End of Libel Case.
At the Paten Court this morning, Mr Wray, R.M., gave decision in the criminal prosecution by the Mayor of Patea against Mr J. Black, proprietor of the Evening Nctvs, for alleged malicious and dofamatoiy libel.
The matter arose out of a contract for printing borough bye-laws ; the Mayor accepting a tender, and the defendant charging him in the newspaper with “reviling the dignity of his position, and imparting to one tenderer what (he only other one had proposed saying also that “unless tenders are kept secret, there is no use calling for them.” This language was complained of by the Mayor as imputing that he had disclosed the contents of one tender to enable the other tenderer to got the work. Other defamatory writings in defendant’s paper wore put in ns showing a continued malicious intent to defame the Mayor in his office. The question for the Court was whether a prima facie case had been made out showing that the passages complained of were popularly understood in a defamatory sense, whether those passages showed a malicious intention to defame, and whether the ease ought to bo sent for trial.
Mr Barton conducted the case for the prosecution, and Mr Hamerton for the defence. The case had been before the Court many clays, and tlie defendant bad not yet been called on for evidence in justification. Mr Wray read a lengthy written decision, setting forth the main facts educed in evidence, and then quoting cases bearing on the law of libel. The sting of the News article was said to He in its tail. The particular sentences appeared to admit of two constructions —one alleging that revelations were made after both tenders were sent in ; the other before one of them had been sent in. The first question was as to the nature of the publication complained of ; and he quoted from Broom’s “ Legal Maxims” with respect to libel and slander, that the rule as educed from an extensive class of cases is : Where an occasion exists which, if fairly acted on, furnishes a legal protection to the party, the actual intention of the party affords a boundary of legal liability. If, on the contrary, he used the occasion as a cloak for maliciousness, the occasion can afford him no protection. Another maxim was that in communicating defamatory statements by one party interested to another party having a corresponding interest (respecting the character of servants &c.), the occasion would be privileged. Sir James Fitzjames Steven’s “ Digest of Criminal Law,” referring to the publication of matter honestly believed to be true, contained this maxim : “ The publication is not a misdemeanor if the defamatory matter is honestly believed to be true by the person publishing it, and if the relation of the parties is such that the person publishing is under any legal, moral, or social duty to publish such matter, or has a legitimate personal interest in so publishing it ; providing the publication does not exceed in extent or in manner what is reasonable on the occasion.”
Although it is shown (continued the R.M.) that in disposing of this contract the Mayor acted with impartiality and fairness, and was actuated solely by a desire to forward what he considered was the interests of the borough in getting the bye-laws printed at as early a period as possible, it is not the less true that he Went to work in an irregular and altogether irregular manner ; and as it seems to the Court, he should have refrained at that stage from repeating the particulars of the News tender to the proprietor of the Mail. The evidence established the fact that neither the Committee nor the Mayor had authority to call for or accept tenders ; that the Mayor opened and accepted the lowest, on his own responsibility, before the time for sending in had expired ; and that after intimating the acceptance he also revealed certain particulars which should not have been disclosed until they became public property, or until the whole matter had been referred to the Council. These facts I consider, together with the public position of the informant as Mayor, and the position of the defendant as an interested party and a public journalist, establish the right of criticism, and the occasion rebuts the inference of malice, and puts it on the informant to show that the defendant was actuated by personal spite. It is for the general interest that the public actions of public men should be freely discussed and keenly criticised ; and it is peculiarly the office of a journalist to expose apparent abuses and irregu-
laritica that come under his notice. While ho can have no right to impute sordid motives or dishonest conduct, wo ought not to look so strictly to the expressions used as to the general intent of the publication. Tlio R.M. concluded by saying a civil remedy is still open to the complainant ; and aggrieved persons should, before instituting criminal proceedings, first seek the civil remedy (hat is open to them. A jn’inia facie case for an indictable offence had not been made out, and the information would be dismissed.
Mr Buton : lias your Worship considered—
K.M. : 1 have disposed of the case. Mr Barton : Did your Worship consider the subsequent article, and the conversation as related by Mr King ?
K.M. : I have dismissed the information
Permanent link to this item
https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/PATM18820221.2.9
Bibliographic details
Patea Mail, 21 February 1882, Page 3
Word Count
896End of Libel Case. Patea Mail, 21 February 1882, Page 3
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