Poverty Bay Herald PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING GISBORNE, SATURDAY, JUNE 25, 1938. BRITAIN AND SPAIN

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume LXV, Issue 19666, 25 June 1938, Page 4

Poverty Bay Herald PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING GISBORNE, SATURDAY, JUNE 25, 1938. BRITAIN AND SPAIN

'• The sinking this week of another - British ship by Spanish rebel aeroplanes, or aeroplanes fighting on behalf of the Spanish rebels, directs || further attention to a deplorable situaK tion in which Great Britain is unable, gj or unwilling, to intervene. Since the B commencement of the Spanish civil B war, four British ships have been !j3 sunk, ten have been seriously dama aged, and more than 40 have sustained a damage in the course of attacks by |3 aircraft. As a result of these attacks, « 23 lives have been lost and more than ■5 half the victims have been British gj subjects. On the face of it, it is inre tolerable that the British nation should jl submit humbly to these outrages and g indignities and they must inevitably g further incense the high feelings that ® have been engendered by the methods * with which this war is being fought. Jg It has been officially stated that none jg of the vessels attacked was carrying arms or munitions, so that the attacks

on them cannot possibly be justified. Protest after protest has been lodged with the Spanish Nationalist authorities, but they have been treated almost with contempt and the British Government has received no more consideration and apparently carried no more weight than some third-rate Balkan State. It is this fact that makes the position of Britain so humiliating, but the same token leads to a strong suspicion that there is more behind the issue than appears on the surface.

No one can deny that Great Britain has displayed the utmost patience and forbearance. Indeed, her conduct has been so foreign to her traditions and her avowed determination to protect British interests that those who are tempted to criticise her might well seek for some hidden motive. In regard to Spain, British policy, of course, has been one of strict nonintervention, and for this attitude, irksome though it may be, there is a good deal of excuse. The Prime Minister reaffirmed this policy only this week, and in the course of a statement in the House of Commons he touched on one or two other points of interest. The Government, he said, did not admit the right of General Franco or anyone else to attack British shipping, but he added that the Government, after a careful and exhaustive examination, had been forced to the conclusion that it was impossible to prevent these attacks without actually intervening in the war. It would seem that that position must be accepted, and this being so it means that those who oppose the policy of the Government must be prepared to face the possibility of Great Britain becoming involved in a war in which she has no direct concern—and not only in a war in Spain, but in a conflict which might ultimately embroil the whole of Europe and probably the world.

It is on this basis that British conduct in regard to Spain must be judged. It is not a question of taking sides in Spain or of complacently permitting British shipping to be destroyed, but essentially a question of whether Great Britain could possibly be justified in adopting an alternative course which might, and in all probability would, lead to a widespread war. It can be argued, and quite reasonably, that British inaction is tantamount to an invitation to the

rebels to continue on their present course. But there is another more serious aspect that demands consideration, and that is the sinister motives and machinations that lie behind the Spanish conflict. It is conceivable, and far from improbable, that the attacks on British shipping have little real connection with the Spanish war itself but are designed deliberately to provoke Great Britain and bring about her intervention. There is one Power ,at least, which does not desire non-intervention, which has been active for years in promoting discord and unrest in Europe, and which has been providing the means for the continuation of the war in Spain. In all probability it is the aircraft of this nation that have been attacking British ships—possibly even without the consent or approval of General Fsnnco —and acceptance of a seeming challenge might play right into the hands of those who desire the downfall of the British Empire.

Possible ulterior motives are not necessarily confined to the progress ol the Spanish conflict, but may be interwoven with other facets of European diplomacy. British policy at the moment is largely motivated by a desire to bring about a rapprochement between Italy, France, and herself. This plan, obviously, is resented by Germany, since it would mean the end of the Rome-Berlin axis and a blow to the anti-Comintern pact. Germany’s logical move, therefore, is to attempt to frustrate the Anglo-Italian agreement and she could devise no better means of achieving this than by forcing Britain to take sides in Spain against the faction which Italy is supporting. In the meantime, there is evidence of Italian anxiety to bring the agreement with Britain into force, but this hinges on a settlement of the Spanish question. Italy now has io decide whether she has more to gain by the conclusion of the agreement orby a victory for General Franco, and the odds favour the former. Bound up with this point is the welcome progress made by the non-intervention committee at this week’s meetings. Whether success will be achieved in this direction remains to be seen, but it can be said with certainty that the outlook is more hopeful and that there are better prospects of the British policy being justified by results.