ELINGAMITE ENQUIRY.

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume XXX, Issue 9646, 22 January 1903, Page 3

ELINGAMITE ENQUIRY.

♦ THE COURT'S FINDING. COMMENTS ON THE SHIPWRECK. i The full text of the judgment of the • Court in the Elingamite enquiry is to hand, and we make v the following extracts : In the ship's company there were 18 men who might be looked upon as thoroughly skilled in seamanship and boat work, twenty men probably were able to : handle, boats, and eighteen men who were / accustomed to the sea, and would be more or less useful in a boat. All these 56 men were supposed to be drilled in lowering boats. At 4 p.m. on Saturday, the Bth, it was discovered that the patent log had foul- ! ed, and no reliance could be placed on it to denote the distance run. The speed was therefore guessed at by the master and the second officer, and' they estimated it at 12 knots, although during 1 the previous day a speed of 12^ knots had I been shown, and there were no conditions to indicate a lesser speed. At 10 a.m. on Sunday the fog had so increased that not more than two ship's lengths ahead could be seen. It is necessary to here consider what was the position of the master at this particular point of time,, His safety depended on his not having deviated from his course, anil not having over-run his distance. Since the wreck of the Wairarapa. in 1894, no master should plead want of knowledge of currents off the Three Kings, but the knowledge of strong currents and set in the locality of the Three Kings, Cape Maria Van Dieman, and the North Cape, has been common to seamen in these waters for many years past. The New Zealand Pilot mentions the fact, and the charts indicate it. The master could not rely on his log to indicate the distance run, and he could see no land, light, or mark by which to ascertain his position. One means he had of averting disaster, and that was by sounding. Tf less than 100 fathoms was found, he would know he was in danger, he could then feel his way, and his chart would enable him to estimate the. degree of danger. He had on board Sir William Thompson's Patent Sounding Apparatus, and he says Ik- gave orders for it to be prepared, intending to use it at 11 a.m. He did not use it, and the disaster to his ship was the result. At 10 a.m. the engines were slowed clown to "slow speed," giving, it is said, a speed of 4£ knots, but the Court is of opinion that, considering the number of revolutions, viz., 44 per minute, the pitch of the screw, 18ft 6in., the fairness of the wind. ; and the probable current, a considerably greater speed was attained. Although the master had found at noon on Saturday that he was two or three miles northward of his course, he appears to have allowed nothing for set during the succeeding period of 22 hours, but at 10 a.m. on Sunday he altered his course to N. 80 E. true, which would put him still more to the northward, and more up to the Kings. He offers no reason for this alteration, except that he found a southerly set on a previous voyage, and lie judged it wise to make it. He had no reliable data on which to found a reason for so doing ; he did not know his speed accurately, he had taken no special measures to ascertain it from the log after 4 p.m. on Saturday; he could see no safe distance ahead, nor had he ascertained his speed when going "slow ahead." He was making for a passage between the Kings and the mainland, which is fifteen miles in width, if calculated on an area of safe water. The vessel struck at 10.45 a.m., and almost immediately it was apparent that recourse must be had to the boats and rafts. . . . The stewards and stewardesses did their duty well. Naturally lliere would be some confusion, or seeming confusion, when 136 passengers were obtaining and fastening on life-belts, but no panic, or even disorder, appears to have taken place. The work of lowering the boats was not performed well. • There was more confusion and less discipline than should have been the case, even under the stress of the situation There were 56 male members of the crew on board ; if these had been properly distributed every boat could have been got out in a few minutes. The seamen should haw been mixed with the other members of the crew, so that a proportion of each class should have attended to each boat. Evidence was given of periodical boat drills having been held on board. Accepting the statements made as to these drills as accurate, it is apparent that no thorough or efficient drill was held. What occurred was this : The whistle for boat drill sounded ; some of the men turned up round one boat, the small dingey, and it was hoisted out of the chocks to 'the rail ; the rest of the drill wa.s "taken as performed," and an irksome matter of fonn was considered as having been gone tlirough. When the occasion arose for testing the value of such drill it showed its inefficiency. No compasses were kopt in the boats ; the compasses were kept in a locked box on the bridge, and to this fact may be attributed the loss of many lives. No. 1 boat, the starboard forward life boat, capable of carrying 50 people, was lowered amid a good deal of confusion ; the life line fouled, the falls acted imperfeetly, and the disengaging gear did not work. After smashing against the side of the ship for some time, the falls were, eventually cut, and some twentythree people, including six children, got into the boat, and Captain Reid, an experienced seaman, who was a passenger in the ship, took charge of the boat under the master's authority, and immediately pulled off to find a landing on one of the islands. Captain Reid says he wanted others, especially men, to come with him in the boat, but the master ordered him away. This was a most regrettable- error of judgment. Before so large a boat should have left the ship, only half filled with people, it should have been ascertained what other boats were' available for those people left on board. The boat left the ship in a dense fog, without, a compass or provisions, and the reason given for not putting compasses into the other boats could not have applied at this time to No. 1. The compasses were in a box on the bridge, and could have been obtained. There was a dense fog prevailing at the time, and the chances of. finding the wreck again, with or without a compass, were few. Captain Reid had with him in this boat, four of the ship's company, six male and seven female passengers, and six children. It was doubtful if any of the port boats could be launched, and as it turned out, it was a fatal mistake to send or take a large boat away from the ship half loaded. If a mistake was made in prematurely leaving the ship, a very courageous attempt was made to redeem it the following day, but it shared the fate of most attempts to so redeem failure at a crisis. .Captain Reid was, however, successful in rescuing the forecabin steward from a perilous position on a rock. No. 2 Boat. — This was a large liieboat on the port side. SeveraJ attempts were made to lower it, but without success. Had the tackle been in proper order, and had there been a prompt and disciplined effort, there seems to be no reason for supposing that this boat could not have been launched.. . . No. 3 Boat. — This was a starboard lifeboat. She was lowered after some difficulty with the tackle. The. chocks would not open, and were broken out, and the falls were cut when the boat was in the water. Because of the difficulty with the tackle the boat was badly damaged in the process of lowering by being bumped against the ship's side. . . . No. 4 boat was one of the smaller port lifeboats, and the. fact that she was lowered speedily and got away shows that No. 2 could also have been lowei"ed if the tackle had been in proper order. The fact that. No. 2 boat was released by the ship sinking and saved many lives does not exonerate those responsible for the defect in the tackle from blame. No. 4 is said to be capable of carrying 35 people, and about that number are supposed to have been in her, but it is significant, that of these seventeen were members of the. crew. The third officer was in charge-, and there is no evidence to show jf' she was damaged at all in lowering or wiien she left the wreck. As nearly as can be ascertained she had twenty-five passenger*, the first engineer, third officer, two able seamen, two trimmers, and five stewards and cooks. She passed out of sight in the fog and has never since been heard of. , No. 5 boat spoke the mils, and there is contradictory evidence as to whether there was a refusal to help those on the rafts. The purser says he did not refuse to take the stewardess from the raft or to tow the raft on which the stewardess was. The. boat was not damaged, but is said to have leaked and shipped a good deal of water. There were no compasses in any of the boats, and probably the loss of No. 4 with its occupants and much suffering to the. occupants of the other boats and rafts arose from this 'omission. The compasses wero kept in a locked box on 'the bridge, the key to which was in the chart, room. The chief officer says he tried to get the compasses, but the box containing them Wfi« washed overboard ; but, if this is true, jfc could not have happened while the boats wej*g. being got out, as there was no great rolling for some time, and no seas swept the ship for some 15 minutes after she struck. The chief officer was himself swept off the ship at the. last., and it must have been very shortly before this that he looked for the compasses. There was ample time to get the compasses before the boats left the ship. The chief officer suggested that the practice of keeping the Bout compasses in the locked box was approved by the surveyor in Melbourne, but that officer in an official communication repudiates t&is suggestion, and alleges 1-hat at his kst suryey, in April, 1902, the compasses were in the four lifeboats, and were Mien hi good condition. Dr Goldie, who was on the smaller raft, says they had two oars, and that they asked the boats which came near them to take them in tow, but met with no re-

sjponse. . . The larger raft had a more terrible experience. . . Mr Wefcherilt says they besought the purser in No. 5 boat to help them and lo take Miss .\ic(.luirk into his boat, but. neither rocjmwfc was granted. The, boaUs would not come alongside, apparently from fear of being n^hed. One boat 'had sail on. and Mr • WWierilt is positive (hat this boat could see|them, but passed them by. l;he engineers say in effect' that the vesj selj was wrecked before the order to reV | CI J 0 'i CVUI '. V ot ' lOT witness called says ' tha. r there was ample time to reverse and 1 get [dear afte.r the order was given, and ; before the vessel touched at all. Unfor- ; tuna/tdy, the chief engineer is lost, and, tJiei*fore the evidence of the person responsible for the condition of the engines is not obtainable. . . The second, third' and fourth engineers gave evidence. They say that the engines were in perfect orderj but did not reverse when the reve.i-s- --; ing 'gear was put on. Thev sav the ves- ; sel bumped simultaneously with' the order to leverse, and that the tanks discharged thrrtugh the air pipe.s into the engineroom they suggest that the propeller was held externally, and that therefore, the engines could not reverse, or that the vessel was so much injured by contact with the land as to throw the tunnel shafting out, of alignment The Court is of opinion thai- there was no grounding astern until after the vessel struck forward. If the stern of the vessel wa.s held, she would not have swung stern into the rocks. The vessel was .gliding smoothly ahead at at least 4£ knots, and probably at a considerably greater speed when the order to reversV came ; her engines stopped, and she contimieU to proceed with the weigh kli« had o|ii, until she st ruck bow on. No one on board, outside the engine-room, perceived any touching or bumping, such as deposed to by the engineers, and their story is at variance with the known conditions existing at the time. The engineers nil told the same story, advanced the same theory, and showed "the same reluctance to speak candidly about the engines. Whetlier the engines were jammed, or whether the steam had been so lowered as to prevent sufficient power being applied when required to reverse or whether there wa.s a.ny other cause for the defect, the Court is unable to sav but it is clear that owing to some defect "in tinengines, the reversing gear would not act and the chance of thus saving the vessel was consequently lost.