SUCCESSION DUTY.

Otago Witness, Issue 3015, 27 December 1911, Page 88

SUCCESSION DUTY.

ACTION AGAINST COMMISSIONER. CHRISTCHURCH, December 19. Before Mr Justice Denniston at the Supreme Court, in. the matter of the estate of John Bulleid, late of Oamaru, draper, i deceased, an appeal was heard between Fanny Bulleid, widow, administratrix of the estate, and the Commissioner of Stamps. Mr S. G. Raymond, instructed by Mr Lee, of Oamaru, appeared for the appellant, and Mr Stringer, -K.C., for the respondent. The case as stated by the Commissioner of Stamps was that John Bulleid died on September 17, 1910, and the final balance of his estate was certified under the provisions of "The Death Duties Act, 1909," to be of the value of £30,620 3s 2d. Of this amount the sum of £30,594 15s lid represented the value of property comprised in a deed of gift executed by the. deceased in favour of his wife on October 9,1909, which was deemed by virtue of section 5 (IB) of the Death Duties Act to be part of the dutiable estate of the deceased. Estate duty was assessed by the Commissioner of Stamps upon the final balance of the .estate of the deceased at £2347 10s lid, being 7 2-3 per cent/um upon £30,620 3s 2d. Succession duty was assessed upon the succession of the appellant at £612 3s 7d, being 2 per centum upon £30,594 15s lid, and upon £l4 Is 3d, the value of the appellant's succession over the property of the deceased, exclusive of property comprised in the deed of gift. The appellant refused to pay the succession duty, alleging that she was not a successor to the deceased within the meaning of "The Death. Duties Act, 1909," inasmuch as she "did not become entitled to the said property on the death of her husband, but before his death. The question for the court therefore was whether the appellant was a successor of the deceased within the meaning of section 15 of " The ueath Duties Act, 1909," and therefore liable to pay succession duty as assessed. The gift was made on October 9,1909, and the Death Duties Act came into force on December 24. The court was asked to decide whether the widow came within the definition of "successor," which was defined by the act as meaning " any person who on the death of the deceased who has become entitled to any property forming part of the dutiable estate of the deceased, being abeneficiaiy under any gift or donation, mortuis causa, made by the' deceased within three years before his death." Mi Raymond submitted that section 15 of the act imposed a tax on property passing by gift to a successor deriving an interest on the death of the deceased. He distinguished succession duty, as affecting persons benefiting on a death, from estate duty, < which was levied on the whole estate. He claimed that any other construction would lead to retrospective legislation. That was quite outsipe the scheme of the statute, and would lead to great hardship.

Mr Stringer said that the commissioner claimed that the statute was retrospective in terms, and affected any gift made three years prior to death. The same considerations applied to succession duty as to estate duty, which was chargeable under similar circumstances.

Mr Raymond replied tljat estate duty was leviable only on the estate in the hands of the administrator. Judgment was reserved*.