PATER'S CHATS WITH THE BOYS.

Otago Witness, Issue 3470, 14 September 1920, Page 55

PATER'S CHATS WITH THE BOYS.

V.—" GALLIPOLI DIARY." I could write, -with annotations, a score of Chats on this interesting book —interesting from' many points of view: classical, military, historical, stylist's, etc., — but-it is getting time to switch off, because so many other events or incidents require to be touched upon. In September, 1915, it became apparent that the Home authorities, rightly or wrongly, became convinced that the Gallipoli operations, taking it as a part of the whole sphere of activities, occupied but a minor position, though to Sir lan Hamilton it was the most essential part of the whole. On October 1 he writes: "K. believes in the East and sends his shells to the West. The reason is that K.'s beliefs are only intuitions; he believes in the same sort of way that Elijah knew certain things." Then, though knowing that the evacuation was looming up—for K. had already ordered the evacuation of Suvla Bay,—he still harped on his view of the question, for he writes: "The principle underlying the world war seems to me this: that wherever the new system of trenches, dugouts, barbed wire, can reach its fullest development there we should prefer the offensive. Whereever this new system cannot be fully developed, there the old ideas hold good, and there are the theatres for the offensive. In France and Flanders, where both sides are within a few hours' run of good railways from their own chief arsenals and depots, the new system attains prodigious power. In the Turkish Empire almost all the conditions—railways, material, factories, etc.—are favourable to the old and unfavourable to the new conditions. To me these views appear as clear as crystal and as unanswerable as Euclid. The tenacity of the new system of defence, the • pressure upon France, the apathy of a starved military opinion, the fact that all of our most powerful soldiers are up to their necks in the West, combine to keep us ramming our heads against the big pile of barbed wire instead of getting through by the gate called strait"—that is, breaking through at Gallipoli. From my knowledge of the map and reviewing the position tactically and strategically, I think Sir lan is right. As I have pointed out in a previous Chat, the French moved heaven and earth for the Allies to concentrate on France; and, like all persons who take near views, they probably suffered more than if thev had taken far views. I remember when the Australian navy was inaugurated, many were insisting that it should be kept in Australian waters, forgetting that if the Empire navy were broken up into squadrons to defend the different parts of the Empire they could easily have been attacked in detail and wiped out. The same disintegrating forces were at -work on the Western Front. The Italians would go on their own, and met with disastrous defeats; and it was not until all were put under an Allied command that victory became visible. The same principle comes into play economically. Should an American meat trust be allowed to operate in New Zealand? It wants to get a footing here to make money; but if monev-making is the object why cannot the big meat companies organise and do the business in America and bring the profits here? I remember when the Huddart-Pai'ker Company came to New Zealand. The U.S.S. Company tried to run it off because they wanted a monopolv. For a time first class return fares to Melbourne were £5 10s, and I received a return fare for less than £5. I am told that a saloon passage at the time from Auckland to Sydney could be got for half a sovereign; but no re-

turns, for before a return could be made perhaps the opposition company would have been run off and fares put up again —perhaps higher than before. So with the meat trust. Perhaps higher prices might be had for a season or two when a meat trust would be formed here, and farmers, would not only lose any advantages received by the higher values, but they would lose the benefits to be obtained by having their own arrangements to sell in America.

Big things reqtiire big men who do not worry much about the present as long as they can see success in the future; and that big success in the' future becomes a bigger success by the fact that present local conditions are ignored in the meantime. Try to bear that in mind. This is rather a long parenthesis, but it serve.s its pui-pose to remind us that men who succeed in big things do so by sacrificing the immediate present for a much greater benefit in the future. K. OF K. AGAIN.

Nowhere does Sir lan show any real bitterness. Not only were the troops to be sent to Salonika, but it appears that someone or other was anxious for a change, and Sir lan writes: "I am grateful to old K. He is trying to save me. He picked out Braithwaite. himself [Sir lan's right-hand supporter]. Not so long ago he cabled me in his eagerness to promote him to Major-general." Again: "K. wants, so he says, ' some important change.' That cannot mean, surely, that he wants a sufficiently showy scapegoat to feed the ravenous critics—or does ' it? Perhaps he's got to gain time—breathing space wherein to resume the old scheme which was sidetracked by the offensive in France and smashed up by the diversion to Salonika. Given time, our schemes may yet be resumed. The Turks are in the depths. Sarrail, with his six divisions behind him, could open the Narrows in no time. I see the plan. K. must have a splendid sacrifice; but, by the Lord, they shan't have the man [Braithwaite] who stood by me like-a rock during those ghastly 10 days." On October 5, he refers to a cable from K., saying that the Dardanelles Committee understood that Sir lan was acting on the defensive, and after giving his own interpretation of the cables which must have made the cables burn, so long and frequent were they, he lets himself go and adds: "I realise where we stand; K., Braithwaite, and I, on the verge. We are getting on for two months now since the August fighting—nil that time we have been allowed to do nothing—literally, allowed to do nothing,-seeing Ave have been given no shell. What a fiasco! The Dardanelles is not a sanatorium; Suvla is not Southend. With the men we have lost from sickness in the x>ast six weeks, we could have beaten the Turks twice over. Now Government seems to be about to damn everything—even themselves. But after all, who am I to judge the Government of the British Empire? What do I know of their- difficulties, pledges, and enemies—whether outside or inside the fold? I have no grouse against Government or War Office —still less about K. —though many hundred times I have groused." SIR TAN'S ESTIMATE, OF K. As a footnote to the diary he says —the footnote was written this year—on this grousing, and follows it with his appreciation : "I think I hardly knew how often till I came through my diary in cold print. But all the time I was conscious, and still more so now, of K.'s greatness. Still more so now because, when I compare him. with his survivors; they seem he remains immeasurable. I wish very much I could make people admire Lord K. understandingly. To praise him wrongly is to do him the worst disservice. The theme can hardly be squeezed into a footnote, but one protest must be made all the same. Lord Fisher gives fresh currency to the fable that K. was a great organiser. K. hated organisation with all his primitive heart and soul, because it cramped his' style. K. was an individualist. He was a Master of Expedients; the greatest probably the world has ever seen. Whenever he saw any organisation his inclination was to smash it, and often —but not alwavs—he was right. This may sound odd in Anglo-Celtic ears. But most British organisations are relics of the past. They are better smashed than patched, and K. loved smashing." .In this chapter, ar>tly called "The Beginning of the End," he tells us that in the first three days of October 500 were evacuated on the ist, 735 on the 2nd, and 735 on the 3rd, and adds: "Were this rate kept up it would come to 45 per cent, of our strength in one month." SIR lAN'S SUCCESSOR. By the middle of October it was announced that he had been superseded by Munro, and at tea he said/to some of the staff: "My credit with Government is exhausted ; clearly I can't screw men or munitions out of them. ' The new Commander will start fresh with a good balance of faith, hope and charity lodged in the Bank of England. He comes with a splendid reputation, and if he is big enough to draw boldly on this deposit, the army will march, the fleet will steam ahead: what has been done will bear fruit, and all our past struggles and sacrifices will live." And with that I'll leave Sir lan's volumes, though, as I have said, many more Chats could be read upon it. We know that K. of K. came out himself soon after; that the Peninsula was evacuated without any appreciable loss of life in spite of Sir lan's vision of disaster; that the Anzacs were transported to the Western front where they covered themselves with imperishable memories: and in looking back, we now know that their Gallipoli campaign had far-reaching- effects, though there were not the immediate results an ticipated.