"SMALL AND PETTY"

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume LIII, Issue 16500, 18 November 1927, Page 7

"SMALL AND PETTY"

DIFFERENCES AT GENEVA LORD CECIL'S ATTACK STATEMENT IN THE LORDS. lEiec. Tel. Copyright—United Press Assn) (N.Z., and A.P.A., and Sun.) LONDON, November 16. In the House of Lords, as the outcome of reference to questions of foreign policy by Lord Parmoor, Lord Cecil made a personal explanation regarding lii's resignation.' He said it was the culmination of a series'of events such as the Labor Government's rejection of the treaty of mutual assistance, followed by the Conservative rejection of the 1924 Geneva protocol. He went to the Naval Conference conscious that bis instructions would cause serious difficulties and exactly what lie anticipated occurred. Ho was repeatedly put in the position of defending situations seemingly wholly indefensible, thereby creating the impression that Britain was lukewarm on the subject of disarmament.

Lord Cecil narrated several instances of what he described as '.'departmental obstruction." "Indeed," he said, " representatives of the Admiralty scarcely concealed their indifference, if not their hostility, to the whole proceedings." lie did not infer that was the attitude of the whole Cabinet. Nevertheless, he was unable to convince Cabinet of the / importance of taking a stronger line with its technical advisers, owing to the. harmfulness of many incidents. He asked for a free hand personally to decide minor matters, but this was declined. He trusted Cabinet had now seen the result of too great deference to expert advice, and would give Lord Cushendun (formerly the Hon. Ronald McNeill) greater support than it felt able to accord to him (Lord Cecil). Lord Cecil said when he returned from Geneva he was exhausted and discouraged, and felt that Chough the conference was not a complete failure, the advance was not commensurate with the objective. Above all, he felt the fundamental difference between his and Cabinet's views on the importance of an international effoi'Mo disarm. He referred to Mr. Churchill's declaration after the breakdown of the negotiations when he said : " England is.unable jjow, and I hope never will in the future, embody in a solemn international agreement words binding us. to the principle of a mathematical parity of naval strength." "A WARNING ESSENTIAL." V

Lord Cecil continued that, though he did not agree, he was certain Mr. Churchill was convinced Ids warning was essential for the safety 1 of England. He was equally sure that if persisted it would bang, bolt, and bar the door against any hope of agreement "with America on naval disarmament. There was no doubt that the moment Mr. Churchill realised that the delegates were agreed on parity, even though he had received express telegraphic sanction to do so, he began to press on his Cabinet colleagues the necessity of avoiding what he regarded as a disastrous concession. The culmination of many telegrams was the recall 'of the speaker. Lord Cecil traced at length the subsequent negotiations'and added that the Government had taken a course which he believed had caused the failure of vital negotiations. If he had remained in office he would have had to take the responsibility for that as well as to defend it, and that was impossible. Earl Balfour said. he regretted Lord Cecil thought it necessary to tevel such serious charges at his late colleagues. He did not see how the course of events at Geneva justified the extreme course adopted bv Lord Cecil, who, it appeared to Earl Balfour, had allowed inevitable differences to accumulate to a point at which his temper gaT-e way. The speaker did not believe the two great, pacific countries would fail to reach a friendly agreement on the point at issue. Britain did not object to America building as many small craft as she thought necessarv, but we had duties to perform In the Empire and to the people of the Homeland.

" Let us say to Arherica," he said, " do not ask us to diminish small craft beyond the point we deem necessary for cur safety. Surely that line of policy was not so inherently unreasonable that America will even refuse to listen." Karl Balfour said he regarded the Geneva conference as interrupted and not ended. Compared with the* great issues, the differences that had arisen were small and petty.