“LA BELLE FRANCE.”

Otago Witness, Issue 3518, 16 August 1921, Page 25

“LA BELLE FRANCE.”

HER SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS. PRESENT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. OPTIAIISTIC REVIEW BY PROFESSOR PRINGLE. “Ihe Economic) Outlook in France To- ■ hey” was tlie subject of tho lecture delivered I by Professor W. Henderson Pringle at the j Lniversity on the 12th. It was the fourth of the series of six public lectures Iliac Pruj fessor Pringle is delivering weekly un modJ ern social movements. .Again the audience j was large enough to fill the lower Oliver | classroom, and its members followed the j u-ddross with the keenest interest. Proiessor Pringles began by recommending certain books on modern French social and political conditions. Two that should be read together were Air J. E. C. Bodley’s book entitled “1 ranee’’ and Air Robert 1 Dell s "My Second Country,’’ which pul the em; basin somevvnat differently. He commended also tlie writings of Miss BelhamEdvvards. Speaking' of tint general political development of France in the last 100 years, lie said wo took France as one of tlie great , democracies of the world. Vet- French ; democracy . was essentially different from either British or American democracy. This vo..hi be understood only by going backin her history. Before 1789 France was centralised to a degree not experienced in any other _ European State. The Revolution brought many changes in tho structure of pollllcs and habits of thought of the people, b.iL to this day her system of Government remained highly centralised. This could be seen in the exceedingly important position occupied by Paris in the government of every part of France, In England, on the other nand, local government was often ; much more important than the central lwyernment. Tho English police force, fob in controlled. The control E A\o lteha , l u l - !eon Showing during the i “A O ' J 4’ eai .' s » b,lt any extension cf its conu oi was viewed with the gravest, distrust by the local authorities. In France ihe ; president of tile department was the probet not locally appointed, but appointed by Lie central government. The councils of tue 47 departments could not act in lnany lespeo:without tho sanction of their presinient roprcsentcd lJle central govern- ! /The French conception of pa I riot ism was sii.itp.ly marked oi f f ror ,i the British. J n the lust mace it centred round the State and m the second round the country. The . tafo counted for very little in the Eim- ! T~ mi,; in s conception of patriotism. Mil I ranee to be an employee of the State j convived a certain senes' of j . i rc.li: A not enjoyed oy other members of the commumty A Frenchman felt a love for La Belle France,” for the nation as occupying I he soil of France. That was why they felt so bitterly tlie loss of A Pace ! as ? h, "/ h /.if body of th© nation had been manned. I ho English conception was very ! mneront. ihe Scottish concepts, n was ■ different again, dwelling much on the in- ; tuvKiual locality. This centralisation of . 7 rj . inoe ] V ul cont * nu cd thronoh all the difIcmig phases of French life since 17q>9 : during which time she hud wi.-sed throu'-h j no fewer than 14 revolution's. A marked 1 ,oatl, R‘ of . E' 611011 P°btiC3 to-day was tho I T/nuth ot the power of the executive of 1 j , Government The French President j very different powers from those of tho i / nicncan President, He was an elected kmg after the British type. The real ! responsibility for the management of the Stale until recently rested with the Prime Minister. But. M. Millerand a- year ago insisted on taking much more control pn r , ; ticularly in foreign policy into his’ own nands. I mil gave a very large measure i f 1 the control of French political life to the } hend of tho oxeoutivo. | this centralisation of government was ! nor urea fly reflected in the economic life of Trance. In many respects France held the premier position in industry So fains design and technical merit were c-on-i cernetl _ Paris enjoyed a position of 1 superiority. But there was much Jess in- : torchange between tho different economic | districts into which France was divided ; than between those of England, and that ! want of eonomic unity was another part of die he: ii ,igc of France from the past France was then divided into great provinces, each of which had tho light to levy untiles on Lie others. Jn England there ; had been no mierruption of the free passage of goods from one end of the country ; to the other. j France had gone through many changes j during the nineteenth century. The .system of her social life had been roundly altered, but since 1671 L ranee had gone on tvondorfuJki without displaying great economic enterprise and without being overwhelmed i:v events. Both the Revolutiomu v and Napoleonic wars and the Eranco-Pmssian war and profoundly influenced French life. 14he had never recovered lrcm the loss oi life during the Napoleonic wars. Before them her population was 24,000,000, and now it was only 36,000,000. ’There was a j certain amount of vitality discernible in France. 'lhe Franco-Prussian war had perhaps a- greater effect in modifying in some important particulars the economic and political life of the nation. The great quality that had enabled France to survive so much was the thriftiness and steady persistence of purpose of her peasantry. 'The characteristic catchword in England durj ing the last ' 150 years had been j “ liberty.’/ In France it had been J “equality.” French law leaned very j much _ more to equality than did the ! English law. 'I hat meant a diff used sense of equality, and with it there went a c-er-j tain steadiness of purpose. The French | peasant never kimw defeat. 1 ranee had not. the developed economic and banking institution* that Britain enjoyed. Her banking system did not enable her wealth to bo so highly concen- • tratod and used at a particular point as British wealth could. Consequently her inj elusirios were not so enicvntraied ,She had great ie hiiicnl skill and artistry, but i not tlie mass production characteristic of I Britain, and especially of the United States, i In .England it was particularly easy for the | wage earners to combine, but in Franco | they were not only under legal disabilities that lasted right down to 1885, 1 u ! their combinations had not been so permanent as tlie British. After a particular I grievance had been remedied the trade union dwindled away. The French workman was swayed by some ideal he could immediately realise, but he had not the solidarity or willingness to submit to the 1 discipline of his class characteristic of

the trades unionist of England. Tha different history of trades unions in France was the result of the entirely different social history behind them. Speaking of matters more closely affecting France at tho present time, lie said that at ihe outbreak of the war neither her political nor the economic system was in a healthy condition. in French politics tho parly system as we know n ua! not exist, ■livery crisis through which Prance had passed had left its deposit’, as it were, on Lie party system. iiie r rencli Chamber bad re dec ted in a separate practically every political change Unough which France had passed. Now ihe situation was iurtiur coinxdicated by tlie economic factor. The difference in the parlies in the two countries \\as symoolised by the different arrangement of tue two Houses. K very party group in 1< ranee embodied a certain phaso ot past political life, excex>t tlio.se which had L_en formed as a result of recent economic ino\ements. ,\ govoriiiiient in h ranee was always loimed by a coalition of different groups. Hence ihe fall of a ministry did not necessarily mean the fall oi all its ministers. This iended towards continuity, though possibly in fa* t there had been greater contmuffy* in polite s in Britain than hi France. The wm- liad effected French polities and life. Franco had not the economic means of conductin'* war that- Britain had. Before the outbreak ( d the war the balance of trade France was only some £50,000,000. Franco had been investing very largely in Furope. She had eight- or nine hundred million pounds in Russia and two thousand millions represented the holdings of French capitalists in foreign countries. France had had to rely on vast importations and had to mako enormous borrowing with the result that the ball nve of imports over exports m 1919 was £840,000,000. Since 1915 .-lie had importe I £3,300,000,000 more than she had exported. these enormous imports had in part been paid for by the sale of Trench securities. She hud practically parted with all her foreign securities. Her holdings in Russia had practically disappeared. At the present time France owed an enormous debt to Great Britain and to the l nitod States, and she had to meet this in spile of tile fact that slip had parted with most of her capital abroad, and that not tor three or four years yet: would Northern France he as productive as it was before the war. Her public indebtedness of £10.000.000,000 was 40 per cent, more than the indebtedness even of Great Britain. They would find in those hare facts an explanation of —lie did not say an excuse for—the present obscure and somewhat timid policy of French statesmen. She did not quite know what she had gained by wliat she had come through, except that she was the first Rower on the Continent. The I rencli pet-pie during the last two years had been worsting naivi to make good as far as they could tlie losses of the war. They were determined to produce and to save as much as possible. The fundamental ■ question in France was not economic, but political. She was etill afraid of Germany. Her population was stationary. She was afraid that soon the contest would have to lie renewed. Iler political policy was to make Germany as weak as possible by encircling her by a number of Rowers. This was non a po,icy that Britain could possibly support. It would leave Germany impotent to pay her debts or to organise her life. Germany must be recognised as a permanent factor in Europe. France was too great a country to bo greatly affected in the long run by the mistakes of her politicians, and tha habitual outlook of her people would prevent her from taking an irreparable stop. They had not the same sense as we had of tile necessity of living together in an organised community, hut tlie future of I ranee was assured. Without any formal affiance —which ho could not help thinking would be riisastrouto both countries Great Britain couV! not allow Europe to lose so valued and cultured a nation, which had contributed so mudi to human thought and tho advance cf common civilisation. At tho close of his lecture the professor, who was cordially applauded, remarked that lie was not going to out., r into a newspaper controversy over those lectures. “ f have neither the time nor tlie energy nor the inclination for it, but.” he added. “ I ant quite prepared to stay here till a quarter to 10 answering questions.” In answering questions for three-quarters of an hour. Professor Pringle said that in many important particulars tlie British Foreign Office required reorganisation to meet the needs of (lie new era. The official ambassadorial class was not a class that should control foreign policy. The duty of the expert was to advise and not, to control, and that, applied to other walks of life. He agreed that tlie land system of the United Kingdom was far from perfect, and that we had much to learn from France in this matter. The average French peasant worked too itard and had none of the social enjoyments and amenities. There was no doubt that before 1914 Franco had carried the idea of protection to inordinate lengths, and that was tlie cause of some of her troubles. He was optimistic about France because of her enormous recuperative power and because he believed that, tiie realities of the situation must sooner or latpr come home to the people. France had more coal than she could use at the present time.