PATER'S CHATS WITH THE BOYS.

Otago Witness, Issue 2975, 22 March 1911, Page 81

PATER'S CHATS WITH THE BOYS.

" SALVATION FROM WAR IS READINESS FOR WAR." Thus writes Admiral A. T. Mahan, U.S. Navy, in an article in the Daily Mail, October 31 of last year, and written by request as a sequel to a previous article which appeared on July 4. Now, as Admiral Mahan is acknowledged to be one of the leading authorities, if not the leading one, on the "Influence of Sea Power Upon History," and as I have both articles by me, I think you will be interested if I try to give the gist of the two articles in a paragraph or two. GERMANY'S POSITION. He points out (1) the huge increase in recent years in the naval expenditure of Germany; (2) the strength of a "strong independent Government assisted by a democratic Parliament," as in Germany, as compared with the continual change of policy under the party government system in vogue in England; (3) the strength of the Austro-German alliance through (a) similarity of interests, (b) continuity of territory through the boundaries of the two empires being partly coterminous, (c) immunity of interior lines of communication from attack, and (d) the network of railways being laid down strategically. as well as commercially, and giving swift mobilisation and concentration ; (4 the fact that Continental frontiers promote The establishment of_ government effective for external action ; (5) that every German and Austrian is a trained soldier ; (6) that Germany and Austria are consolidated, and therefore less vulnerable than the British Empire ; (7) and that the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria, and Italy) is strong through contiguity, and, in the case of Germany and Austria, through a great deal of unanimity in pursuing their aims. BRITAIN'S POSITION. Contrast with that of Germany point by point. 1—(a) The increase in naval expenditure has not been in the same ratio, and (b) the inauguration of the Dreadnought era has deprived Britain of her crushing preponderance in capital ships. 2—That party governemnt breaks any systematic plan of "action depending upon a series of years for fruition. 3—That (a) Britain is isolated, and the interests of herself and her allies are not so intimately connected; (b) that the parts of the Empire are also isolated, making attack in detail possible ; (c) that the lines of communication are exterior, and therefore more liable to be cut. 4—That the immunity of Great Britain from invasion, the presence of "the -water-walled bulwark," the navy, and the absence of universal training, have made Britain lax and inefficient in preparation for war. s_That on the Continent every man is trained and ready at all times, but Britain, by having a force specially set aside for permanent soldiering, is really trusting its defence to. mercenaries. 6—That Britain is disintegrated in territory and in government, but the units of the German Empire are bound together in a zollverein or trade league for the mutual benefit of its parts against outsiders. 7—That the Triple Entente is weak through geographical distribution, diversity in nationality, and in absence of any strong binding bond. These are just a few general points of contrast. Now for one or two more where the contrast cannot he so definitely balanced, or where they can be amplified with advantage. THE MTD-EUROPE ALLIANCE. Mid-Europe controls conditions, and partly because of Britain's good offices to Japan. Russia was mighty, and restrained Germany, but Britain backed Japan, and Russia fell. This not only made Germany potentially stronger in ' dominating European politics, but enabled Austria, backed by Germany, to become stronger by annexing Bosnia and Herzgovina, and intensified the unrest against us in India and Egypt. "The Triple Entente was barn tco late. It should have ante-dated, and not post-dated, the Russo-Japanese ' Avar." It will be seen then that as the Middle-Europe Powers —and it is possible that the Triple Alliance- may become a quadruple one by the inclusion"of Turkey—have very small possessions in the East affected by the unrest which is a source of weakness to the three nations of the Triple Entente, what makes for weakness in the dependencies of France and England constitute the opportunity for their enemies ; and in case of war, the dependencies through unrest, isolation, and exposure, will become very vulnerable nositions inviting attack. Britain's weakness cripples her diplomacy. MID-EUROPE DOMINATES THE WORLD. This is what Mahan in effect says. Perhaps I had better quote a little here: "The inter-relations of the European States at any particular moment constitute the basis, the military base upon which rests the influence of Europe as a whole upon the politics of the world. In that grouping, at the present time, the central and preponderating fact is the Mid-Europe Alliance, not only because it is the greatest single factor, but because it alone is a strictly natural combination. The adhesion to it of Italy has, indeed, reasons of policy, but they are complex and alloyed: 'partly iron, partly miry clay.' The Triple Entente is purely artificial —a result of the Mid-Europe Alliance itself, but without the intrinsic strength.. It is a reaction from the Alliance ; but in this case reaction does not equal action in power. Its one leading motive is opposition—defensive • and it is a commonplace that mere opposition, simple defence, is not in progressive force the equivalent of a positive policy. To an aggressive action, such as the annexation of 1908, mere opposition wavers in |

its paA-r, especially when two or more parties have to agree upon a common course, in determining which each remembers its particular interests. BRITAIN'S DRAWBACKS. "New types of warships have enabled Germany to enter upon the contest on more equal term®, and as years go by the British pre-Dreadnought bhips will become absolutely worthless ; and the democratic spirit makes it impossible to have the same concentration of purpose and continuousness of aim obtaining ™ t ®* r ' many. We must remember, too, that never again will it be possible for the British navy to control the commerce of the world, nor of the whole European continent." "THE RISK OF WAR HAS BEEN AVERTED." This sentence is often used as an expression of relief, says Mahan, but it is dangerously misleading. It has not been averted. It has been fought, won by one side, lost by the otiher, and not a shot fired. It is now about 30 years since Europe has had a big war. And the effect is "a precise illustration of the ineffectiveness of populaces to realise external dangers. Continuance of peace induces a practical disbelief in the possibility of war, and practical disbeliefs soon result in practical action, or non-action. Yet observant men know that there has been at least three, wiars in this so-called period of peace; wars none the less because, no blows were exchanged, for force determined the issue." The small capitals are mine. The three wars decided by force standing behind _ the diplomats are represented by Algeciras, Crete, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, in very recent years, too. LAND POWER VERSUS SEA POWER. The Triple Alliance at present represents the embodiment of Land Power, and so far the Triple Entente with which Japan is partly involved represents Sea Power; but the preponderating Sea Power is disappearing. Is Britain, then, in a bad way? Inferentially, Yes. But there is hope. FRANCE'S MONEY AND BRITAIN'S SHIPS. Though Germany plus Austria can put enormous numbers, well trained, into the field, the forces of France and Russia cannot be ignored, nor are Britain's soldiers to be left out of the count; again, in Sea Power, Germany has to be reckoned with seriously, and Austria is "starting in." But the general division of the two coalitions is Land versus Sea, with Britain occupying a critical position. Is there no way out? Between 1894 and 1904 the maritime trade of Germany borne over the seas "increased by 93 percent ; with Europe by 68 per cent. ; whereas the land interchange with Europe increased only 48 per oent." This means that, as long as Britain's navy is supreme it controls the approaches to the German coast; and as France is a wealthy country, French money and British ships, if used effectively, ought in time to outweigh the Mid-Europe combination. Germany sees this; hence her feverish navy expansion, and hence the superDreadnought building by Austria. A war at present would mean annihilation of probably the whole of the German maritime commerce. Germany wants to be in .a position to maintain what she has and to annihilate Britain's. Admiral Mahan's two articles, occupying seven or eight columns of the Witness, are intensely interesting, and their contents should be digested by everybody. AN OMISSION. It appears to me that in his articles Mahan does not make sufficient allowance for the efforts of the present and prospective influence of the Sea Power being, and to be, contributed by Britain's Dominions Beyond the Seas. Perhaps he thinks their latent power will not have time to develop before the great Armageddon comes. THE DECLARATION OF LONDON. The full text of this I haven't by me, but it appears to me tjhat, if finally aoreed to, the effect will be to cripple the offensive power of Britain's navy in time of war. Perhaps I'll refer to this later on.