BATTLE OF JUTLAND

Otago Witness, Issue 3674, 12 August 1924, Page 22

BATTLE OF JUTLAND

ITS STRATEGY DISCUSSED. LORD JELLICOE'S CAUTION. LONDON, August 5. The Daily Express’s special corresponient at Oppeln interviewed Admiral von Seheer, and obtained disclosures relating io the Rattle of Jutland which were not made in von Scheer’s war book. Admiral von Selieer said that the Germans tvere completely surprised to encounter the British fleet, as they only intended a cruiser raid. He declared that Lord Beatty’s wide turning movement would have had far-reaching effects if it had been properly supported by the British fleet semi-circling the Germans, “i had to attempt to save the German fleet from destruction, and this was only possible by the manoeuvre of burning all together, which was magnificently carried out, though it was hitherto unprecedented in any war. ’’ Admiral von Schee» declared that if Lord Jellicoe had wished to bring the German fleet into action on the following morning he could have done so. “If Lord Jellicoe had deployed to starboard instead of to port," he said, “he would have brought a decisive action and prevented our turn altogether,—the manoeuvre which alone saved us. It would have been worth Lord Jellieoe’s while to have lost half his ships, if thereby he could have utterly destroyed our fleet.’’ A senior British officer who was present at Jutland, interviewed with reference to Admiral von Scheer’s statement, agreed with the suggestion that Lord Jellicoe should have deployed to starboard instead of to port. This would have placed the Germans between his own and Lord Beatty's ships, when it would have been improbable that any of the German ships would have escaped. Admiral von Seheer, however, was quite wrong in stating that an action could have been forced on the following morning. The Germans were then inside the horns of the reef, and the British fleet could not be interposed. Lord Jellieoe’s decisions in the light of later knowledge might appear to be wrong, but they had to be instantly taken when Lord Jellicoe was carrying a heavier responsibility than any other individual in the whole w T ar, for if the British fleet had been lost Britain would have been out of the war. DIVERGENCE OF VIEWS. LONDON, August 6. Admiral von Schecr’s comments on the battle of Jutland have aroused much discussion. Commander Bellairs, a member of the House of Commons, declares: “Lord Jellicoe represented the mind of the Admiralty, which aimed at avoiding danger and the loss of ships. The old Nelsonian touch had gone. I forecasted in 1900 that in the event of a big naval engagement our fleet would turn away, resulting in an inconclusive battle. Unfortunately, Lord Beatty, who did not conform to the ‘safety at all costs’ school, commanded the weaker unit at Jutland or the Germans would have been decisively engaged and probably destroyed. If Rord Beatty had commanded at Jutland the W'ar would have been shortened by two years. There would have been no Russian revolution, and no submarine menace. Doubtless it would have cost a few ships but this would have been a small price for avoiding the agonies and hardships of the last two years of the war.” Admiral Sir William Grant, on the contrary, expresses the opinion that the circumstances of the engagement and everything that had since been made Known had thoroughly justified Lord Jellicoe. It had to bo remembered that the Germans had always been most anxious to discredit Lord Jellicoe.

Mr Archibald Hurd, writing in the Daily Telegraph on Admiral von Seheers criticism, urges the publication of Captain Harper’s account of the battle. Mr Hurd says: “This is Admiral von Scheer’s second impression of the action, and it is quite unlike his earlier book. Not a few qualified students consider that if Lord Jellicoe had taken the course suggested he would have exposed all the armies to defeat, as a disaster at sea in May, 1916, would have made the Germans masters of the world. Admiral von Seheer makes the hypothetical suggestion that Lord Jellicoe s deployment should have been to starboard instead of to port, and he prepares a diagram to illustrate his after-thought, but he failed to measure the distances between two fleets and their relative speeds. These serious oversights at the head of Lord Jeliieoe’s line would have mercilessly exposed it to the concentrated lire of the German fleet, and experienced naval officers bold that this would have been an act of madness. Admiral von Scheer’s plan would also have compelled Jjord jellicoe •to fight an action without Lord Beatty's battlescruisers at the head of the line, which would have meant a total breakdown of his whole tactical-system, especially as Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas’s swift ships had necessarily deployed in the rear of the other battle squadrons. Admiral von Seheer also says that Lord Jellicoe should have turned towards the onrushing torpedoes, though as the speed of a torpedo rapidly declines this seems a peculiarly hazardous proceeding. As a fact, Lord Jellicoe adopted the course which all admirals, British or German, took during the war. Lord Beatty adopted this manoeuvre at the Dogger Bank when his squadron turned eight points from a submarine attack, and Admirals Hipper and Sturdec and other admirals acted similarly. Jutland was the crucial test of every decision of the Admiralty for a decade. The British fleet reduced the German fleet to impotence and can well be content with its record. SIR PERCY SCOTT’S VIEW. LONDON, August 7. Admiral Sir Percy Scott, commenting on the revived Jutland controversy, declared: “The truth about Jutland has never will be. Everything told about it is incorrect; therefore I am not participarting in the controversy/’ LORD JELLICOE’S REPLY. LONDON, August 9. Lord Jellicoe, in the Evening Standard, answering von Seheer, denies the hesitation in commencing the action at Jutland. He claims that the difficulty of maintaining the action was duo to the Germans’ persistent retreating under smoke screens.