THE WAR SCARE.

Otago Witness, Issue 3018, 17 January 1912, Page 10

THE WAR SCARE.

PERILS OF THE NAVY. A MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM. "TORPEDO NETS DOWN." (Fboji Ode Own Correspondent.! LONDON, November 22. The British press is so.thoroughly loyal in matters of international relations that it is most difficult to arrive at an estimate of the real value of the statements that have been made regarding the position during the war scare of last summer. That war was possible, even probable, no one entertains any doubt. The mere narrative of official speeches on either side of the North Sea is presumptive evidence that relations were very strained; but few people oh either side were prepared for the statements that have been made as the result of Captain Faber's reckless "disclosures " last Thursday. A TALE OF PROBABILITIES. There are certain statements that have been generally allowed to stand, and sum. marised, they amount to this : When the crisis was at its height —that is to say, when Germany's disregard of England's demand for information was ignored and Mr Lloyd George made his famous speech—the chief of the Imperial General Staff (General Nicholson) completed in detail a scheme for military cooperation with France in case of war. That scheme, which was prepared in consultation with the chief of staff of the French army, was based on the immediate despatch of the whole British expeditionary force, numbering more than 150,000 men. to France, where it should take the field with the French army on the Belgian frontier. That piece of bedrock information is nowhere disputed. It is believed that the moment the French Cabinet heard of the readiness of Britain to despatch this force it would have declared war against Germany. Needless to say, there was division of opinion in the- Cabinet, first as to the obligation of Britain to aid France in a military campaign on such a pretext; and second, as to the advisability of at once denuding Britain of practically the whole of its standing army. This course, it is well known, is contrary to the whole policy of the Cabinet* which is pledged to keep the expeditionary force in the country until sufficient time has elapsed to enable the Territorial Force to be mobilised and trained to a safe state of efficiency. THE NAVY REFUSED. Then comes the portion of the story that is most difficult to accept. According to the Telegraph, "The Admiralty was consulted, and the Admiralty refused to countenance such a scheme, even to the extent of working out plans of co-opera-tion with the army, until the whole' Cabinet had given its concurrence. Those who had been responsible for the scheme of launching practically the whole British army upon this European adventure suddenly found a difficulty across their path, and the difficulty proved insuperable." Though this hardly accords with the contention of the First Sea Lord that an invasion of England on a practicable scale is impossible, its truth is vouched for by the Telegraph, which adds that this substratum of truth accounts for the charges circulated at a later stage to the effect that the army was more ready than the navy. As for the readiness and the competence of the navy tcj deal with the German fleet, the Telegraph states that the British fleet in Home waters at the moment was more than twice as strong as the German. It is so large that it is necessary, both for training and for general accommodation, to divide it into three parts, each commanded by a flag officer of the highest professior.Jil knowledge, in whose ability the country has every reason to place full reliance. "A carefully and anxiously elaborated fighting policy " was transmitted by Lord Fisher to his successor at the Admiralty, and the fleet has been trained for war strictly in accordance with this scheme. HOW THE SQUADRONS STOOD.

At the critical moment in the negotiations the first division of the fleet was at Cromarty, commanding the northern exit from the North Sea, and the second at Rosyth, only three or four hours distant if both divisions moved with the idea of functioning. That means th\\t almost massed on the coast of Scotland were 12 Dreadnoughts and eight other vessels, mounting altogether 144 12-inch guns, and supported by six armoured cruisers superior in offensive and defensive powers to the older ships under the German flag. The Germans, on the other hand, had only four Dreadnoughts and 12 older battleships, carrying altogether 88 11-inch guns. The British vessels, moreover, carried 44 9.2-inch guns, whereas the Germans have nothing between the heavy battie guns and the 6-inch weapon, which is regarded as quite out of the question for the major operations of naval war. In addition to this heavy armament, the British fleet was supported by two destroyer flotillas totalling 50 craft, while the east coast of Britain was patrolled as usual by a powerful force of destroyers, torpedo boats, and submarines, and a complete fleet of the very essentia] technical depot .ships. In addition to all this force, there was available for any emergency the third division (11 older battleships and a large number of cruisers and torpedo craft), and the Atlantic fleet (six battleships and four armoured cruisers) was also in British waters. THE MEANING OF SIGNS.

We can realise now the full significance of certain events which attracted attention at the time, but were explained away by the authorities, for obvious diplomatic reasons. There is no reason now to tfonbt that a great deal more was implied in the alleged manoeuvres outside Cromarty, an incident of which got into the pubfia prees. It was said that a destroys flk'illa which had been detached

.by the Admiral to search for the enemy's squadron had returned unexpectedly to Cromarty one morning and discovered that the main squadron of battleships had sailed. This is the incident 'which is interpreted, in the light of subsequent events, as the despatch of the destroyer flotilla of the first division to keep a lookout for the German fleet, and who shall say that this is not the correct explanation?

Then it became known that great quantities of steam coal were being earned by rail from Wales to Cromarty, a thing never heard of before; and that the railway companies had been asked to make special efforts to secure promptness. At the same time M.r M'Kenna himself went north to inspect the fleet at Cromarty. It was explained at the time £Bat his was meerly an experiment in the transport of coal by rail; but can we doubt the truth of the statement that it was the imminence of war that made it absolutely necessary that a reserve of coal should be conveyed at once.

WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED. The Observer, too, is quite confident that things were all as they should have been : "The Admiralty," says that paper, " was never out of touch for a single day with th© movements of the German fleet. It was never lost sight of, and however real the danger was, it certainly did not arise from the fact that the Admiralty did not know what was going on. Sup posing the worst had happened and war had been declared. With on© of our divisions, it was believed, we could have iield up the German fleet, and with the other we could have smashed it, whilst within a few hours' steaming the two could have been brought together." The Observer put« a view that thoughtful people have held all along—namely, "that it was inconceivable that Germany would willingy have chosen that moment for at tack, with ony 14 vessels in the high sea fleet, when she has in various stages of completion 13 ships of a far higher type, armed with 12-inch guns." In explanation of the apparent dispersal of the ships at the time of the crisis, it is stated that " any needless concentration of forces would have been regarded as a menace and might have precipitated war." The Telegraph is perhaps the least given to scares of all the London papers, and it reaffirms with confidence: "If the truth were published we have every confidence that it would be found that at any moment during the lata summer and autumn very little passed on the North Sea and waters adjacent that was not at once known at the British Admiralty." MORE ALARMING DETAILS. But these assurances have" not stilled the tongue of rumour. A correspondent who was at Cromarty at the time asserts that the naval authorities did lose sight of a German torpedo flotilla, which was supposed to be making a sudden descent on Cromarty. "In consequence theNep- , vn or six other men of war were placed in readiness for action, and rio. nets were out. One-half of a British torpedo flotilla protected the mouth of the entrance to Cromarty, and the other half went scouting in the North Sea, but were unable to find the German craft. Ultimately, when the scare was over, the Germans were found to have gone to the Baltic. "The navy was quite prepared for any emergency, and one captain told him that lie was on the bridge for three days andnights. The only anxiety was the insufficiency of coal, a matter which brought Mr M'Kenna himself up, but the coal supply was made rights in the course of a day or two."

This story itself has given offence to Germany. '" Supposing the German torpedo boats had not been ordered back to the Baltic," says the Berlin Post, " but had manoeuvred in the North sea, what would have happened is clear to everyone who knows the temper of the British navy. The cruisers would have sunk every German boat, whether hidden or not." The facts coming to light will only strengthen the German people in the certainty that in London they seek war with THE ORACLE SPEAKS. In-view of the recent withdrawal of his book. "The Great Betrayal," which contained an exposure of Admiralty method*?, great interest attached to the statement of Lord Charles Beresford at Portemouth. He, too, declared that Britain was on the verge of war during the crisis. Officers were recalled from leave and coal was despatched with great rapidity from Wales to Scotland. Perhaps the crisis through which we had parsed was a blessing in disguise. There were no military guards over the magazines; only a few policemen. There were no guards over dock gates or caissons, nor over railways, where the permanent way was liable to be destroyed at > a moment of crisis. There were no mine clearers for the ports and fairways. Although the destroyers were consumers of oil fuel and not coal, there were no supplies of oil in the north, so that they would have to dra»' their supplies from the tanks of the battlephins. The whole trouble was that. Britain, unlike every other naval power. !•■,:! no war staff at the Admiralty. If thev had a war staff it would take good care that supplies and other requirements were kept up to scratch. There ought to lie a permanent reserve of 200,000 tone of coal, and most of it should be in floating depots, so that it might be shifted without delay wherever it was wanted. Though he loathed the politics of the Government, he had confidence that it would do its beet to put its house in order.