PATER'S CHATS WITH THE BOYS.

Otago Witness, Issue 3348, 15 May 1918, Page 57

PATER'S CHATS WITH THE BOYS.

"DEDUCTIONS FROM THE WORLD WAR."

In 1912 there appeared a translation of "Germany and the Next War," by General Fried rich von Bernhardi, a military writer in the first flight, and one whom we have heard of recently as commanding cavalry on the western front. In April, 1913, I wrote four Chats on the book. In it he says: "The natural law, to which all the laws. of Nature can be reduced, is the law of struggle. All introsocial prosperity, all thoughts, inventions, and institutions, as, indeed, the social system itself, are a result of the introsocial struggle, in which one survives and the other is cast out." This is simply "Might is Right" in another setting. In January, 1914, there appeared an English translation of "Imperial Germany," which had appeared in Germany the previous year, "m the. halcyon days before the storm." This also I have given a Chat upon, and intended to give one or two more. This volume is the work of Prince von Bulow, who was successively Secretary of State for three years (1897-1900), a position in which he had been preceded by his father, and who then succeeded Prince Hohenloe as Chancellor, and held the position for nine years (1900-1909). During this time the modern aims of Germany became thoroughly denned, and became known as "Welt-Politik."

Then, last month, I gave a Chat upon "Mittel-Europa" (Central Europe), which was published as a translation in 1916. This, you may remember, is by Friedrich Naumann, who is a member of the Reichstag. This I intend to return to again. Then there are the books recently pub' lished and clearly defining the Pangerman aims, aims which, to al] appearances, are being reached in the Balkans and Russia: and some of these books I have given Chats uponi—"The German Road to the

East," for instance, the Chats upon which appeared just over 12 months ago. And now I come to the most recent one, "Deductions from the World War," by Lieutenant-general von Freylag-Loring-hoven, of the German Imperial Staff, a book which was reviewed in the Book Notices last week. (In passing it ""might be stated that the book was not supposed to leave Germany.) My remarks, however, will not cover the same ground aa the review.

The writer appeared as a Prussian j but, as a matter of fact, he is the son of a Russian diplomatist, was born in Russia, and served in the Russian army "before, at the age of 21, bo joined a Prussian Guard regiment" ; and this fact, in connection with my Chats about 12 months ago on German "peaceful penetration" of Russia, especially along tho Baltic provinces to St. Petersburg, shows how easy it must have been for German propaganda to permeate Western Russia. The translator, in his or her preface—initials only are given, no name—says: "The book is very instructive as a denunciation of international ideals, and as a warning of the plans which are being made in Berlin for the cold and reasoned applications of the war and the development of a still more scientific military system, and a still more perfect war machine, than existed in 1914," and that it "is determined not only to rebuild her military system, but to* build it this time upon an indestructible economic foundation." And just as Bernhardi before the war preached that every nation was a law unto itself, and that "might was right," so now, after seeing Franca and Belgium deluged in blood and fertilised by the cannon fodder buried there, this (to us) new writer sees no way. out but fight, fight, for he writes: "War has' its basis in human nature, and as long as human nature remains unaltered war will continue to exist, as it has existed already for thousands of years." This statement is a true one, but that is not to say we are not to try to abolish war. The translator ends his introductory note by saying: "Militarism is not a Prussian invention; militarism is Prussia herself. And so long as Prussia rule 3 Germany all talk that seeks to distinguish 'war parties' from 'peace parties,' 'militarists' from 'statesmen,' is idle and • deceptive chatter." «As with other German writers, this Lieutenant-general has fallen, into the error of "knowing their own country well, up to date" ; but "assuming that ail other countries have stood- still since we visited them,'! and that in the. British Empire there is an alienation between the social classes and between the Mother Land and the overseas dominions, an alienation which would benefit Germany—such, for instance, as is shown in Ireland, the Province of Quebec, and the' Commonwealth. But Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven lets in another light on German- thought. In 1870-71 Germany was predominantly an agrarian State, depending more upon the products of theland than upon manufactures, and "questions of world policy and world economics had played a comparatively subordinate role." Up to then all countries were comparatively self-con-tained. But to go a little further back.

As a result of the "Seven Years' War" Britain became a world-power, but it was not until after the American War of Independence that Britain—Germans always refer to 'England' —"entered upon a period of world-policy and world-economics, the world-policy developing when another continent became in whole or in part antagonistic to Europe; and this .world policy was further carried out last century, and thus by the advent of America, Germany, and Japan as participants in foreign diplomacy, in territorial aggrandisement—to control trade—and in overseas maritime 'commercial activities.

And it was this maritime genius possessed by us that enabled us to crush Napoleon. And here was the first big mistake that Germany made. Her rulers thought that we could not break away from what he calls our "traditional custom of waging continental wars to all intents and purposes by means of the armies of her allies." Here Germany fell in badly, for as ft became necessary to keep the Entente together, "England gave expression to her desire for war and victory (German bias in the statement, of course) by creating a strong land army, finally adopting the system of universal service." Germany and Austria have this system, but it was most unfair for us to depart from our "traditional custom," and do so, too, wasn't it? Having settled what our traditional policy was, but assuming that we may be tempted to assist on land, Bernhardi—the two writers are tarred with ' the same brush—reasons like this : "The Territorial army a militia made up of , volunteers . . ." is destined exclusively for home defence . . . For a continental European war it may be left out of-account." Then there is the "regular English army, some 250,000 strong," of which he says "at the most 150,000 men may be reckoned unon for an English Expeditionary Force. (What does he think now of "The First Hundred Thousand?"). Then after showing that here, there, and somewhere else, troops are necessary on account of the precarious position of the English, he concludes the reference to the Empire's fighting force—dominions beyond the seas are viewed as impossible sources of reinforcements—bv saying "England can employ her regular army in a continental war onlv so long as all is quiet m the colonies. This fact brings into prominence how important it will be, should war break out, to threaten England in her colonial possessions, and especially in Egypt."

Next week I must return to "Deductions from the World War," and show how Geri man calculations went wrong after the i Franco-German war of 1870-71, because of *wror.« deductions.