ABOUT THE WAR.

Otago Witness, Issue 2456, 17 April 1901, Page 11

ABOUT THE WAR.

THE PRO-BOERS AT IT AGAIN. SIR REDVERS BULLER AND LADYSMITH. (From Ouu Owx Correspondent.) LONDON, March 1. Uiidi°touraged by all the lessons they have received as to the folly and futility of their proceedings, the "Conciliation Committee" persists in iU pro-Boer propagandum with the aid of scandalous misrepresentations and shamefully garbled literature. Forced into a corner by the comp.ele exposure of the fraudulent character of the leaflet it had issued which purported to give authentic accounts of barbarous conduct or tho part of British troops, it having conclusively shown that the alleged letter had been to gio&sly garbled since its original publication in a Canadian journal that by the time it reached tho Manchester Guardian, a nortorious pro-Boer organ, it had become a virtual forgery, ilr Leonard Courtney, presiding at yesterday's meeting of the Conciliation Committee, tried to brazen the matter out. He said: "The committee had published verbatim et literatim a letter which had appeared in a most honoured newspaper in tho North of England as to the genuinene,-, of which no suspicion had been suggested. They stated that they found the letfer, gave the circumstances of its origin, and claimed for it no more than a faithful reprint from an honourable newspaper. But the newspapei, like themselves, was deceived. The lette- which appeared m the Manchester Guardian, which they had 'faithfully reprinted from a New York paper, did not, it appeared on examination, correspond wit'i the letter as originally published in a newspaper at Ottawa. Sinee < that was communicated to the committee they withdrew the leaflet, and declared their intention, which they were now fulfilling, of publishing the original letter in full. It was for this offenca that charges were made against them in language befitting almost the foulest crime." This is the sort of free-and-easy way in which Mr Leonard Courtnsy and hie crew justify their circulation of gross and baselfcso accu?ations against their country and fellow -countrymen ! Such a course of conduct is hardly calculated to induce the ppople of Great and Greater Britain to accept the nocti'um which the " Conciliation Committee would like them to swallow — viz., a fresh " scuttle ' like the Gladstone one of 1881, only so much worse, inasmuch as we have expended enormously more of human life and national treasure now than then. But I am glad to see that the Courtney conciliation scheme, which is practically a repetition of the disgraceful Gladstonian sequel of Majuba, lias ben received with a roar of enraged dissent. Assuredly the people of England will never agree to the proposal of these pro-Boer agitators that all the sacri fices of the past two years shall be rendered utterly nugatory by any " terms of peace " being offered to the Boers save the " unconditional surr.°ndei " which has from the first been the inevitable consequence of the Kru-ger-Steyn ultimitum of October, 1899. Nor is it easy to see what adequate leason can be shown why De Wet, if even captured, should not be personally tried for his life for his infamous lriurder, after torture, of t'u)°e peace envoys Yet the pro-Boers indirectly seek to jtutify even those diabolical atrocities. Surely a time must come when tiic-e sedition mongers will have exhausted the patience even of the Imperial Government, as they Ions? have done that of the Britibh and colonial public? A most scathing review of Sir Redveis *Buller's conduct of the military operations in South Africa v\hile in command there has been published in a strongly Conseivative periodical. The article has created a great sensation, and will no doubt elicit some violent rejoinder^ from the friends of the popular general who is so incisively criticised. But it will not be easy to controvert the criticisms themselves, which are based upon Lord Roberta's recently published despatches. The writer begins at the beginning: — "Sir Redvers Buller," he says, " was designated for the command officially so early as August; but he did not leave England till the middle of October, actually after the Boer ultimatum. During the months his proper place was Capetown or Natal, not Pall Mall or Aldershot. Hisi selection for the chief command, however unfortunate it may now be considered to have been, no doubt at the time commanded ih;> confidenco of the public. ... It is natural to suppose that in all these months previous to the appointment of Lord Robert? hj was the principal military adviser of the Government as regards South African matters; it is therefore only fair to him that it should be now known whether he is or i-> not respossible for all these omissions' and mistakes in forethought and preparation to which v\e have alluded, and which exercised such a disastrous influence in the early stages cf the war." Admitting the ca°e of being '" v. ise after the event," the writer yet thinks that moie wisdom mio;ht have been shown before it a-j well. Ho says: "Had all troops available besn retired to Ladysmith, had tho railway bean broken up in all possible places, had minor actions, such as Talana Hill, Elandsltngte, R-eitfontcin, and Farquhar's Farm, been avoided*; while, on the other hand, had every moment been utilised in collecting nupplies, in constructing redoubts, and improving the defences of Ladysmith, — tho troops would have been left fre='i, the Boers would have been forced to act on the offensive, and Ihe communication with Colenso might probably hpve been maintained. There would, we believe, have been no investment of Lpdysmith, and the entire cour r a of the war might have been altered." Next, turning to the other operations before the relief of Ladypmith, as explained by the desnatches of Sir Redvers Buller and Lord Roberts, the writer observes : " The contrart is most remarkable. Many points require explanation, others are explained only too well. Indecision, vacillation, despondency on one side, firm, resolution, determination, and hopefulness on the other. . . In fact, it is now quite clear that Sir Redvers Buller was anxious to throw up the sponge altogether, and would have done =o had it not been for Lortr Roberts It would seem that those qualities of iron determination, persistence, and perseverance in the face of all difficulties and di<-appointment<- — qualities which were the fpecial claim to his support, by the British public — were the veiy la^t which, in tho circumstances, he po'-ser^ed." The absence of those characteiistica is thought to be illustrated by two other features in Sir R^dv ers Buller's coiuse of action. "It is now admitted," continues the ■writer, " that the Hlangwane Hill was the key to the Doer position in front of Oolenso

— in fact, it had finally to be occupied before the relief of Ladysmith was effected Sir Redvei-3 Buller himself says: 'I examined this position several times in December, as, had I been able to take it, it i& evident that its possession would confer great advantages. I decided that its captiup was a task altogether beyond the powers of the force I then commanded.' Nevertheless, on December 15, at the battle of Colenso, he directed a force of colonial mounted infantry to attack this hill, and hsd they been moderately supported no doubt they would have been successful — in fact, even without support, and numbering only 1000 men wi^h six guns, they very nearly captured it. Again, it is admitted that no attempt was made to warn Sir George White that an attack would be made on the Boer position on December 15 so as to ensure his co-operation; nor is any explanation given of this extraordinary omi=fcion. It would seem as if in both these incidents there were sig.is of the same fatal irresolution, and that absence of any decided and combined «lan of operation without winch success in war is almost impossible." Nor do these complete t':e heavy indictment of General Buller's methods and proceedings. "It 13 abundantly clear," •-•ays the writer from whom I ha\e been quoting, " that, in the refusal of Sir Redvera Buller to allow any pursuit of the flying Boers ofter the relief of Ladysmith, a great opportunity was missed He states in his desnrtch ' that the whole country round for 10 miles was clear of the <-:^my, and that, as they had moved their laagers between the 20th and 24th February, pursuit was uscles*. ' This statement is essentially contradicted by Sir George White and Lord Roberts. The latter puts it very mrdly, saying, ' I am led to believe that Sir Red\ers Buller must have been misinformed.' The relieving force had two complete mounted brigades, with guns, perfectly fresh and intact. It is known now that they repeatedly asked leave to pursue, and received positive and distinct orders to abstain from doing so Had the permission been granted, there is every reason to believe that nine pieces of artillery and the whole Boer baggage and transport must have been captured — in fact, a blow would have been struck at the demoralised and defeated farmers from which they would riot have recovered until they evacuated Natal." It is no wonder, in Hew of these disclosures as the way we precared for this war and carried it on, that the friends of Sir Redvers Buller and other officers implicated should be most anxious to " let bygoneo be bygones," and to hush up the past. But after its having become known what measure was meted out to Sir Henry Colvile for blunders infinitely smaller, alike in their essence and in ?heir results, it is not strange that the British love of lustice and fair play, which I trust we as a nation shall ne\er lose, should inspire a very general determination to insist on evenhanded treatment all round. Certainly the poople of the mother country will never rest satisfied until the full responsibility for all the shocking waste of life and money that has been caused by our political and military muddles in South Africa shall have been conclusively fixed upon the shoulders of those whose incompetence or negligence must be held accountable for our disasters.