FEEDING THE ARMY.

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume XXVI, Issue 8696, 15 December 1899, Page 4

FEEDING THE ARMY.

> PREVIOUS SUCCESSES AND FAILURES. ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. THE LINE OF COMMUNICATION. 3 (From the Special Correspondent of the b Standard.) t The Duke of Wellington prided himself t less on his tactical skill than on his success r in feeding the army under his command. 3 During the Peninsular war more orders c were issued on the subject of feeding the 1 troops, and on the working of lines of comb munication, than on any other question. I The subsequent military history of Great b Britain furnishes us with some less fo \n- ) nate recollections. When our troops i landed in the Crimea, the transport for the 3 whole army consisted of 75 mules and a , few carts, while ihe supply Bervice was J equally parsimonious. The consequence : was that although the army before I Sebastopol was encamped within six or I seven miles from the harbor of Balaclava— . filled with ships and stores— our men were . dying for want of food and fire. This • criminal folly is not likely to be repeated. s Instead of 75 moles and a few carts for an E army, each battalion of 1000 officers and s men under orders for active service has, t according to the scale of mobilisation, 16 ) vehicles, 68 draught horses, three pack I animals, and 32 drivers. How great is the . change since 1854 may be judged from the ■ Soudan campaigns iv 18SS and 1893, when F we had an army .operating in the heart of I Africa with a single line of communication i extending over a thousand miles from the I base. i It i simpossible to lay down any binding f rules for providing for an army in the '■ field. Many things have to be taken into l account besides the physical characteristics of the country. There are questions of railways and waterways, of animals and forage, as well as of climate" and distance. Of some of these conditions in South Africa we have already gained experience i in the Zulu and Matabele wars. But much r has yet to be learned, and can be taught i only by personal examination of the route i over which the transport and supplies i have to pass. The general character of t he scheme has, however, been determined. Assuming that we have a single line of ( communication through Natal to the Transvaal frontier, Durban will be • the | base, and Ladysmith or Newcastle the i advance depot. [Estcourt has been the i most advanced depot yet established.] Sir > Edward Chichester— who was in command . of the squadran at Manila when Admiral i Dewey had his memorable passage at-nrma . with the German naval officer — is responr sible for the disembarkation of troops and | stores. The work will be difficult, for no large ships can safely enter the harbor at Durban, on account of the bar and the i heavy seas that tend to diminish the depth of water. Horses have to be landed .in lighters — a costly and tedious operation, t which is entrusted under military and t naval supervision, to a civil contractor, j As soon as the stores are received they ) will be sorted and sent to the front by . rail and road. The strain to which these l means of transport will be subjected may be inferred from the faot that the weight of stores and supplies required each day , for an Army Corps is 300 tons, j The single line of railway from Durban j winds northward through hilly country, . there being a steady ascent along its entire v route. Ladysmith, 189 miles from the a coast, is 3284 ft above the sea, while ] Newcastle, 2GR miles distant, stands at ? an elevation of 3890 ft. The carrying capacity of this line is accordingly I limited, and must fall far short of the I requirements of 300 tons a day, not to speak of men, sick and wounded, and [ ammunition. This deficiency has to be made up by waggon transport along roads [ which, in many districts, are little better , than tracks, and are . likely to become r quagmires in the rainy season, which, in Natal, is already upon us. Waggon trailJ sport will be by mule and trek ox. Owing , to the rinderpest, these animals are rather , scarce in South Africa, and large purchases t of mules have been made in Spain, the South of France, Chicago, and elsewhere. \ Fifteen thousand mules have been re- , quisitioued, and will be used for drawing waggons of American pattern. These I vehicles are strongly built, and weigh from 16c\vt to 22cwt, their track being '. sft 2in. Twelve mules can carry a load of , 40001 b, aud the transport will be worked in spotions of twenty waggons. Mules can do well on crushed mealies or maize, but should have from three to four hours' grazing if they are to be kept in condition. Tim ration is 81b a day on the march, 60 that each section will need half a waggon-load of mealies for every eight hours' journey. Trek-oxen, though not suitable for regimental transport, will be used on tho line of communication. They have only two ! recommendations. They can find their ' food on the veldt, and when no longer able 1 to walk or to carry anythiug you may eat ' them, as our men did when shut up in ■ Lucknow and the Alem Bagh. The disadvantage of tnis method of transport is • its extreme slowness, and the liability of ' the animals to sickness. Great care has to ' be taken in feeding the oxen, and in regu- ' luting their hours of work. Fifteen miles 1 is a good day's march, and in the rainy [ season it is doubtful whether 10 miles can : be exceeded. Trek-oxen are never in--1 spanned for more than eight hours a day, 1 or for moro than four hours at a time. 1 They must rest for two or three hours 1 between marches, and should never work during the hour after sunrise or during tho 1 hour before sunset. These drawbacks are not without compensations. Sixteen or 18 ; -ixcn will carry a load of from fiOOOlb to ' 9i 001 bin a tented waggon weighing about •J9e\\t. Each team has a leader, or voer--1 louper, who walks in front and guides, while the driver encourages the cattle to 1 pull together by cracking a raw-hide lash 12ft or 18ft long attached to a bamboo stick. In order that the strain may bo diminished as much as possible, anil tho most economical use may be inado of the transport, the line of communication will be divided into sections. Tho distance between these sections must depend on local circumstances, though, as a general rule, whore no attack is apprehended, and an escort is unnecessary, the intervals should be short, six miles loaded and six miles return being considered a good journey. The advantage of this system over the ordinary convoy is obvious. Transport riders become intimately acquainted with the road, and travel without the usual impedimenta of camp equipment. It is at once economical and efficient, and should enable the .Army Service Corps to maintain continuous and unbroken communication between the base and the army in the fluid. Between Maritzburg and Ladysmith will be established a central depot, where eacli company, or battery, or troop, will lind its horses, mules, and equipment rcudv. There will consequently belittle delay in moving tho force to the front. A rcßt camp and a remoun tdepOt have also been prepared at Durban. Two hospital ships will lie in the roadstead, one of them being stationary, while the other will steam hackWiirds anil forwards to the Cape, which is healthier and cooler than Natal. The medical transport from the Brigade field hospitals to tho field hospitals at the

advance depot, and thence along the lino of communication to the bnse, is curried out by the Army Service Corps. Rap'd transport of the sick and wounded is of the greatest importance, not only for themselves, hut in order that any accumulation of invalids at the advance depot may be avoided. The sectional stations ought to be invaluable for this object. The magnitude of lln lit or involved in these preparations, mil th-> Lrt sight needed to meet any unexpected contingency, can be measured only by those who have personal experience in organising great masses of inon and material. Upon the working of the lines of communication depends the Bnccess of a campaign. The duty of a director of transport and supply is, therefore, of the highest importance. His sphere of duty extends from the base to the trot>ps at the front. It is indispensable that he should be a man of infinite industry and resource, as well as of varied experience. These qualities may certainly be ascribed to Colonel Ward, Assistant Adjutant-General to Sir George White, and to Colonel Richardson, who will act in asimilar capacity to Sir Redvers Buller. Both have served in African campaigns, and have proved themselves masters in the difficult art of organisation.