JUTLAND BATTLE.

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume L, Issue 16321, 3 January 1924, Page 8

JUTLAND BATTLE.

“JELLIOGE VINDICATED.” NAVAL HISTORIAN “AMAZED AT HIS MASTERLY SKILL.” LONDON, Nov. 11.---“ In point of fact Jollicoe emerges from this study triumphantly vindicated, Beatty as a bold impressionist with a slight tendency to ignore inconvenient detail.” The third volume of “Naval Operations” will be read with perhaps a deeper interest than any, for it covers the Dardanelles operations and the battle of Jutland. In respect of the latter it is not’ for the layman to pronounce a verdict for or against any particular policy. But the above quotation, extracted from a review by Fabitis Junior is well worth citing as the considered dictum of one whose views are of weight. THE CRITICISM. SR* Julian Corbett, the author of this volume, as of the earlier ones, is now dead and cannot be drawn into a battle in which, judging by liis volume, he supports the Jellicco school and fully demonstrates that Viscount Jellicoo chose the better part. ■ There are, it appears, three separate criticisms of Lord Jellicoe’s. handling of the fleet. Firstly, lie is criticised for having deployed to. the east instead of to the west, when lie had steamed at full speed into the fight. , What Sir Julian Corbett shows is that as a matter of fact Lord Jellicoo did not know wliero the German lleet was, that Lord Beatty, who should have known, was seven miles west of his reckoning, while Lord Jellicoe was six miles east. In view of the man in the street, the errors balance, and there is ns much blame as praise to be allotted to both the great naval leaders. SERIES OF ACCIDENTS. But Sir Julian Corbett shows that, on tho scanty information at his disposal, Lord Jellicoe deployed in the only way possible if he were not to give Admiral Scheer every advantage of position. Tho same series of accidents which prepared the 'Unexpected appearance of the enemy, spoiled Lord Jellicoe’s manoeuvre, since it had to be checked to allow Lord Beatty to get clear in liis passage across the battle front. But tho supporters of tho dashing school of tactics lay moat stress on what they consider was Lord Jellicoe’s failure to rise to the occasion when Lord Beatty gave bis rousing signal: “Submit van of battleships follow battle cruisers. Wo can then cut off the whole of enemy's battle fleet.” What arc the facts, as brought out by Sir Julian Corbett’s careful study of all the available material? The main fact is that at the very moment this signal was issued, Lord Beatty had lost sight of the enemy and was still looking for it, and he had even omitted to give his own position. It is made abundantly clear that Lord Jellicoe was promptitude itself in following up Lord Beatty’s signal. Within 17 minutes, Admiral Jerram bad bad the order, and did bis best to find the battle cruisers, but not having Ixird Beatty’s position was unable to find them! “CHEATED OF VICTORY.” The charge lias been levelled against Lord Jellicoe that ho was wrong in turning away to avoid German torpedo attacks, during which and under cover of the smoke-screen, the Germans got away. But “Naval Operations” shows that the Germans only escaped on their second attempt, and that tho first torpedo attack was met successfully. Tho inability to keep in touch with the German fleet was unfortunate and duo in fact to errors in giving its position to Lord Jellicoe. “Fabius Junion” sums up the view which “Naval Operations” gives us of this great naval engagement-: “All the smooth fictions about the Battle of Jutland wither in the light of the facts, ... “It is impossible not to remain amazed at flic masterly skill of Jellicoe, who, constantly placed in unforeseen positions no less by the inevitable errors in signalled positions than by the boldness and address of his adversary, repeatedly read the situation aright,' and was only cheated of an annihilating victory by adverse conditions.”