THE DEFENCE OF INDIA.

Otago Witness, Issue 2805, 18 December 1907, Page 70

THE DEFENCE OF INDIA.

By. Col. SIR T. H. HOLDWICH.

The sequence of events in Central Asia during the past century awakened the British Government to a realisation of the necessity for setting bounds to the nearer approach to the borders of India of the only European Power which can menace tha security of our Indian Empire on the north and north-west. The result was the demarcation of the northern boundary of Afghanistan and- the definite declaration- that Great Britain would not suffer any transgression of this border on the part of Russia. The menace of aggression is by no means removed at the present day, but the feeling with regard to its imminence has been greatly modified by the Tesults of the late war with Japan, and the policy of defence' to-day is a policy of security by general preparedness rather than by the development of military defensive works. Such a policy is not only suitable to the conditions of the present time, but provides the foundation* of a more active policy in the future based -on an appreciation of the undoubted truth that all systems of strategical defence, in order to b* truly successful, must be active in purpose, aiming at positive results, rather than passive in natnre, content with securing merely negative results. In the minds of far-sighted statesmen, there must also weigh seriously the wider j problem oi security for our position in' Asia aa a European Power when challenged, as it certainly may be by the recrndescent force of the militant Asiatic;, a development which we can afford to cratch for the present, bnt which, must I always hereafter affect the general pnr- [ poses of our military policy as regards India. At present, at any rate, we can se.t aside the great question of- panIslamism, or the yet greater one of a panAsiatic combination, and, accepting the position as it stands, believing the loyalty of the Indian peoples to be unaffected' as yet by the teachings of Japan's success or the looming power of Chinese military development, we can consider the defence of India aSi a great imperial problem whose political and strategical elements are confined to India and the countries adjacent to its north-west border. FROM A 'MILITARY STANDPOINT.

Even from this circumscribed point of view there are two possible schemes for military action presented for our choice. The borders of India and Russia lie far apart for the vaatTy greater portion of 1 their length. We may therefore adopt a system of passive defence of the Indian border, leaving to' our adversary the 1 task of: toiling over the intervening, space, or we may ourselves advance into the neutral territory in c«der to check the advance of the assailant while yet he is for from- our borders.

Whatever may be urged from, a purely military standpoint as to the advantages of ar passive policy, it is not open to question that such advantages are outweighed* by the immense disadvantage of surrendering the initiative to the adversary, thus depriving -ourselves of freedom of action, allowing his will to dominate the course of. events in a campaign, attdf obliging ourselves to conform to his movements, whereby we render ourselves peculiarly liable to be surprised in one part or another of. the enormously extended front along which operations would have to be conducted. These disadvantages are inherent in all plans of defence of a passive nature, though there are circumstances*, in. the present caise which may minimise them.

Discussion on these points of military interest must, however, remain academical in face- of the overwhelming, importance of the political considerations which dictate the course to be pursued. First and foremost is the necessity of fulfilling, bur treaty obligations. with our ally- the Amir of Afghanistan. By these we are bound to assist him to repel any unprovoked act of. aggrss.sion of violation of his territory, and in return he engages to conductbis foreign policy in accordance with the advice of the British Government, and to abstain from entering into relations with any foreign Powers without our consent. The maintenance of a strong and selfreliant buffer-State with an efficient and fitable government is a prime necessity for us if we' are not to have an extensive land frontier coterminus with that of a European Power, and an extensive army to guard it. Added to this, it is indisputable that a policy of inaction would inflict a severe blow on our prestige, upon wliieh the stability of British Tule in India so largely depends. The experience of history teaches us that such a policy is invariably construed by Asiatics as being due either to weakness or to fear, and the events of the present time in India go far towards substantiating the truth of this maxim. Under such considerations we must admit that under no circumstances whatever can we afford to undertake the defence of India in India, but must be prepared to- fight beyond our borders.

NATURAL BARRIERS.

Next, we have to consider the nature of the country in which we may be called upon to fight. Starting at the elevated table-land known as The Pamis, at a mean elevation of 13,000 ft above the sea, our boundary runs with a general westerly trend following the watershed of a stupendous mountain ranged the Hindu Kuflh. — for come 300 miles. Along this length, the Russian boundary follows tTTc course of the River Oxus from its source in the Pamirs, running approximately parallel with our border-line and only separated from it by the narrow strip of an outlying Aighan district, so narrow th^fc ai one point the borders lie only 20 miles apart. Across the mountain chain along this length the passes- are few and difljcnlt, with an average altitude of 16,000 ft, snow-bonnd for many months of tu«t year, Vke valley* leading to them, on

both sides are deep and narrow, sterile for the most part, and affording no supplies for any considerable body of troops. Of well-constructed roads there are none, the only communications being a few narrow mountain tracks passable only with the greatest difficulty for laden pack animals. The peaks of the Hindu Kush in this region run up to 24,000 ft in altitude, and this magnificent natural barrier stretches away to the south-west until it sinks finally into the plains of eastern Afghanistan in the neighbourhood of Herat. The Russian border, however, continues to follow the course of the Oxus towards the west, whereas the Indian frontier, leaving the main range of the Hindu Kitsh, turns in a southerly direction for some 900 miles- until it finally touches the sea near Karachi. A large portion of Afghanistan called Afghan Turkestan lies north of the Hindu Kush, separated from Russian territory only by the Oxus. There is nothing- to» prevent the crossing of the Oxus from me north at any desired point, and the occupation of Afghan Turkestan, by a Russian force — and this we are powerless to check. But the Hindu Kush to the south of Afghan Turkestan maintains its character as a- barrier throughout its length, and it is-^impossible for anyone conversant with its rugged system of parallel ridges to believe in toe practicability of carrying any line or railway across such a series d*f rugged physical obstacles as it presents.

The western extremities of these ranges disappear into the plain country of Western Afghanistan, and here it is (and here only) that a route may be found, free from serious physical difficulties. This is the direction in which we may expect the main effort of an invader to be made, for here, and in Eastern Persia, lie the- only' tracks southwards, which, do not pass through, waterless deserts, impracticable for large bodies of troops.

HDW WE MUST PREPARE.

But even a- successful advance to the borders- of- India by this western route by no means secures to the invader a "foothold in India, fur supposing Kandahar to be im hia possession, and our outlying fortress — Quetta — to be besieged, there still remains in front of him the Rajputana deserts, and tbe sands of Sind, ere the fertile plains- of India are reached. In short, there, is no royal road to India across Afghanistan or Persia. The strength of our defence, then, depends chiefly on our power to make good use of those natural resources in Asia, which we posses equally with Russia — Le>, the loyalty and fighting capacity of a great horde of Asiatics, stimulated by the traditional appeal to their faith ; backed and supported by British troops, whenever and wherever British troops, can be used to the best advantage. The Asiatic, will be to the front along the whole line of action; the Afghan sharpshooter in his own hills, combining with Indian troops accustomed to mountain warfare to hold the gates of the Hindu- Kush ; Indian troops, again in ordered ranks, -jesociated with the solid, formations of British infantry, wjhere t|ie fight for supremacy may perchance be fought to a finish in the plains about Kandahar or in the front of Quetta.

What India has to think about at present, whilst there is yet time before her to consolidate her strength and her puri pose is, first, how to deal with the Afghan so that the full fighting strength of a warlike people may be made available for the defence of their own country ;- secondly, bow she may, secure the best of the Mahommedan fighting races of India in numbers sufficient to meet the demand, when that demand arises, without maintaining an unwieUdy standing: army; thirdly, what numbers of British troops can she spare for the East, and what is the capicity of our navy te transport them, t<t the shores of India.; and, lastly" (and chiefly) where is she to find her officers? Not her generate-— there are enough of them, — but the all-important captains and subalterns and juniors in the officersranks, who are to give the confidence inspired by good leading and who will be ready to sacrifice themselves, as of old, in showing the straight way to the front ; for it is* the officer, and not the soldier, who • will finally differentiate the quality of the opposing forces when India meets Russia on the plains of Afghanistan.