NAVAL WARFARE.

Otago Witness, Issue 3517, 9 August 1921, Page 15

NAVAL WARFARE.

REPLACING OBSOLETE SHIPS. LONDON, August 3. In the House of Commons Colonel L. C. M. S. Amery (Financial Secretary to the Admiralty), m submitting the Nasal Estimates, including provision for four capital ships, said the latter was neither a policy of competition nor a challenge, but. was simply for the replacement of obsolete ships. A few hours of actual lighting in the late war had’ sufficed to revolutionise ideas regarding the type of battleship that was necessary. Other Powers wire not slow to make use of that experience. There were at present under construction whole battle fleets of a type into nparably more powerful than any afloat at the battle of Jutland. Japan would have eight battleships completed bv 1525, and eight more completed by 1928 ; while the United States would have 12 of these supreme engines of war, each over 43,000 tons, completed by 1925. The construction of four ships could not. under the circumstances, continued Colonel Amery, be regarded as provocative On the contrary, the Admiralty might be open to a charge of allowing the navy to fail below the standard of other Powers. This was a risk only justified by the general financial situation and the desirability of avoiding any step which would invite competition in armaments on the eve of a conference, the object of which was to avoid competition.—(Cheer.-.! In the matter of design, said the Minister, we are not trying to steal a march on other Powers. We are only bringing ourselves up to date with modern developments. The new ships would be battlecruisers of the Hood type, but they would be improved in regard to armaments and protection in the light of the war experiences. They would be equipped with 16in guns. The day of the capital submarine or capital aeroplane had not yet arrived ; therefore the capital ship remained the pivot of naval warfare. These ships would be constructed in private yards, as the Government dockyard? were rot large enough for ships of the Hood size. <t was intended, as soon as the finances permitted, that the Government dockyards should be brought up to date. Colonel Amery, continuing his sneech on the Naval Estimates, said: “If we fr.il to construct now, we accentuate the present position of inferiority. Great Britain must declare that she will not accept a position of definite naval inferiority. Let ns

be sure we can relv on our own strength, and never allow our sea power to fall to a point when we. are forced to make entangling agreements to avoid the path which leads to the greatest disaster, not only to ourselves, but to the whole world.” The vote was carried. Mr Asquith referred to a resolution which was passed by the Imperial Conference, deferring the commitment of a naval policy until after the result of the Washington Conference. He said that he gravely doubted if it was necessary or wise to commit ourselves to these new ships. He put their cost at £30X00,000, which was a serious commitment at the moment. Continuing, Mr Asquith said it would be the worse possible policy to appear to regulate our construction by the United States. He hoped tile House would not be induced to enter into a wasteful and criminal competition with those with whom we hoped to become permanent Allies. \\ e ought only to build the ships necessary to provide against the risks of interrflption in international communications. Mr G. Lambert (Labour) ccnten led that the new ships were unnecessary. Mr Lloyd George was going to Washington a? a dove of peace, but lie was building afterwar dreadnaughts. Mr X. ML ean (Labour) moved to reduce the vote by £IOOO. MR CHURCHILL’S WARNING. LONDON, August 4. Mr Churchill deprecated aggravating tho situation by extreme language. He said it was an astonishing fact that, excepting tho Hood, the leading capital units had not been reinforced for more than seven years. In the meantime two other navies had revolutionised their construction according to the lessons learned in the iata war. “If we delay another year we shall sink to the level of a third rate naval power, and may never recover our old position. Y\ e would exist then as a great power only on sufferance. Our power to guide events for good would cease, and we could not extend to the dominions that protection which we have always been proud to extend. Our hopes for the success of the Washington Conference aro of the sincerest, but unless we could assume that the ships now being built iu Japan and America would be scrapped, any disarmament decision at Washington would be irrelevant to the decision reached to-night.”