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Poverty Bay Herald. PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING GISBORNE, TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1930. BRITAIN AND EGYPT

Any belief which may have existed that the visit of the Egyptian delegation to London was merely a formal prelude to the signing of the draft treaty submitted by the British Government and accepted by Mahmoud I’aslia, at the time dictator of Egypt, has already been dispelled by the meagre reports of the negotiations which are now proceeding at Whitehall. It would .almost appear that an effort is being made to clothe the discussions in an atmosphere of secrecy, for so far no oflicial statement of any consequence has been issued. It is significant, however, that a report that unexpected difficulties have been encountered has not been contradicted. It is true that nothing official has been said concerning the Egyptian counterproposals, if they have, in fact, been made, but in such circumstances it may almost be taken for granted that this is a case where official silence is tantamount, to confirmation of the report. Were it not so, it seems extremely unlikely that the statement should pass unchallenged for some days, for, clearly, if the Egyptians insist upon fresh demands the conclusion of a treaty will be practically impossible. When the draft proposals were submitted to Mahmoud I’aslia, Mr. Henderson was insistent in his declaration -that the various clauses represented the absolute limit to which Britain was prepared to go, so that any suggestion that the terms should be*extended in material details, in the direction of giving Egypt an even greater measure of independence can only result in an impasse. In plain language, Egypt was oll’ered a treaty on certain conditions, with a definite ultimatum to “take it or leave it.” Apparently they have not been prepared to take the treaty as it stood, and nothing is less likely than .that the British Parliament would agree t.o any further concessions. Unless, therefore, the Egyptian statesmen are merely indulging in a piece of bargaining with the object of testing the determination of Britain to adhers strictly to its former draft, the conference is already doomed to failure. The great popular rejoicing with which the Egyptian delegation left Cairo, and the blessings with which it was despatched, seemed 1o indicate that, in Egypt at least, .the treaty was regarded as un fait accompli. It is patent, however, that from the very outset the Egyptian people have been insensible of the importance of the proposals, and wholly unappreciative of tin' concessions and sacrifices Britain was prepared to make. When Mahmoud returned to Egypt with the draft proposals it was one of the conditions that they should be submitted to the people for ratification. Certainly elections were subsequently held, but it would be absurd to suggest that the trinity was regarded as an important issue. The entire indifference shown by the political leaders to such an outstanding question was itself a remarkable commentary upon the efficiency and wisdom of the treaty proposals, and the capacity of .the Egyptian people to use aright the privilege*, which the British Government wishes to bestow. No real effort was made to enlighten the electors oil -the proposals, or to induce them to give an intelligent expression of opinion. On the contrary the campaign almost immediately developed into the .scramble for personal aggrandisement, which is so typical of Egyptian politics. The strikingly important constitutional issue was studiously ignored. In this way. the significance of the elections, far from achieving the result which Britain intended, was practically stultified. .Outstanding among the treaty, proposals are provisions for the withdrawal of British troops to the Suez Canal, Egypt’s responsibility for the protection of foreigners, and the application to foreigners of Egyptian legislation. Concessions such as these cannot be made without careful consideration. They are of far-reaching importance; and not merely to the Egyptians themselves. Their acceptance by the Egyptian individual might be taken to indicate a full realisation of the new and imposing duties devolving upon the legislature of the country. The elections, however, proved" that the people are wholly devoid of a national grasp of democratic principles. The huge illiterate electorate could hardly have appreciated the proposals, even if they had been laid before them; yet now the delegation in London is reported to be insisting on fresh concessions—not, concessions demanded by the people as a whole, but demands which undoubtedly originate solely in the minds of the loaders of the Wal'd, an organisation, always antagonistic to British influence, and based on methods of intimidation, religions fanaticism, and hatred of the foreigner. And this is the organisation which is negotiating the treaty with Britain, not ns might appear on the face of it, a treaty of alliance between the two countries for the gdod of Egypt, but a treaty aimed to widen the breach which has existed for many years. Egyptian polities

have never been imposing, nor such as to inspire confidence; frequently they have been a matter of ridicule. Even the educated Nationalists, men who have received all the benefits of Eng lish education and institutions, hitliej - to have shown no real capacity for democratic leadership, or for using their abilities other than for the furtherance of political aims and private interests. The failure to recognise, in .the new diplomacy of Mr. Henderson, that the draft treaty represented the “absolute limit” may, ultimately, prove a blessing in disguise, for it is not impossible that the demand for further concessions will result in the treaty being indefinitely postponed. If that should be the case it will not lie an occasion for regret. In Britain itself the proposals savored too much of party politics; too little consideration was given to the Imperial aspect, and particularly the interests of Australia and New Zealand in the .Suez Canal. In Egypt, the proposals were not seriously considered at all, except so far as they represented something wrung from Britain at an opportune uiomcnt. It will be well, perhaps, if the whole question is

shelved until such time as the Egyptian people are more deeply sensible of thi‘ responsibilities attaching to complete independence. If the treaty is concluded, then it can only be hoped that there will be no departure from Ihe very wide concessions already offered.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/PBH19300408.2.32

Bibliographic details

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume LV, Issue 17229, 8 April 1930, Page 6

Word Count
1,035

Poverty Bay Herald. PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING GISBORNE, TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1930. BRITAIN AND EGYPT Poverty Bay Herald, Volume LV, Issue 17229, 8 April 1930, Page 6

Poverty Bay Herald. PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING GISBORNE, TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1930. BRITAIN AND EGYPT Poverty Bay Herald, Volume LV, Issue 17229, 8 April 1930, Page 6

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