Poverty Bay Herald. PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING. GISBORNE, THURSDAY, JUNE 4,1916. WAR PROBLEMS.

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume XLIII, Issue 1407, 1 June 1916, Page 2

Poverty Bay Herald. PUBLISHED EVERY EVENING. GISBORNE, THURSDAY, JUNE 4,1916. WAR PROBLEMS.

A careful perusal of English newgpapersf shows that for eighteen months j>a'st 'there: . have been -b\v6 schools, of -iniilithry thinkers, 'differing completely jinthiiir opinion ,as tne^sb.und. "order ibf expectation and efforts 'in '.connection Avith the future, conduct^ of. the war. One school, at -first -a mhiority even' in England but now strong. -eygn^in France, ilield that the wholo. war should be' regarded as one; that the.:logic of siege war and siege craft should be accepted and applied, oh; "a vast '^ scale. . \Tlie, outer defences', of the •Centrat (Empires and Turkey should*- be* ' assailed at the weakest points and overthrown • then tlfe 'inner wall slioiild be breached ;'{tnd fihally the German citadel should be invested and reduced by the concentrated 'efforts of: all the besiegers." The main idea is that Turkey should be decisively attacked and knocked, out of' thestruggle as soon asi possible; that the ve)*y vitals of Austria Arould be then attacked, and that Germany, deprived; of her ambitions ' as ; completely as of: he^r colonies - and the- sea,. . would b^ brought toreason. The; Allied would M> making sure of something all the time ;aijd would .progress steadily, towards* the final goal- Tliat was at the back of. the pn Constantinople via, I Gallipoli— a splendid ! 'conception' ruined, |by weak and fumbling execution which' I issued from divided counsels; and conflicting authorities. The .Eastern plan was never thoroughly supported, because it c seemed too slow: . As jl matter of" fact, with stronger handling, as every T oiie t admits\(now, it would have shortened the war by a year. The Western plan held the field in theory and practice until recently, arid according to a well-informed' correspohdnt the. hard facts of the deadlock existing from, the Vpsges to the sea are threatening- to dislodge it. In all the armies the professional leaders have rebelled for long against the gririi mockery by which the siege -war reduced everything to a strategical standstill v in the West, amidst the endless ditches an'd dug-outs The, Germans were the first to face the miserable truth. Early, last year they settled down to the defensive on • the West, only hoping and praying that pur 'side would launch a: general offen-' &ive, which the enemy was confident of being able to dash to pieces. The Germans were holding ground they had seized, and could wait with more complacency. . For the Allies, tlie moral ahd mental problems .were much more difficult. Tlie French/ at heart, burned to clear their own' sepl and Belgium. The British were, as ardent; Both the staffs, in the Western field at first ab-* horred the . Gallipoli 'adventure, .' and, grudged /every man and. :gun diverted;, to it.- ' They fully, coitnted a year ago/* On being able to break 'the German's-in-the West. Had they been right, all

the guns and ammunition which Fiance and Britain conld muster ought to have been concentrated on the West. Com plete success there would, of course, have realised all subsidiary aims in other theatres. Neu.ve Chappelle ...was the first experiment, but there, was' ni/ "througb. H break.;\;::Agaiu the attempt was made on a far\larger scale, and with desperate, sustained energy .by the Fivench in the battles of Artoi?. There was no "through break." Tt was. argued that staff work had not been perfected, that more colossal stores ofmunitions, must be accumulated. Aftei preparation for months the third effort was*, splendidly made last September in Champagne and at Loos, and there was no "through break." After' that the romantic vision of smashing up the enemy's lines and 1 launching masses of cavalry on his traces to complete the work of destruction died !a ' ' natural death. The; lingering tradition of the old wars was buried. . There was now a. new theory, which may bo called that of the gradual and progressive., offensive. ThcS experiments, had shown that after a sufficient bombardment, first ahd 'second, lines' could.';. be' stormed at relatively slight loss. Infantry was no longer 'to* be the sovereigh of battles. The gun was to' lie the king of battles aiid -the. infantry' its follower. Drum fire advari'cte-T-iubving" up "'the ':'.- massed artillery -^ l dilim '" fire again --f- advance "again— this 'was [to be ; the '■ future rhythm of «,the -new.' offensive, :s)ow but sUre. So much 'J or theory. Quite unexpectedly, while some keen minds ftmbng the Allies were meditating this niethod, the Germans Wer"e -the first to adopt it. They experimented with tremendous thoroughness at Verdun. The preparation this time was of a magnitude before, -inconceivable,, carried Out by more two , tho ; usand guns, nearly 'half ; of VhichV 'were ; -of the heaviest calibres, and ragged, from Binch to ;17-n«h:'''-'''''F^r.-thV-''firit'' few days the 'G ernian S i 'thonigtit-: iha't ''they had solved tbV{pS*oblem< \aV ; last and found the isecret of breaking 'the .trench lines in the West. ■ Their Ahiighty 'batteries threatened to act like giant feet flattening ou'tj everything ' i# ' 'front \of them. It was a delusioit. .Great is Kxupp's, great is' the .gim'- ; but greater is; the unconquerable heart of man. |.i. If wjeight of fire could obliterate resistance, Ypres salient^ much smaller and. more disadvahtageousb/ placed than the Verdun circuit, would haye ceased to be in British hands) .nearly a, year agg.^^Even tlje, intensified 'unparalleled orde ! a;l < at Verdun was withstood by tho Fremh. New tactics in defence countered the hew offensive. Since the first few"' days the Germans have *-gaihecT practically nothing. With all their guns they have not piade progress at the rate of a mile a, month.; sure, secret of breaking trench ' lilies ha^ not been found at Verdun. t But the grim lesson has worked bol!h ways. .It^lias proved that the advantage on "the ".^ide of the defensive is enormous. It is realised that the Franco-British forces could only assail the .carefully , prepared German lines in France and 'Flanders With a, prodigious sacrifice of men and material. Tlie Russians are not in u very dissimilar position; they are* faced along their extensive front by defensive works of the. most elaborate and formidable kind, backed by- excellent communicatibnaV Tlie Russian's' recuperation has. been marvellous, . Ijut they_ ape only 'half -w'ay HpWards ti^fe development of their:: 'ultimate' strength'^ They: sire in ho hurry,;. By 1 nexpsnfrih^ they will ;ikv&' ft,OCO,ooo^eq^'ppVd; nieff withrt^artiliery/and all artinivinitioti ,lvto' match.'. ':"' With- time .'they -"'can.' db ; their part of the work arid' enable, the Aliieg iii the West to, do theirs.! if; the latier have equal. v endurance — gr,ini-,, and ..farsighted patience » enough— -between' the North' Sea and the Vdsges, : whilst emulating and co-operating with Vthe Russians in, sufficient activity, in: that common, field, or in the operations' of all the Allies — the south-eastern, theatre— through which lies the absolutely sure "line of .approach to the . vitals,<Jpf tlie Central Ehapires. , On. that .lin<C the correspondent' goes on' to assert, liotlir ;idg could stop the Allies if they were; resolute. The Ottoman Empire, 'once completely mastered^ ..= the if .movement tln*ough the. Balkans vworil^ be deadly td /.the .'Empires, : for it would thrust in from the south- thrpugh the main lines of their*; dispositions east and west. In Armenia,., the' 1 G^'aiid Duke has shown what card be done.- If the Western Allies would use thefr sea power to co-operate definitely with Jiim everything could '■[ be y done 1 , and sbpherj than is now generally imagiped. By cq-operating from. Cyprus, occupied by, Lord Beaconsfield with prophetic vision tfor a' future base,' Britain aijd France cduld make stireof joining hands with tlje'- Grande .Duke, What .;.,» then? Armenia, Mesopotamia; v Syria t and thei whole Arabuv world would 'be cut off from the Ottoman Empire. It is known fOr certain that; Tui'l^ey v has alread^rjiad enough and " that such a blow irbuld brmg the Young Turks "and Porte to teVms; ■'■ The ; Allies at Salonika; and ' in 1 / with .#e, reconstituted Army) 150,000 strong, .have more than 6CjO,OCsn<m'eir/:^ witli v the Pwiissian&*frOni: Hthe;. Caucasus^ .ah'* .'these forces should be able to eliminate. 'Turi key in • Asia -altogether from, the struggle. v Next f "they ' cote. 1 - as certainly make W*e of Constantinople and reopen the B^ack Sea. Next, the Gi."and : Duke hinisel f . cpuJ|dl cross the .Bosphbrus and take command in' tlie Balkans. ,In that peninsula the troops of : .the ■■■. Grand, Alliance alone, would number— after certain convenient readjustments— at least a million. But things would happen. Rumania would strike in on tfte side of the Allies, the .Bulgarian people wduid change stdfes Wid*!rniers* the, Greeks would mote .with the great tide; the Italians now . forced back * r j? m ~ . Trentino;. would- : . recover mobility and would h% able .Ifor : the first time to bring;, their reseryes into play. Above all, 'pisrhaps, Russia by time would*; hSLye^ahpther couple ■ of million men throtigh ':Rumania and the Black , Sea; full military 'contact would, be established' between" her main armies #uid; all .other' forces of tile Allies. : JRfje .ipositiort of AustiMaHungary would -'/become hopeless. The Whole great dernjan system "of defence in Gen trar. Europe would be broken through , : from ;flie .sou^ll. Tlie! German? could ho .longer, reinforce, tiieii* front between the' Vosges and the sea. 'Nay, they would have, to weaken it; t Theui indeed; the Franco-British armies would borne to'- •■•their-' own in' the -West and their ;-' success would .be the crowning, act of the whole^nighty drama ol' Armageddoji. fSvicii is the: plan of crtm.v paigu that; ; i's discussed in England to-day," and it is_. felt that 'if Russia . but', holds^' firWvaganjlst i eyery German onslaught this, the method described will have proved he-

fore the end of another year to be the Allies' line -of; victory.