WHY THE GERMANS LOST THE MARNE.

Otago Witness, Issue 3514, 19 July 1921, Page 52

WHY THE GERMANS LOST THE MARNE.

THE DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR. It ha; been proved beyond doubt that the battle ot the Marne was the. deciding factor of the war. Precise details of the German plans and the instructions issued to the various armies have come to light since the armistice. Lieutenant-coionei DForster and Captain E. W. Sheppard, the official historians of the war for the War Office, have in the National Review summarised the storv from German and Allied despatches, and Major-general Sir F. Maurice, K.C.M.G., in his hook, “Forty Days in 1814,” supplies a vivid narrative covering the period from the first disastrous collision at Moils to the turn of the tide at the Marne. —Von Kluck Disobeys.—To understand the course of events it is necessary, however, to bear n mind the composition of the right of ihe G erman army and of the Allied left. -fi le former had at its extremity the First Army, commanded by \ on Kluck, and next to that the Second, commanded by Von Buelow. The Allies had at their extreme left the Sixth French Army, commanded by Maunoury, next to the British under Sir John French, and on the right of the British the Fifth French Army, commanded by Franchet d Esperey. As the Germans swept onwards from IVlons over northern F ranee, a breathless world believed that Paris was Von Kluck’s almost certain prize. But on September 3 German G.H.Q. issued orders that the French were to be cut off from the capital and forced back to the southeast. To give effect to this design. Von Kluck was required to march m echelon jehind Von Buelow, leaving Paris on his Tight. Whether unwittingly or otnerwise, Von Kluck a’lowed himself to be betrayed Into a flagrant disobedience of orders, for two clays afterwards he was actually 10 miles ahead of Von Buelow instead of being in his rear. This inversion of his instructions helped, as we shall see, a little later to enmesh the German forces in irreparable misfortune. —The Gap.— On September 5 the Germans changed the plan of September 3. The idea of using Von Kluck and Von Buelow to roll up the Allied left was abandoned, and in a belated fit cf prudence they were ordered to watch the east front of Paris, where lay Maunoury, a lion awaiting the hour to spring ! This change of plan involved the withdrawal of the First German Army from the south to the north of tlje Marne, while the Second should of necessity face west instead of south. These evolutions entailed deadly peril for the Hermans, peril to which they were destined to succumb. As events developed, Von Kluck found his forces hopelessly scattered, while Von Buelow, thanks to the other’s disobedience, saw his right flank exposed. A yaw fling gap was thus opened between the First and Second Armies! suddenly, like a veritable resurrection from the tomb, the British were reported advancing towards this gap, burning for their revenge, and playing an essential part in Joffre’s masterly scheme. Then came the dramatic transformation. During the retreat from Mons, Joffre ; alert and clear-headed, had applied himself vigorously to building up a new force, to be used as opportunity arose. This force was the famous Sixth Army under Maunoury, lying, as already explained, on the extreme left of the Allied line, thus constituting the natural shield to Paris. The Germans as they advanced ignored Maunoury and ignored the British. That either could he used as a serious weapon of offence never, apparently, entered their minds, or, if it did, was not adequately considered until it was too late. Joffre had builded well and builded patiently, to be in readiness like a true Si/‘her for his opportunity. 1 r, '.he evening of September 3 the plan of battle was determined upon. It wa>. decided to throw Maunoury’s array agaiivit Von Kluck’s flank or rear, while the French Fifth Army turned and attacked Von Buelow. What of the British lyhg. between these two French forces; —Joffre’s Appeal.— That question was answered on September 5 when General .Toffre visited Sir John French at his headquarters at Meiun. His last words to the Fingiish general were: “It is France that supplicates you !” Confident of his men. confident of his country, confident of his allies, Sir John French answered with immortal chivalry. The British had finished their retreat : they would take their full share in the Battle of the Marne! On the evening of September 5 the Germans noticed the first mutterings of the storm that was to destroy them. Maunoury’s army advanced from Paris and early the next morning it became obvious to Von Kluck that energetic steps were needed to save his right flank from being enve'oped. As the situation became more menacing, during the 6t'n, Von Kluck called up reinforcements, with the result that, in the interval between the 6th and the morning of September -9 the British had no German troops m front of them except a weak rearguard ! - German Ineptitude.— On the 7th Von Kluck, thoroughly alarmed bv the progress of Maunourv’s attack, called to Von Buelow for the assistance of the Third and Ninth Corps. The commander of the Second Army felt bound to comply, but the effect was to expose his own right flank in a dangerous manner and to create the fatal gap to which allusion has already been made. Facing that ga.p wa.s the British Army, elated at the prospect of so speedily

settling accounts with the foe, and the French Fifth Army, led by the redoubtable Franchet d’Esperey. By the evening of September 8 the latter had captured Marchais, Montmirail, and Vanchamps, and hid right had driven Von Buelov.-’s left centre back across the Petit Morin as far as lionuay. Turning from the battlefield to the council room, the curtain rises on a drama, within the drama of the battle, quite astounding in its revelation of German ineptitude in contact with a prodigious responsibility. General Von Moltke, Chief of the Imperial Staff, was at the time ill at Rpa, and he had instructed Lieutenant-colonel Hentsch, of G.H.Q., to consult with the army commanders and “take action on his own responsibility.” Hentsch arrived at Von BueTow’s headquarters on the evening of the Bth, and there discussed matters with the commander of the Second Army, who e troops had been so soundly whipped by Franchet d’Esperev during the preceding hours. That evening Von Buelow issued orders for the retirement of his right on the following day, and a continuance of the attack by his left. The following day, however, brought new anxieties and new and far-reaching decisions. The_ British on that never-to-be-forgotten morning inflicted upon the luckless chief of the. Second German Army a staggering surprise. Von Buelow says in his despatch: When, therefore, early on September 9, the enemy in several columns crossed the Marne between La Ferte-sous-Jouarre and Chateau-Thierry, there was no doubt that the retreat of the First Ai-mv was inevitable in view of the tactical and general situation, and that the Second Army mast fall back if its right flank were not to be enveloped. —The Beal Marne Miracle.— Deeply impressed by the gravity of Von Buelow s situation, Hentsch hastened to Foil Kluck’s headquarters, arriving there about midday on September 9. To the iatter’s Chief of Staff, Von Kuhl, in the absence of the commander of the First Army, he explained the difficulties in which the Second Army found itself, difficulties which had reached a culminating point with the unexpected return of tile British to the offensive. Von Buelow’s right was, he pointed out, being forced back, and a retirement of his whole army behind the Marne was unalterable. Hentsch held that it was necessary for the First Army to conform to that movement if it was not to run the gravest risks. Von Kuhl replied that she F’irst Army was then actually engaged in making a vigorous attack, and that a retreat would be a delicate operation, especially as the men were tired and the units intermingled. Hentsch, however, was adamant. Full authority was vested in him, and he exercised it* The F’irst Army should retire! Here was, in truth, the real miracle of the Marne, for at the moment when orders were given for the retirement of the First German Army that army was actually driving back Maunoury, whose left hail been already turned and whose situation was seemingly critical. In that dark hour Hentsch; Moltke’s envoy, was his salvation ! —Hentsch’s Orders.— Hentsch had fulfilled his mission well, from the point of view of the Allies! When lie issued orders for Von Kluck to retire he had made the Allies a present of the battle ! Franchet d’Esperey, with the British on his left, witnessed the dawn of September 9 amid the happiest omens for the outcome of the fray. General Maurice relates : The British columns advancing at dawn on the 9th found that r:ot°only were the bridges to the west of ChateauThierry intact, but that the enemy had made no attempt to hold this part of the Marne. ... As early as 9 a.m. the Second Corps had not only crossed the Marne, but the leading brigade of the Third Division was established more than four miles beyond the river on the Chat eau - Thier ry -L izy road. The appearance of these British troops—the British who in all the German calculations had been ignored as a beaten foe—had, as we have just seen, forced Von Buelow to the conclusion that Von K'uck’s army must retreat. The events of the previous day had shown him that his right could not stand against Franchet d’Fsperey. Now the British, on Franchet d’Esperev’s left, were pouring over the Marne —pouring into the fatal gap ! He himself was manifestly ill dire peril, but Von Kluck seemed threatened with complete disaster unless lie could extricate himself rapidly from the forces tending to envelon him. This is how the situation presented itself to Aon Bue ow s mind. Knowing, as we do. that Maunoury was being roughly handled by Von Kluck, we are aware that it is not a faithful picture. But it was that upon which the commander of the Second German Army, acting in agreement with Hentsch, decided to yield the field to the Allies. —An Amazing Blunder.—As the day advanced. Von Buelow sent a wireless message to Von Kluck stating that his right was retiring upon Datnerv? Tip. mo sa >e contained a blunder that will live in military history. As worded, it meant that there was a gap between 30 and 40 miles wide between the First and Kg on I Armies. In reality this was not so. Aon BuelowV, r.ghf was not moving on Ttamerv, but or, Dormans, 10 miles farther west—that is, 10 miles nearer to Von TClnek. It was not, however, until 9 0 hours later, when the whole German line was in retreat, that the error was corrected. At midday TTentseh. as iust stated, had reached Von K 1 nek’s headquarters. We have - seen what we now know to he the tragic obstinacy with which lie boat down the po'dierly arguments of the Chief of Staff of the First Army. Hentsch was taking no risks at a moment when a man

wlio knew how to -do so might have defeated Maunoury on the Ourcq and made the Marne the grave of the British! An hour later Yon Buclow sent out his wireless message with its egregious blunder respecting the line of retreat, a message that to Von Klu-ek must have sounded like .a. cry of despair. At 3 p.ra. the Herman batteries near Tin v ceased tire, and reconnaissance showed that the trenches in front of Pui.ieux had been evacuated. Von Kluck had thrown up the sponge. The miracle of the Marne had been accomplished. Paris was saved and Germany had lost the war! —What Foch Did.—■ Foch’s indispensable share in the victory must be indicated. He commanded the Ninth Army, operating on the right of Franchet d’Esperey. It was subjected to terrific blows by the Germans, who hoped to break through, in which event the Battle of the Marne would have ended in a further more or less disastrous retreat by the Allies. The Ninth Army yielded a little ground under the staggering impact of the enemy’s onslaught. But always its superb ranks staunchly maintained their battle array. The iron obstinacy of the Ninth ensured the discomfiture of Von Buelow and the triumph of Joffre's plans.