Poverty Bay Herald PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING GISBORNE, TUESDAY, MARCH 10, 1936. AN ITALIAN PUZZLE

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume LXIII, Issue 18960, 10 March 1936, Page 4

Poverty Bay Herald PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING GISBORNE, TUESDAY, MARCH 10, 1936. AN ITALIAN PUZZLE

Overnight reports that Italy had suspended hostilities in Abyssinia with a dramatic suddenness comparable only to that with which they commenced little more than foui mouths ago are flatly contradicted by to-day's cable messages, and, as a result, the whole world will be trying to decipher the latest cryptic moves in the tangled skein of European politics. Whatever the exact position, however, there are strong grounds for believing that the war in Abyssinia Is nearing an end, and it will not be surprising if Signor Mussolini does find some excuse for declaring un armistice. Last week the League of Nations, in a final effort to avoid the imposition of further sanctions against Italy, made overtures to the two belligerents for peace negotiations*, but it is extremely doubtful whether Geneva itself cherished any hopes that its efforts would meet with success. The Emperor of .Abyssinia promptly accepted the proposal and then, on Sunday, Signor Mussolini, acting with characteristic unexpectedness, intimated that Italy, too, was willing to try and end the war by conciliation. Yesterday, this was followed by an announcement that instructions had been issued for the cessation of activities on the battlefronts, but later the report whs contradicted. On the face of it, an Italian withdrawal might be accepted as evidence of a sincere desire to bring a futile war to an end, but no one is likely to overlook the fact that events of far greater importance have occurred nearer to Italy's own borders, and the genera} feeling will bo that whatever decision is made will be prompted by the new situation created through the German reoccupation of the Rhinelnnd zone and her denunciation of the Locarno Pact. The truth, perhaps, although it is never likely to be admitted, is that Mussolini is as anxious as anyone else to terminate the disastrous Abyssinian campaign and, consequently, will seize upon the first reasonable pretext for calling a halt. This view is based on a belief that the African adventure was started, not because of what it was hoped to gain directly from it, but with the object of diverting the attention of the Italian people from their own parlous economic plight and providing a ground upon which continued loyalty to the Fascist regime could be secured. .Germany's breach of the Locarno Treaty, of which Italy is a guarantor —although she did not hesitate to commit a breach herself—may relieve Mussolini of the necessity of going overseas to discover a popular cause upon which to unite his followers. Apart from this aspect of the question, there can be little doubt that Italy has all along recognised that her interests can best be protected "by continued membership of the League of Nations and, particularly, by association with France, with whom her future safety is indissolubly linked. It is significant that, despite the utmost provocation, Italy has retained her membership of the League, and, notwithstanding various approaches by Germany and rebuffs by France, has clearly indicated a preference for French friendship. There is some ground for suspicion, in the light of subsequent developments, that the French proposals to the League for renewed pence negotiations "were prompted by Italy herself, and there can be little doubt, that Germany's dramatic action during the week-end provided her with a reasonable excuse for terminating hostilities. It is still far too early, however, to greet the Italian action—assuming that it has been taken —with jubilation, for what it actually portends remains to be seen. If it indicates that the situation in Europo itself is so grave as to require the concentration of all Italy's forces in her own territory

there is good reason for perturbation rather than gratification; if, on the other hand, it merely connotes Italian willingness to listen to the League's proposals and still to claim the fruits of her conquest, then little progress has been made towards a just settlement of the dispute. It is still a fundamental principle that any peace terms must be acceptable alike to Italy, Abyssinia, and the League, and an equally firmly-established principle that no nation should benefit by an act. of unlawful aggression. Viewed apart from the Phiropcan situation, therefore, there can only be peace in Abyssinia if Italy renounces her claims and is prepared to leave the whole question of colonial territory to free negotiation.. The probabilities appear to be that Italy, whatever her ultimate aims, will not renew her campaign if she once suspends it, at least in the immediate future, because the present interruption comes just at a time when she had been at pains to convince the world that victory was within her grasp. Taking a broader view of the situation, an Italian decision to cease hostilities will be frankly welcomed as an indication that her statesmen realise that in the unsettled state of Europe to-day there is no room for divergences of opinion among those who are sincerely desirous of preserving peace on the Continent, but a demand for. determined adherence to the principles laid down at Locarno in 1020. If it proves to be the ease that Italy is prompted by a desire to consolidate the opposb tion to a threat of a Teutonic hegemony in Central Europe, then hei action will do much to restore her to the comity of nations and her untimely and ill-judged Abyssinian experi nient will, in time, be looked upon merely as an unfortunate adventure.