THE ADMIRAL OF THE ATLANTIC

Otago Witness, Issue 3002, 27 September 1911, Page 77

THE ADMIRAL OF THE ATLANTIC

I By Line-ahead.

I _ ! To those who study the development of German sea-power, recent announcements are of considerable interest. Morocco is under French suzerainty. To anyone glancing at the map it would seem that Spain, France, and Great Britain might be expected, from their geographical position, to have some interest in this disaffected country; but Germany would seem to be as little affected as Norway or Sweden. Why, then, should Germany desire an interest in Morocco? It may be the question of protecting commercial interests. But Great Britain ie the best customer of the Moors, claiming one-half of the total trade. France comes next with one-fourth, while Germany and Austria, put together, handle only one-tenth. We must. then, dismiss the commercial aspect of the question. However, we get a clue to the solution of the problem in the aspiration that has been credited to Germany of making the whole Atlantic seaboard German. This is part of Germany's settled policy—to get a naval base on the open ocean. There are half a dozen courses open, but the wide-awake Teuton —not being ready for war —takes the line of least resistance. Look for a moment at the hopeless position of Germany. When the military view of the duties of a fleet was accepted, it could not be denied that the dangerous sands and intricate naval harbours tended to strengthen the position. But in those days, the fleet was looked on purely as a defensive instrument. In these tenlightened days, it is the duty of the squadrons to seek out and destroy the enemy's opposing ships. Wilhelmshaven, Emden, and Cuxhaven are not suitable harbours for a fleet that must hurriedly take the offensive. Now and again, an alarmist novel conies out which telle of the surprise attack by German warships. This surprise dash at full speed across the North Sea is an impossibility. The German fleets must be in one of two places that are easily watched. Supposing that the boats slipped out under cover of darkness, they could not reach their objective before daylight. Sheer-ness-is only 320 knots from Wilhelmshaven, but after covering that distance at full speed a torpedo flotilla would have empty bunkers. There would be no reserve of fuel for the actual attack or the withdawal. If the coal was husbanded the voyage would take too long. It is a waste of space to labour this point. Surprise attacks are denied to Germany. Her fleet must be in certain well-known places. She needs two or three coaling stations and bases on the open ocean. Again, in the event of her deciding on a policy of commerce-raiding, her cruisers would be obliged by some means to run the gauntlet of the English Channel, or away north past the Orkneys, into the Atlantic. Here, again, the situation bristles with difficulties. A raiding cruiser has no ports available for a base, which is desirable for many reasons. Prizes nrnst be towed somewhere. If they are sunk, she must take off the passengers. Above all, coaling is imperative. To replenish bunkers, visits must be made to home ports, or away down on the west coast of Africa to Kamerun (or the Cameroons). This port would be a good base for cruiser? raiding traffic by the Cape route, but is too far away to intercept ships taking the Mediterranean route. , We cannot but sympathise with Germany in her predicament. But with characteristic energy she is leaving no stone unturned to improve her position. It is generally thought that the absorption of Holland will solve the difficulty. This is not as simple as it seems. The Dutch would resist, and helped by the . British, no end of trouble would be created. Denmark is the worst thorn in the side of the British diplomat, and it is here that Germany in the long fun will most probably be successful. But here again Great Britain steps in and helps the weaker Power. If Denmark were to federate with Germany, as Bavaria arid Saxony have done,. Great Britain would have to fight. Wo could never tolerate Iceland and the Faroe Islands in our competitor's hands. Even now the Danes have no definite defence policy, and tariff reform may drive them into the arms of their powerful neighbour. Then, unless we prevent it, Germany will be out to the open sea. Portugal and Morocco are the two other ! countries on which Germany has designs. Portuguese territory in the shape of the Azores would serve as a naval base and coaling statmn. Here, again, Great Britain, by her treaties with Portugal, bars the way, It is no wonder that Germany complains of her " isolation by the English." { A little more than five years ago the j eyes of the world were, as now, on Moroccp. Germany, thinking to gain an Atlantic port, insisted on taking a prominent part in all the negotiations. Trouble has again cropped up, and once more our friends are in the forefront. The reason is obvious. Tangier is only j three hours' steam from Gibraltar. Either ! Mogador (which port has on a previous occasion been claimed by Germany) or Mazagan would make suitable bases. Using" any of these places as headquarters, cruisers could intercept all shipping from the English Channel, all the Mediterranean traffic, as well as the Cape of Good Hope trade. It is to the interest of Great Britain to see that Germany does not get a fonthold in Morocco. The German squadrofta are safer in the North Sea than anywhere else; and It,is our duty to see that they get bases nowhere else. That the Kaiser has ambitions no one can doubt. We have not forgotten his famous signal to the Czar when in the harbour Of Bevel, August, 1902. For aheer presumption $ is hard to l»eat»

"The admiral of the Atlantic greets the admiral of the Pacific." In that we see the working of the Imperial mind. It is some satisfaction to know that the Russian is "admiral of the Pacific" no longer. Togo altered that one foggy afternoon in the Straits of Tsushima. The claim to the title "admiral of the Atlantic" will be settled some day to the tune of the 13.5'5. May our gunners shoot straight!