MR BALFOUR'S APOLOGETICS CRITICALLY EXAMINED. (ANONYMOUS:)

Otago Witness, Issue 2558, 25 March 1903, Page 70

MR BALFOUR'S APOLOGETICS CRITICALLY EXAMINED. (ANONYMOUS:)

By Dixorkis. Watts and Co., London. R. J. Stark arid Co., Dunedin. (4s 6d.) Of Mr Balfours apologetics in essence, a* embodied in his "Defence of PMlosophio Doubt* and the Foundations of JJelfef," i only know enough to make me utterly indifferent to them. An ultra-amiable scion of aristocratic lineage, a devout church,man and convinced spiritualist, Arthur J.Balfour, the suave and gentle politician, is not the kind of man for whose opinions I am likely to care veiy much. Besides, he isa metaphysician of tfie deepest dye, and metaphysics, when made to usurp the place of better things, I heartily abhor. Thafc there is a higher, as .veil a* a lower, metaphysic, I do not seek to deny, only it seems to me that Air Balfour's mental product ia hardly of the higher order. Of his "Foundations of Belief," it was aptly said by a shrewd critic that whoever corrected the proofs clearly made a -mistake in. omitting, two letters* from its.Ttitle,' as "Foundations" of Unbelief" would, have- far 'more- aptly;desf cribed its scope and argument ; that it was, in fact, a gospel of Tiniversal^cepticism, attacking all beliefs whether basedon supernatural sanction" or on- science. In writing his book, Mr Balfour's object, according to the same -critic, seems to have' been themaking of a tabula rasa of all' beliefs, especially of rational and scientific beliefs, and to leave nothing but a vagus phantom 'of authority, itself without any rational ground for belief, but. which exists and may as well be accepted, at anyrate provisionally, as giving us a religion which contains manygood and beautiful things, and satisfies' a good many of our emotions and aspirations. No doubt such an intellectual position would prove acceptable to many thoughtful,, well-meaning people in an era like ours, when hoary old creeds .ire falling to pieces everywhere. On i the other hand, ifc certainly- 1 would not satisfy the ordinary rank- andfile representatives of existing religious sects any more than.it would' satisfy -the.man who prefers to rely upon exactly ascertained knowledge of natural law. This is really, what most of us go by the. greater part of' the time, and it suffices fairly well for all ordinary human needs. What we are- is largely the result of what- we know. Tho acquisition of merely natural knowledge haa done a good deal for us, however unwilling some may be to admit it. It has advanced mankind from primeval savagery to modern civilisation j has chained- the power* ofr Nature to our service' and given- us jusfc ideas -as. to our. position and that' of the planet we- inhabit in- the universe of things; from- stars to atoms. ' Mr "Balfour!s "position^ "that weknownothing unless- we know everything," is a/perfect absurdity — outside of metaphysics.- . Without Jmowing anything -at all. about the origin of the universe, yet know • a great f deal-that ispraciacally'ceriain abuot what* goes on in it. The law- of gravity, for instance, is a pretty sure thing, though we know nothing of gravitation in itself, but only its operation. If we cannot proph&cy; to any purpose nowadays, we can do sonto. first-class predicting. If we can. predict" eclipses and navigate, trackless oceans, it is because intricate calculations, founded on* the law of gravitation, enable us to say beforehand what \will be the relative positions of the earth, sun, and. moon as seen at, a. given time at v a given locality on the earth's surface. And these calculations never deceive us. When; on the faith of thee*; we send expeditions to observe total s^iipses or transits of Venus, the asS^nomers never come back with limp tj^s, because the event did not come off. The eclipse or transit happens, exactly^when it is sxpected to, and the faith- of the student is justified. We trust more to the good faith of the law of gravity than to all the>* metaphysics ever' span by the mind of "man. Jusfr' consider, for instance, the matter of navigation. Aship with hundreds of human beings aboardy and laden with, rich cargo, has been driven hundreds of miles out of its course, and lies , on the trackless water like a fly .in ,a, milkbasin, with a circular horizon- about it. The shipmaster may not have seen'land for; f weeks, but' that fact 'does not distress him? Ho has - the Nautical' Almanac in- hi^room ; its figures, based on' the law of gravity, en- . able him to take his bearings and .mark his position on the ocean > with, absolute . certainty. Thus the certainty of gravitation is seen to be a first-Tate "foundation of belief," for which everyone is indebted to physical science. On 4 ne other hand, instead of finding in the metaphysics of Sir Balfour, or anyone else, any real foundation for belief, we are more likely to find what others have found — intellectual quagmires of limitless extent. The present volume is devoted to a search-ingly-aeute criticism of Mr Balfour's two books already alluded to — his "quaintly entitled " Foundations of Belief, and Philosophic Doubt. Mr Balfour occupies a favourable vantage ground for purposes of controversy. The mere fact of aristocratic lineage carries lr-uch weight with many; while his easy advance to preferment in politics, even to ths inheritance of the Premiership of the House of Commons from his uncle, Lord Salisbury, adds' prestige to his name, which, in ordinary circumstances, would be lacking. Still, after allowing something on account of these matters, it need not be denied that Mr Balfour shows great ability as a controversialist. The distinctive characteristic of his reasoning is not that he fails to prove or disprove enough, but that for his purpose he proves altogether too much. "His philosophy is aptly summarised- in one line of Byron: — " All we know is, nothing can be known." He leaves all things exactly where he found them. His philosophic doubt strikes with • equal force at the roots of all systems ; and therefore, like an elector who divides his votes equally between opposing candidates, he neutralise.' himself, and can have no voice in the decision of questions at issue..

■When face to face with the problems of life, men have "always ignored the philosophy ■which thus proclaims and proves its own impotence, and have recognied that practical questions must be approached from the standpoint of the relative, and without reference to the metaphysical conundrums ■which lie coiled like snakes around the bases of human thought. While declaring that science is defective in its premises, in its inferences, and in the general relation of its parts, 'Mr Balfour avows that he shares the "implicit and indestructible confidence" •which is -felt by all men in the truth iri science. His doubts and arguments are not of a practical kind, and have no relation to common sense; they a?* merely philosophic and academic. Yet he hopes by the use of these airy and fantastic weapons to prove that religion has claims on our credence not less strong than the claims of science. The answer to this line of argument takes the form' of a- demand that the trial of -this cause shall be removed from the ratified atmosphere of the court above to the more invigorating air of the court below. The question whether science and super-, naturalism, have equal claims on our credence. |s a question o£ immense practical import-^ aa.ee, which must be decided on practical grounds and apart from the finely-^pua .■dialectics of a- philosophy -which is hopelessly entangled in questions of the absolute, •nd unknowable^and which confesses that it' is unable to discover reasonable, grounds for' any belief whatever. My own belief is that man everywhere, save where he is unprogressive and decadent, trusts more to nature than to supernature in everything pertaining to his existence; that, in fact, our faith in God is largely tempered by the care we exercise towards keeping our powder dry "The human heart" — from whatever source the attribute springs — "has a deep reverence for justice, love, and mercy — a reverence -which in .higher natures is instinctive, and which has l>cen engendered in the whole race, in varying degrees of strength, by millions of years of family and social life." Belief is essentially an expression of our attitude towards and an interpretation of Nature, .which may be disturbed, but never can be Juelped by the dialectical duelling which, freely passes as philosophy. The real philosophy is that which will lead us safely from out the mazes of abstract speculation to the -unique starting pomt — life ! While Mr Balfour's two books may be looked upon as typical example* of their kind, the present volume of clean, clear, and sharp-cut criticism should readily take a place as a first-rate exposition of the other .side — the naturalistic side — of the subject. •Ifc is.-an exceedingly -ab\e ■production, the ■work of a keen reasoner and able writer Aphbse -words, can be read with pleasure, ■even though the 1 subject dealt with is admit'tedlyof a somewhat knotty texture. It is an able expression also of " the free and fearless application of reason, regardless of consequences, to all questions of ethics, "science, -philosophy, and Telicjion."