THE INDEPENDENT AIR FORCE

Otago Witness, Issue 3397, 23 April 1919, Page 38

THE INDEPENDENT AIR FORCE

MAGNIFICENT COURAGE AND DETERMINATION.

SIR H. TRENCUARD'S EULOGY.

(Fboii Oub Own Cobbespondekt.j LONDON, January 3. Major-general Sir H. M. Trenchards despachonthe work of the Independent Force, R.A.F., covering the period from June 5, 1918, to the signing of the armistice, is a record of great enterprise which met with substantial reward, as well as of remarkable bravery and of keen and efficient work performed by the staff and all its personnel. It was in October, 1917, that the raids on Germany were begun by a small force located near Nancy, and up to_ June 5 57 attacks were made on the Rhine district, despite the severe handicap imposed by the limited capacity of some of the machines then in service. It was only after that that largo bombers thoroughly equipped for long-distance work became available in any number. With the addition of further squadrons of heavy machines a more ambitious programme was entered upon,_ but raids on Germany were at all times highly difficult and dangerous. The toll of Independent Force machines "missing" is 109, biit no risks and no losses deterred our pilots and observers, whose courage and determination are described by General Trenchard (commanding the force) as "magnificent. I never saw, even when our losses Avere heaviest, any wavering in their determination, to get well into Germany. There were cases in -which a squadron lost the greater part of its machines on a raid, but this in no wise damped the other squadrons' keeness to avenge their comrades and to attack the same target again and at onco. It is to this trait in the character of the British pilots that I attribute their success in bombing Germany." On June 5 General Trenchard took over from Sir D. Haig the tactical command of the force, and the administrative and complete control a week later. His first task was to push on and arrange for the accommodation of a force of some 60 squadrons, which work was practically completed by November 1. Previously he _ had emphasised the necessity for equipping the B.E.F. on the western front with sufficient aircraft to hold and beat the German aerial forces there; that the bombing of Germany was a luxury till this had been accomplished, but that once accomplished it became a necessity. He decided to attack as many as possible of the large industrial centres which could be reached by the machines at his disposal. The moral effect of this plan, the General considered, was very great, as no town felt safe, and it necessitated continued and thorough defensive measures on the part of the enemy to protect the many different localities over which the I.A.F. was operating. Bombing by day as well as by night Was necessary, because if the former were excluded (although it meant higher casualties) at least four-fifths of the value of night bombing must be wasted, owing to the fact that the enemy could then make his arrangements to work by day and live at a distance by night, and take other similar defensive steps. OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE. Decision had to be come to, when it was impossible for squadrons to reach their objectives well in the interior of Germany, what alternative objective should be attacked, and which attacks would have the greatest effect in hastening the end of the war. General Trenchard put railways first in order of importance, and then blast furnaces. He knew that the Germans were extremely short of rolling stock, and some of the main railways feeding the German army in the west passed close to the British front, and they were fairly easy to find at night. 550 TONS OF BOMBS AND INCREASING DISTANCES. Between June 6 and November 10 the I.A.F. dropped 550 tons of bombs —160 tons by day and 390 tons by nights-including tons on aerodromes. This percentage was due to the necessity of preventing the enemy's bombing machines attacking our aerodromes and in order to destroy the large number of enemy scouts era their aerodromes as it was not practicable to deal with thorn on equal terms in the air. In June the longest distance flown out and back by day was 272 miles, by night 240 miles; in July the distance by day remained the same, but was increased to 300 miles by night; in August the day mileage was 330, and the night 342, the highest figures "mentioned. Photographic reconnaissance by individual machines was done at a great height, with nearly always successful results, and only one photographic machine was lost during the period reviewed. In September and October the day bombing squadrons had to fight pracMcally from the front line to their objective, and from there home again; several times they had to fight the whole way out and the whole way back.

INTREPID AIRMEN. To the squadrons' keenness to avenge their comrades and to attack tho same forget again and at once, General Trenchard attributes their success in bombing Germany, "as even "when a squadron lost the greater part of its machines, the pilots, instead of taking it as a defeat for the force, at once turned it into a victory by attacking- the same targets again with the utmost" determination. They were imbued with the feelings that whatever their casualties were, if they could help to shorten the war by one day, and thus save many casualties in the army on the ground they wore only doing their duty. I never saw, even when our losses were heaviest, any wavering in their determination to get well into Germany. Long distance bombing work requires fine judgment on the leaders part to know if he perseveres to the objective, whether he "will have sufficient fuel to carry the formation home again safely. This will be realised when it is pointed out that on several accasions the machineo with only 5Jf hours' petrol were out for that time; in one case a formation was out for 55 hours, and only just managed to clear tho front-line trenches on its homeward journey. A miscalculation of five minutes would, have lost the whole formation. Ceiling was of more importance than speed for long-distance day combing work. It was essential that squadrons should fly as high as possible, and it soon became apparent that the two squadrons with the 200 tiorse-power B.H.P. engines ha 4 not sufficient power for this long-distance wort"

BERLIN THE OBJECTIVE. The 27th Group was established in England under the command of Colonel R. H. Mulock, D. 5.0., for the purpose of bombing Berlin and other centres. This group only received the machines capable of carrying out this work at the end of October, and though all ranks worked day and night in order to get the machines ready for the attack on Berlin they were only completed three days before the signing of the armistice. THRILLING EXPERIENCES. On July 31 No. 99 Squadron, under Captain Taylor, went to attack Mainz. South of Saarbrucken they encountered 40 hostile scouts, and fierce fighting ensued, as a result of which four of our machines - were shot down. The remaining five of the formation reached Saarbrucken, dropped their bombs on the station, and on the return were again attacked by large numbers of hostile scouts, with the result that three more were lost. Immediately after their return, No. 104 Squadron, led by Captain E. A. Mackay and Captain Home-Hay, went to attack the factories and sidings at Saarbrucken, accomplishing this successfully without loss. On another occasion two machines, piloted by Captain Lawson and Lieutenant Purvis, left at 8 o'clock. One pilot shut off his engine at sCoOft, and glided in on the target from the north-west, following the river. He was at once picked up and held in the beams of the searchlights, and an intense anti-aircraft barrage was put up. The machine continually changed its course, but could not shake off the searchlights, and tho pilot was completely blinded by the glare. At this moment the second machine glided in, with its engine almost stopped, underneath the first machine, got immediately over the works, below the tops of the factory chimneys, and released its bombs right into the works. The searchlights at once turned on to this machine, freeing the first one from the glare. This machine" then turned, and made straight for the works as low as the second machine among the chimneys, and released its bombs. The lights were turned almost horizontally t& the ground, arid the anti-aircraft guns were firing right across the works and factories almost horizontally. But in spite of this our two machines remained at a low altitude, and swept the factories, works, guns, and searchlights with machine-gun fire. They returned in a heavy thunderstorm. On the night of September 16-17 seven Handley-Page machines were missing. Five of these, detailed for Cologne and Mannheim, were probably unable to in the face of a strong south-westerly wind, which increased after, the machines had left the ground. The missing machines undoubtedly attacked various objectives before they had to land. On September 25 No. 110 Squadron, led by Captains A. Lindley and A. C. M. Groom, dropped over a ton and a-half of bombs on Frankfurt. They were opposed by a large number of hostile machines, and destroyed two of them. _ Four of our machines did not return, and, in addition, one observer was killed and one observer and one pilot were wounded. This was the first long-distance raid carried out by this squadron. The average time taken by each machine of No. 55 Squadron in an attack on Frankfurt was five hours' and a-half, but all 12 machines reached their objective and returned safely, only just clearing the trenches on the return, as the petrol had completely run out. Most of the bombs dropped by these machines _ burst in the town east of the goods station, _ and only one observer was killed. Captains B. J. Silly and D. R. G. Mackay were in command. General Trenchard gives numerous other ■instances of magnificent work carried out by the I.A.F. in the space of these five months.