HOW ROOSEVELT SCARED GERMANY.

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume XLIV, Issue 14446, 5 November 1917, Page 5

HOW ROOSEVELT SCARED GERMANY.

CHICAGO, Sept. 28. Colonel Roosevelt to-day gave his own version of tho secret conferences he held with the German Ambassador m 1902 relating to the occupation of Venezuela by Germany, an incident that then threatened to bring on a war between Germany and' the United States. Colonel Roosevelt told the story for the first time, ho said, m an address at a luncheon. "It was about a year after I took office," Colonel Roosevelt began, "Germany was then engaged as she had been for years m striving to extend her dominion all over the world. She had m view certain chosen positions m South America. That was why Germany was the strongest foe of the Monroe doctrine. She aimed to turn South America into a German appendage. Venezuela at that time had a dictator named Sastro, commonly known as the 'Monkey of the Andes.' "I was determined! that Venezuela should not become a German possession. Germany said it was not to be permanent and did. not define what was meant by permanency. I permitted John Hay to write a number of notes and then decided to handle the matter myself. I sent for the German Ambassador and said to him: 'This Venezuela question has been going on long enough and I can not afford to let it get to the point where it will cause trouble for this country.' At that time England, I thought; was backing Germany. I paid little attention to England, but kept my eye on Germany. It was the last flicker of England's antagonism to the United States. I called the attention of the Ambassador to the fact that Germany had' a squadron of warships near Venezuela threatening the mouth of the proposed Isthmian Canal. I demanded a statement pf what Germany meant by temporary possession, saying I did not propose to have any ninety-nine-year leases. The Ambassador told me he did not feel he was at liberty to discuss such an important question. The conference wound) up with the following ultimatum: 'Tell your Government that m ten days it must arbitrate the matter or I will send Dewey down there.' Thirty days before I had! ordered Dewey to take our •ieet into West Indian waters, just for a friendly cruise, You know. " 'I can not send such a message, Mr President. I do not tliink you realise what it means," the Ambassador replied. "'You think it means war?' I asked. " 'I do not want to say what I think,' was the reply. " 'If it means war, you have chosen the one spot where you can not fight us/ I replied, and then I showed by maps our commanding position. "When ho retired I sent word to ,Dewey to bei ready to sail on an. hour's notice. About a week later, the Ambassador called on me and talked about the weather and tennis, and when I asked about the Venezuelan answer, he admitted that he had not dared send the message. . "I then told him that instead of allowing three days that remained for an answer I vvould order Dewey to sail m forty-eight hours. He told me it would be an awful thing for this country. " 'Yes, but it will be more awful for your country,* I replied. "Inside of thirty-six hours he came back smiling and said he had received instructions from the German Government that they would arbitrate.''