A GRAVE WARNING

Otago Witness, Issue 2654, 25 January 1905, Page 17

A GRAVE WARNING

A LESSON OF MANCHURIA.

RUSSIA AND INDL4.

(Fbou Ottb Own Correspondent.) LONDON, December 10,

A trumpet note of warning has just been given forth by a very eminent writer on j military affairs with respect to a point on j which I touched last week — namely, the tremendous alteration- which had come' about in the military situation as between Russia and India since the construction of the two great railways that virtually converge near the Afghan frontier. This writer takes ths matter very seriously. He is satisfied with what has been done "by the British" Government in regard to naval preparation for contingencies, but he exclaims : " How different is the outlook for our land' forces ! No policy, no standard, no forethought, and, in place of all these, the vain pursuit of evanescent visions, the rule of ihe arbitrary, the illogical and the uninformed, empiricism in its shabbiest garb, but a garb never the same and changing its chameleon hues with every breath that blows upon the front or back or side of the Government bench. It would be easy, much too easy, to write down the bitter truth of the history of past years of wasted effort, to show how wo have drifted with every tide and every current, without chart, without compass, and without the most rudimentary notions of Imperial navigation." And he goes on to cay" that "the warning of Manchuria lies in this pregnant fact that it has given us a practical illustration of the power of Russia to assemble and supply a great army many thousands of miles from Western Russia by means of the service of a single line of railway. The precedent of the Russian concentration in Manchuria must inevitably recur in every future plan for rhe defence of India, since it supplies \is with definite and instructive information uron th© question whether, and if so in what measure, Russ'e can assemble a great army far from the sources of her power, -and maintain it effective for purposes of war with the aid cf a single railway. Conversely, and when v;e have finally determined the utmost that Russia can expect to do upon the borders of Afghanistan, we obtain the standard and the wsflt'ns; pol'cy for our arnvJ i^rc<” that we have thitherto sought in vain, a standard by which all our army organisation, -whether at Home, in India, and throughout the Empire, must in future be judged, and with which it must imperatively conform.' 1 He fully recognises, p.s indeed most thoughtful persons are beginning to recognise, that if we were forced into a war with Russia it would not bp '

a case ot the whale fighting the elephant, j to quote Yon Mortice's well-known simile, ' but it would be a eas9 of elephant against j elephant. In other words, we should have 'to fight Russia immediately on land. Our ! navy could not gel at her or do her anyreal damage. The struggle, if it took place, j would bo in the East, first in Afghanistan, and then, if the fortune of war went against us, on the frontier of India itself. Such being the case, ifc is very important to grasp the fafefc of what Russia has already done in the present war. The writer points out that, whereas at the outset Russia had nofc more than 150,000 men at the front, to-day, after 10 months of war, she has probably over 400,000 men east of Baikal, of whom no fewer than 250,000 j men are with the field armies, and hithertj {lies© troops have been maintained, for prao tical purposes, effective, apart from the waste of war, which has been considerable. Many of these troops have been loeallv raised, but it is almost certain that 250.000" men have been transported from WcsteiM Russia, or at the average rate of 25,t)00 men a month, regimental transport, stores, and ammunition included. The Trans-Sibe-rian railway has nofc broken down under the stress of heavy arid continuous military traffic, as was predicted by eminent British engineers, but. on the contrary, has steadily improved in efficiency, and has doubled its original carrying capacity. So much for what Russia has already done In Manchuria during ihe present war. Now -tor what she is preparing- to do. The writer from whom I am quoting says: — "Let us now turn to the Central Asia theatre, and recall that the construction of Russian railways leading toward Afghanistan has also proceeded concurrently with the prosecution of the war in the Far East. Before the Orenburg-Tashkend section was taken in [ hand, Russia already possessed the line from j Krasnovodslc, on the Caspian, by Merv, to J Charjui, on the Oxus, and on to Bokhara, Samarcand, Khojend, Khokand, and Audijan. From Merv a branch ran south along the Murghab to the frontiers of Afghanistan, while another line, crossing the Syr Darya at Chinas, went north to Tashkend. In order to complete for the time her railWay system toward Afghanistan, Russia de- j termined to construct the Orenburg-Tash- , kend section, and to continue this line in ! order to reach the northern frontier of i Afghanistan in the vicinity of Balkh. Sh© would then have a railway base of concentration, Merv-Bokhara-Khokand ; two lines of communication by rail in rear ; and two advanced feelers abutting on the Afghan frontier, and serving as tetes Detapes de guerre. The work on the Orenburg-Tash-kend section was begun at both ends, and has been steadily pursued during the past two years. The line from Orenburg reached the Sea of Aral in October, 1903; the work in the south was also pressed on vigorously, I and by September 27 of this year the last' t rail was laid, and the line possibly opened I to provisional traffic a week or two ago — such, at least, was the expectation, and it may have been the fact. The line has been j expressly built to carry 12 pairs of trains in the 24- hours ; the stations are 22 versts apart, and there are two sidings where trains can pass between every two stations. The railway is, without doubt, a strategic line of first-rate value, and is intended for : military purposes, and for no other. Work still remains to be done, especially in the ballasting of the line and in the construe- - tion of aqueducts, but for practical purposes the line may be taken as complete. The concluding section, leading to the Afghan frontier north of Balkh, can very easily be begun at several points at onoe, and there should be no insuperable difficulty in rapid construction if only a tithe of the energy displayed in the Far East is expended upon the line. We have, then, to consider that Russia will have two lines of railway, each capable, perhaps, of supplying 12 pairs of trains a day. leading to the borders of Afghanistan. We are in presence of a new situation, and it is one which we have to face." Admitting that Central Asia cannot compare with Manchuria from the point of view of &upply, he points out that a Russian army aiming at Afghanistan or India could tap one of the richest districts of Russia by means of the Orenburg line, which places all Western Siberia at its disposal, while across the Caspian th^ro can com© from Southern Russia plentiful supplies, and the distance to be traversed is only onethird of that in the case of Manchuria. Wherefore the preliminary concentration could be effected with proportionately greater rapidity and ease. He can see no l-eason why Russia should not be able to assemble, in the course of a few months, 400 000 men, inclusive of the army of Turkestan, at her railheads on the Afghan frontier, and maintain them there at full strength during a long war. And he says: " Herat can be taken by Russia at a blow, ' and its populace would welcome anyone ' who Avould cvici, the Afghans. A Russian advance _ from the north might also score a preliminary success, since the greater part of Afghan Turkestan north, of the Hindu

Kush lies open to invasion Contact between the advanced troops of Russia and those of an Anglo-Indian army might conceivably take place in a' few weeks from the outbreak of war. The Afghan army, even if all the tribesmen remain loyal to the Ameer and rise against the invader, has no chance of making a long resistance, and, at the best, would soon be forced to xeeort to guerilla war, where its strength would lie." All this amounts to a direct warning by a most competent authority of dangers which lie immediately ahead in case of a war with Russia being forced upon us. It is easy enough to understand why Lord Kitchener's vstay in India was considered infinitely more necessary than his return to England to aid at Home in the reorganisation of the British army. It is very fortunate that at the present crisis we have in India two such oble men at the head of affairs political and military as Lord-Curzon and Lord Kitchener. One may hope they can be trusted to see that all is done which the. urgency of the case demands. But at the same lime one must needs hope also that this may not be put to the actual test by a. disaster so formidable as the outbreak of an Anglo-Russian war.