INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

Otago Witness, Issue 3833, 30 August 1927, Page 7

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

PROFESSOR BLAKESLEE’S

VIEWS.

Professor G. H. Blakeslee, Professor of History and International Relations of the Clark University, Massachusetts, and Visiting Carnegie Professor of International Relations, gave an address in the Allen Hall at Otago University on the evening of August 22 on “America in International Relations.” The attendance was good, the hall being nearly full.

Mr W. J. Morrell, on behalf of the audience and of many beyond the audience, extended a hearty welcome to the Visitor.

Professor Blakeslee, who' spoke for 80 minutes, said that though America differed much in geography and nationality, and though the outlook of the Atlantic jeoast was totally different from the provincial outlook of the farmer of the middle west, or the views of the Pacific coast, he thought that on many issues there was an American point of view. In the American attitude to Great Britain there was no sentiment, but there was a deep sense of "amily security. Professor Gilbert Murray had come to the conclusion that the relations of America and Britain rested on “a deep sense of community of Interest, with frequent ‘-urfacc irritations.” America had a tie to Canada, to Australia, and to New Zealand; they had all been built up by the labours of pioneers. Then there was the attempt to hold the racial integrity of the people. Australia and New Zealand had taken steps years ago to limit immigration, ft was only since the war that the United States had realised that the national type ©f America was in danger of destruction from a flood of immigrants from the East and from Central Europe. New Zealand had 98 per cent, of British stock; Australia had a similar percentage. A professor of a Canadian university estimated that Canada was 52 per cent. British. In the United States 57 per Cent, of the people had come fr m British stock, so the States would actually seem to be more British than the great Dominion.

The Americans, he admitted, looked upon the Monroe Doctrine as a kind of political fetish. This doctrine aimed at a policy of defence: it insisted that no non-American country should be allowed to enter American territory and seize land or government. A similar measure had been passed by the Intercolonial Conference at Sydney in 1873 (when it. was feared that Germany had eyes on the Pacific) against the acquisition of dominions in the Pacific by foreign Powers. Avoidance of the political disputes of Europe was another strong policy of the United States. It wanted no parts in the quarrels of the Continent. Canada and Australia, though parts of the great British Commonwealth of Nations, had also shown an unwillingness to do this. Deep down in the American political consciousness, rightly or wrongly, w:s the idea of keeping out of the “periect horror” of European politics, and the sentiment had been noted many times since Jefferson gave utterance to it. Even Great Britain had shown a desire to keep out of European affairs, and the Atlantic was rather larger than the Channel. The beginning of the war was viewed with horror and dismay by Americans, not one in a thousand of whom believed there was any need to enter the conflict until it came to involve the principles vital to democracy. There were two reasons why the United. States entered the war—the first, to protect her commercial rights; and the second, to join the great crusade for the well-being of herself and the world, “to make the world safe for democracy.” The United States wanted to keep out of the quarrels of Europe, hut desired tc help with the financial and economic rehabilitation of Europe. Though she had not joined the League of Nations, she had as many official repiesentatives at Geneva as any nation, and she was for all practical purposes a member. She had never been so friendly toward ths League, and never so determined not to become a member. If the States of Europe would form — a central league for the settlement of their own political disputes, America would bo

delighted, and would then be able to take part in the questions of world-wide interest. Year by year she would co-oper-ate with the other nations, until she became an associate member of the League. Until the States entered the war she had given dollars, while th- Allies had given soldiers. Since the soldiers could not be called back, then surely the dollars should not be. There was a strong movement for an entire reconsideration of the question of the indebtedness . University leaders were making a strong appeal, and though it meant that the money would have to be raised by taxation if the Allies did not pay, there was a supporting- feeling in the country. In a year and a-half Germany would be at the peak of the payments she was supposed to be able to make, and this might be a suitable time to reconsider the question, m order to further the spirit of Locarno. The great problem of the future was how nations could live together in a world rapidly getting smaller, while they were jostling each other more each day. The British Commonwealth of Nations had shown the new idea in which peoples might live tog-ether harmoniously ; the great factor would be the friendship of the English-speaking nations; and the Premier of a sister dominion had made a plea for a better understanding between the English-speaking peoples, because, lie said, “o n that understanding is based the hope of civilisation.”—(Applause.)

On the motion of Mr J. B. Callan, a hearty vote of thanks was accorded Professor Blakeslee for his instructive