WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

Otago Witness, Issue 3571, 22 August 1922, Page 24

WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

SIR JOHN SAI.MOND’S REPORT. THE NAVAL PROBLEM. (Fhom Ocb Own Correspondent.) WELLINGTON, August 16. The report of the Hon. Sir John Saljnond, New Zealand delegate to the Conference at Washington on the limitation of ajrnwments, was tabled in the House of - Representatives this afternoon. It gives, as was only to be expected, a remarkably lucid account of what the Conference actually accomplished. THE NAVAL TREATY. On this subject a good deal of what appeared in the report has already been made public in the newspapers of tho world. Tables are given indicating the capital ships that are to be retained bv each of the Five Great Powers. The British ships, and their individual tonnage, are as follow: —Royal Sovereign 25,750, Royal Oak 25,750, Revenge 25,750, Resolution 25,750, Ramillies 25,750, Malaya 27,500, Valiant 27,500, Barham 27,500, Queen Elizabeth 27,500, Warapite 27,500, Benbow 25.000, Emperor of Lidia 25,000. Iron Duke 25,090, Marlborough 25,000. Hood 41,000, Renown 26,500, Repulse 25.690, Tiger 28,500, Thunderer 22,500, King George V 23,000, Ajax 23,000. Centurion 23,(XX); total tonnage, 580,450. 'There is a brief reference to the ships of the different nations that are to be destroyed. The capital ships to be destroyed or otherwise eliminated from tihe battle fleet of the United States are 30 in number. This number includes 15 new battleships and battle-cruisers, which are •till in process of construction, and on which the American Government has already spent no less than 332,000,000 dollars. The total tonnage of these 30 ships is 845,740 tons. Tho British ships to be destroyed, or rendered unfit for battle, are 80 in number, with a total tonnage of over 400,000 tons. These vessels include the battle-cruisers Australia and New Zealand. DESTROYERS AND SUBMARINES. Interesting reference is made to the proposals regarding destroyers and submarines. The Treaty contains no restrictions either jn respect of their size, numbers or aggregate tonnage. It was proposed by the British delegation that the submarine should be abolished altogether and declared an Illegal weapon of war. This proposal gave rise to a discussion which excited much public interest and disclosed a wide divergence of opinion between the Powers concerned. The argument of the British delegation, based on the experiences of the late war. was that the possession of a fleet t>f submarines leads inevitably to a form of Warfare against non-combatants which is faiconsisb ;it with the dictates of humanity. These arguments did not prevail at the Conference, but they made a considerable impression on public opinion, and it is not Unreasonable to hope that at some future time, before the memory of the Lusitania has faded from the public mind, the total prohibition of submarine warfare may find It place in the law of nations. In the meantime, although the unrestricted building of submarines is still allowed, severe restrictions upon the use of such weapons have been imposed by another of the Washington treaties, to which reference is made later in this report. On the failure of the British proposal to abolish the submarine, it was intimated by the British delegation that so long as such weapons existed it, was Impossible for the British delegation and Empire to agree to any limitation upon the number of cruisers, destroyers, or other auxiliary craft available for anti-submarine Warfare. 'Hie fact was disclosed in the Course of this memorable debate that although the average number of Gorman Ilibmarines operating at any one time in lie neighbourhood of the coasts of Great (ritain had not been more than nine or 0, it had been necessary for the British Government to maintain an average of not Jess than 3000 anti-submarine craft to meet the menace so created It was a matter for regret that it was not found possible to Impose any limitation upon the construction ©r use of aircraft. The discovery of the art of flying, and the terrible possibilities involved in its future development for the purposes of war. constitute a menace to the cause of civilisation, and humanity in particular. It is to be observed that the progressive increase in tile power of these •eiial weapons is a growing danger to ships ©f war and renders uncertain the future •fficiency of those fleets to which the Nava! Treaty relates. The Treaty, notwithstanding all its advantages, is open to the criticism that, while restricting the further development of the battleship, it leaves unrestricted the growth of the most formidable enemy which that ship may have to preounfer in the future.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TREATY. .The primary purpose ■*'‘d significance of the Treaty, Sir John Salnioncl states. Is financial. It is designed to put un end to the ruinous cost of competition in natal armaments. l?ven before the war this cost irag serious, but since the war it lias become intolerable. The experiences of the >ear, and particularly the lessons learned at the Rattle of Jutland, have shown the need of very important and very expensive changes in naval architecture in order to give adequate protection against gunfire, torpedoes, mines, and aerial bombs. To meet these new requirements the British Government was preparing before the Washington Conference to build four new battleships, which would have been the most powerful vessels in the world. Each of those would have had a tonnage approaching 60,000 totts, and would have cost about jBICsOGO.OOO. Similarly, the American Government was at tiie dale of ihe Conference building no less than 15 capital ships of the latest type, while Japan was building, cur was ready to build, no less than 14 of these formidable engines of destruction. No sooner arc such ships built than they begin to grow obsolete, by the advance of Scientific invention, and by the building of lliore powerful vessels bv rival states, and tins process of ruinous competitive expenditure goes on indefinitely. The Washington Treaty has nut u happy end to it. He adds that the I icaty is not an agreement to preserve the peace, nor is it designed for that end. Nations are not prevented or •ven disco raged from going to war with •aoh other by a mutual and proportionate Reduction in the scale of their armaments, nor would the Treaty, save in respect of .tertain minor details, have any- continuing operation in tiie event of an outbreak of ?nr. In such a ease there is nothing in the reaty to prevent each belligerent State om fighting at sea with all the instru-

ments which its power and wealth place within its reach. The Treaty in no way limits the weapons with which States may fight and defend themselves; it merely limits the weapons which they may prepare for that purpose in time of peace. Still less may the Treaty be properly regarded as a step towards total naval disarmament. No such impracticable idealism inspired the Washington Conference. . The agreement of tho Great Powers to destroy a large part of their existing fleets, and to impose strict limitations on the building of new ships of war, is not a confession of wrongdoing, or a promise of amendment. It has no ethical significance. Th e right and the duty of every State to make proper provision for its national safety by land and sea, remain as undisputed and as imperative as before. The Washington Naval Treaty doubtless has behind it, more especially in the United States of America, a considerable volume of pacifist public opinion, which regards that Treaty as a step towards the total repudiation of any such right, or duty of national defence, and as a practical recognition of the wrongfulness of military and naval preparations in time of peace. It is not on any such ground as this, however, that the Treaty is to be justified. It is based on the reasonable and practical consideration that the purposes of national defence are better served by an agreed scheme for the limitation of armaments in fixed proportions than by a scheme of unrestricted and ruinous competition in time of peace. The abolition of such competition protects the nations, not only from an insensate waste of their financial resources, but also from that permanent risk of war which results from the temptation to strike before it is too late, at the growing SUBMARINES AND TOISON GAS. After reference to the provisions arrived at in regard to submarines and poison gas, Sir John adds this conclusion : “How far these or any other rules of warfare will prove adequate to restrain belligerent Stales from doing in the grim necessity of war whatever their interests may b e thought to require, is a question to which no confident answer can be given. At, all events this is clear that if any signatory, or adherent Power, violates these rules in any future war, it will stand convicted before the civilised world as guilty of a grave breach, not only of humanity, but of public honour ” OTHER TREATIES. The report, deals also briefly with the treaties regarding the Pacific, with respect to China, Shantung, the Chinese Customs, and the resolutions relative to China. GENERAL. In some general observations Sir John ‘-■almond says the true significance of the presence of representatives of the dominions at that Conference is not that those dominions have acquired, for either international or constitutional purposes, any form of independent status, but that they have now been given a voice in the management, of the international relations of the British Empire, as a single, undivided unity, relations which were formerly within the exclusive control of the Government of Great Britain. Th e position of the do minions at Washington was essentially different from the position which they occupy at ap assembly of the League of Nations. By the special and peculiar organisation of that body tli e self-governing colonies are admitted as members in their own right, as if they were independent States, although by constitutional and international law such colonies are merely constituent portions of the Empire to which they belong. They are entitled by express agreement to be treated, so far as practicable, as if they were independent, but no such principle was recognised at Washington, or exists except for the special purposes of the League of Nations. The dominion delegates were present at Washington for the purpose of being heard and consulted as to all matters there in the issue concerning the Empire, and of approving and confirming on behalf of. their own dominions the decisions of the King-s general plenipotentiaries, and of testifying such approval and confirmation ny signing on behalf of their own dominions the treaties there negotiated. UNANIMITY OF BRITISH DELEGATION. It appears from the report that no question ever arose on which it was found impossible to secure ultimate unanimity of decision within the British delegation. If. unfortunately, it had been otherwise, and if any dominion delegate, either of liis own motion or under the instructions of his Government, had found himself unable tc agree to some proposal which commended itself to tile delegation, it would then have been necessary for his Majesty’s genera! plenipotentiaries from Great Britain to determine in their own discretion the action k e biken. If they were of opinion that the matter in dispute wa s of such minor importance, or related so exclusvely to the dominion itself, that the views of that dominion ought to be acceded to for the sake of unanimity, this result could have been attained either by a modification of the terms of the proposed Treaty, or by excluding the dissentient dominion from its operation, unless and until it chose, through its Government or Parliament, to give its subsequent advertence. If, on the other hand, it was considered that the matter was of such general importance that dissent on the part, of a dominion should be disregarded in the interests of the whole Empire, it would have been within the authority of the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain to assent- to the Treaty on behalf of the Empire as a whole, without regard to such dissent. The fact that the delegate of one °f British dominions had failed to sign tiie *1 reaty on behalf of that- dominion would have had no effect on the international operation arid obligation of Ihe Treaty. Any difficulty so unfortunately resulting would have been matter for negotiation and settlement within the borders of tiie Empire itself, but would have in no way affected the external relations between the Empire and the other contract inv Powers. °