of Cod was on the German fields. 11l one of our boxes there wa; a hygrometer, from which we gathered that dew as well as rain was lacking. We knew when the crisis was passed, ami then we said: "Let all the rain come no . w T~ AV '" °n'.v com])lete the mischief. ' And then the rain came—lashing thunderstorms of the most damaging kind—and those of our custodians who were concerned with agriculture pulled long faces and used ugly language. There was no mistake about it—the harvest ol 1S) 1 had failed. Official Cerimiiiy did not admit the failure. Official Germany ciilv lied aboiii that harvest, but tried to give plau-iliility to its lies by a certain show of reckless extravagance. It increased the rations of bread and supplementary rations to people who could prove that they were engaged in hard work calculated to sharpen their appetites. The idea was that they were sure to conclude a victorious peace before Christmas and compel Roumania to sell her superflous stock of grain. Ihe expected victory, however, was not gained, and Rumania invented one excuse aft.t another for refusing to part with her grain, lhe necessity of "nee more cutting down rations and making fresh rules r.nd regulation of the food supply has at last eompelloel an admission, if not of tlio whole truth, at least of a portion of it. It is now conceded that the harvest of l!H.j was bad, and " Vonvarts" — that 'enfant terrible' of the German Press points out that the weather was only on, l of the reasons why it was bad, and was bound to be so. The other reasons given are as follow : J. The ground was not manured, tlio monopolisation of the railway trucks by tlio military authorities preventing the transportation of the manure to tlio farms. 2. Horses and carts were scarce because so many of them had been taken for the Army. -Most ot the skilled agriculturists we're at the scat of war; and tie unskilled labour of old men, boys, women and prisoners of war was very far from giving satisfaction.

■l. The manufacture of agricultural machinery had turned their energies to tli.' manufacture of implements of war. It is further pointed out by ''Vorwarts' 1 that, whatever the weather may be like this summer, these four causes, making for a had harvest, wiil l>e even more potent than they were last year. And Germany lias now reached a point at which any further diminution of supplies will sell starvation for largo numbers of the people. CAXXOT BE DELAYED VERY LONG. Famine, in short, is equally inevitable whether the war continues or poace i- concluded at a comparatively early date. Because: 1. No neutral friends have made, or are likely to make, arrangements to pour jn provisions as soon as the siege is raisvd; the Germans will have to buy what they want and get it delivered as be«,t they can. 2. Prices will be high—particularly high for those who buy in marks. The mark already at a discount t3O per cent., will come down with a further run when Germany begins buying abroad on the scale on which she will presently need to buy. Very likely it will then be necessary to pay twenty marks for about five marks worth of goods. 3. Germany will not be able to pay for food by exporting goods localise, there are now hardly any goods available for exportation. ■l. Owing, among other reasons, to the submnrino campaign, freights will remain high, and it may be a long time before it is possible to bring any appreciable quantity of food into ihe Gcr. man ports.

Tlies.? statements arc not invented !>y me—tlioy are extracted from the Ger. man "toll-the-truth 1 ' Press; and it seems to me that there is no avoiding conclusion tliat Hie stare of the German people will soon lie prettj much wliat the state of the Belgian people would no'.v lie hut for American philanthropists. flie date at which tlio eatastroplis will occur depends upon a good manv uneertain factors; but it cannot he delayed very long. Meanwhlie there is one grave possihilitv of wliidi tlie German farmers are terribly alrajd. Suppose, wh >n the opportune moment arrives, the Russian aeroplanes should dror> inflainmatory bombs into tlie midst- of their standing wheit, and hurley, and rye. If so—well, a prairie fire might prove to h<» the last straw required to break their backs. FKAXC'IS (ilU!ini,E.