THE STORY OF THE WAR,

Otago Witness, Issue 2456, 10 April 1901, Page 27

THE STORY OF THE WAR,

TOLD IN THE DESPATCHES.

The London Gazette of February 8 contains the whole series of Lord Roberts's despatches from the date of his arrival in South Africa down to the date of his departure. These include not only Lord Roberts's own occount of his great march from Modder Hiver to Bloemfontein, Pretoria, and to the Portuguese frontier, but the accounts of his subordinate commanders, more especially Sir G. White's account of the investment and siege of Ladysmith and Sir Redvers Buller's account of the long and stubborn struggle for the relief of the beleaguered garrison. They form, in fact,' a oomplete history of the war from the end of January, 1900, to the middle of November last. The first despatch of the series is one from Lord Roberts to Lord Lansdowne, sent from Capetown on February 6, 1900, stating the position in South Africa as Lord Roberts found it upon his arrival, and announcing the general outlines of the policy he, intended to pursue. It begins as follows : — " Now that I have been nearly a month in South Africa, and will shortly be leaving •Capetown for the operations which I propose to carry out for the relief of Kimberley and in the Orange Free State, it seems desirable that I should submit for the information of her Majesty's Government a concise account of the state of affairs in this country as I found them on my arrival^ on the 10th January. " The force which was despatched from England between the 20th October and the early part of December had been greatly scattered. The army corps organisation had been broken up, and even the formation of the divisions and brigades mateiially differed from what had been originally contemplated. On assuming the chief command, the 1 first step which Sir Redvers Buller undertook was to despatch Lord Methuen with the Brigade of Guards, the 3rd, or Highland Brigade, and a third brigade, iniistoviscd from three and a-half battalions on the lines of communication which were immediately available, for the relief of Kimberley. As your Loidship is aware, this force succeeded in crossing the Modder River; but the subsequent attack ou the Boer position at Magersfontein having been repulsed, Lord Methuen fell back on the river, where he has formed an entrenchment facing that thrown up by the enemy."

Lord Roberts then goes into the details of the disorganisation of the original schemes for a general advance owing to the critical state of affairs in Natal, and continues : —

"In view of the distance of my headquarters from Natal, and of the fact that on the date of my arrival Sir Redvers Buller had made his dispositions for the second attempt to relieve Ladysmith, I thought it best to leave him a perfectly free hand, and not to interfere with his operations

" Since I have been here I have taken no steps to render active assistance to General Sir Redvers Buller, as he had a force at his disposal which seemed sufficient for the relief of Lady-smith, and, after being reinforced by the sth Division, he had informed me that his task would not be rendered easier by a further addition to the number of his troops. Moreover, I had no troops to spare. The frontier of the Cape Colony was weakly held, and the attitude of a portion of the colonists bordering the Orange Free Stale was in some cases doubtful, and in other 3 disloyal. The conclusion I arrived at was that no sensible improvement in the military situation could be hoped for until we were prepared to carry the war into the enemy's country, and all my efforts have accordingly been exerted in that direction."

" This plan was, however, attended with considerable difficulties. The v two main roads leading from Cape Colony to the Orange Free State were held in force by the Boers at the points where those roads crossed the Orange River, and it seemed certain that the bridges over that river would be destroyed if the enemy could be forced to retire to tho northern bank. Moreover, I could not overlook the fact that, even if either of these routes could be utilised, the movement of an army solely by means of a line of railway is most tedious, if not practically impossible. The advantage is all on the side of the enemy, who can destroy the line and occupy defensible positions when and where they please. In a hilly, enclosed country, or where any large river has to be crossed, they can block the line altogether, as was proved in the case of Lieut. -colonel Lord Methuen on the Modder River, of Lieutenantgeneral French on the Orange River, and of General Sir Redvers Buller on the Tugela. A railway is of the greatest assistance; it is indeed essential to an army for the conveyance of stores and supplies from the base, and it is a most valuable adjunct if it runs in the direction of the objective, but even then a certain proportion of the troops must be equipped with wheel or pack transport to enable supplies to be collected, and to render the force sufficiently mobile to deal with many tactical difficulties which have to be surmounted, owing to the greatly increased range and povyer of modern projectiles.

"No organised transport corps existed ■when I arrived in South Africa. Some thousands of mule 3 had been collected, and a number of ox and mule waggons had been purchased, but what is known as the regimental system had been adopted, which consists in providing each unit with sufficient transport for its ammunition, baggage, and two or three days' supplies. Such a system. may answer well enough for peace manoeuvres, where the troops march short distances daily for a week or ten days, and ■where depots are established in advance from which the regimental supplies can be replenished. But this system is quite unsuitable for extensive operations in a district where no food and scarcely any forage can be procured, where advance depots cannot be formed, and where all the necessaries required by an army in the field have to be carried for a considerable distance. It is, moreover, a very extravagant system, for during a campaign every corps is not required to be continually on the move. A certain number have to garrison important points, and guard lines of communication, and for these transport is not needed. On the regimental system the transport attached to such corps would remain with them, and would therefore not be available for general purposes, or, in the event of its being taken away from them, no one would be specially responsible for its supervision. "Major-general Lord Kitcheners experience in this important matter coincides with my own, and we decided that the first thing to be done was to form a properly organised Transport department. . . "On the 26th January I received intelligence of Sir Redvers Buller's withdrawal from Sjjioft Koq to PotjsieLer'g Drift. The

second attempt to relieve Ladysmith having failed, it has become imperatively nece e =.ary to give early effect to the policy indicated above. With this object I am collecting as large a force as possible to the north of the Orange River railway station, with the view of joining the troops under Lord Methuen's command, and proceeding, in the first instance, to relieve Kimberley. The column, including cavalry and mounted infantry, will number 35,000 men, with about 100 guns. On the relief of Kimberley being accomplished I propose to leave a moderate garrison at that place, and with the remainder of the force to move eastward for the purpose of threatening Bloemfontein and seizing some points on the railway between that place and Springfontein. This operation will, I trust, cause the Boers to reduce the fore« which they have concentrated round Ladysmith, and enable our garrison there to be relieved before the end of February."

Incidentally Lord Roberts refers to the ' organisation under his auspices of that valu- ' able force, General Brabant's Colonial Divi- '< sion. To quote his own words: — "A subject ' which from the first attracted my attention was the development and organisation of the colonial force 3, of which. I was inclined to think that sufficient use had not beer made." That evening Lord Roberts left for the front. The next despatch, only 10 days later, is dated from Jacobsdal. Kimberley had been relieved, and Cronje was fleeing towards Bloemfontein with Lord Kitchener in hot pursuit. Lord Roberts begins by referring to the riaks incurred by denuding Cape Colony of troops, risk 3 which Sir A. Milner had taken care to impress upon him, but which he determined to disregard. The position in Cape Colony was serious. It was not less serious in Natal. "On the 6th of February I received a teles-ram from Sir Redvers Buller reporting tliat he had pierced the enemy's line, and could hold the hill which divided their position, but that to drive back the enemy on either flank, and thus give his own artillery access to the Ladysmith plain, 10 miles from Sir George V> nite's position, would cost him from 2000 to 2000 men, and success was doubtful. General Buller inquired if I thought that the chance of relieving Ladysmith was worth such a risk On the same day I replied that Ladysmith must be relieved even at the cost anticipated. I urged Sir Redvers Buller to persevere, and desired him to point out to his troops that the honour pf the Empire was in their hands, and to assure them that I had no doubt whatever of their being successful. i "On the 9th of February General Buller \ reported that he found himself not strong enough to relieve Ladysmith without reinforcements, and that with the fores at his disposal he regarded the operation upon which he was engaged as impracticable. i '' As Sir Charle3 Warren confirms the views of Sir Redvers Buller I have informed the latter that, though I have no wish to interfere with his dispositions, or to stop his harassing the Boers as much as possible, my original instructions must hold good. j But Lord Roberts knew that the only way to ease the strain elsewhere was to strike a signal blow himself. The despatch ejoes on to give the details of the great flank march which relieved Kimberley and ended in the capture of Cronje. The fight and siege of Paardeberg are thus described : " On the 17th and 18th of February my headquarters remained at Jacobsdal with the 7th Division. On the former date the pursuing troops came into contact with the enemy under Cronje below Paardeberg Drift. Throughout the day a series of rearguard actions took place, the enemy skilfully seizing one defensible position after another and delaying our advance. The Boers continued their retreat, and on the morning of the 18th were found to be holding a position in the bed and on the north bank of the Modder, three miles above Paardeberg Drift, where the river makes a curve to the north. In this position they had begun to entrench themselves during 1 the previous night. As soon as our troops came up the 6th Division occupied the ground to the south of the stream opposite the Boer i laager, with mounted infantry in its front ito the east The Highland Brigade was also i on the south side of the Modder, while the I 19th Brigade of the same division, under 1 Major-general Smith-Domen, advanced j along the north side, on which also two brigades of cavalry, under Lieutenant-gene-ral French, were converging from the direction of Kimberley. Early in the afternoon it seemed likely that the laager would be captured, but the Boer 3 held their ground so obstinately, and it was so difficult to force a passage through the trees and undergrowth fringing the river on both banks, that the troops had to be drawn off. Heavy loss was inflicted on the enemy, while our own loss was hardly less serious, the casualties being as follows. . , . .

" Leaving Jacobsdal at 4- a.m. on the 19th, I reached Paardeberg at 10 a.m. When I arrived on the scene I learnt that an armistice of 24- hours had been granted to General Cronje, who had asked for it on the plea that he desired to bury his dead. This armistice I immediately revoked, and ordered a vigorous bombardment of the enemy's position. General Cronje knew, as we knew, that considerable reinforcements were hastening to his assistance from Natal and from the south, and Ijis request was obviously only an. expedient to gain time. " I found the troops in camp were much exhausted by their previous marching and fighting, and I therefore decided not to make a second assault on the laager, the capture of which, by a ' coup-de-main ' would have entailed a further loss of life which did not appear to me to be warranted by the military exigencies of the situation. . . . " After his force had been surrounded, Cronje contrived to open heliographic communication with Bloemfontein, and doubtless asked for assistance, as reinforcements began to come up in scattered parties of varying strength from the east and southeast. Each commando was composed of men belonging to different districts, some of them having been withdrawn from Ladysmith and others from the northern frontier of the Cape Colony. On the morning of 23rd February the Ist Battalion Yorkshire Regiment engaged one of these parties, about 2000 strong, at the eastern end of the position 6outh of the river, and drove off the enemy with heavy loss, losing themselves three officers and 17 men wounded. Later in the day the 2nd Battalion of the Buffs, which had come up in support of the Yorkshire Regiment, captured 80 Boer prisoners. Similar parties of the enemy appeared in other directions, but were beaten back without difficulty by our troops. After being repulsed the Boer 3 seem in most cases to have dispersed, whether to their homes or to join other commandoes it is impossible to say. "At 3 a.m. on the 27th. the Royal Canadian Regiment, and No,. X Company Royal

Engineers, commanded respectively by Lieutenant-colonel W. D. Otter and Lieuten-ant-colonel W. F. Kincaid, suppoited by the Ist Battalion Gordon Highlanders, advanced under a heavy rifle fire to within 80 yards of the enemy's defences, and succeeded in entrenching themselves, with the loss of two officers v\ ounded, seven men killed, and 27 wounded. A gallant deed, creditable to all who took part in it.

"At 6 a.m. I received a letter from General P. A. Cronje, making an unconditional surrender, and throwing himself and his troops on her Majesty's clemency." The despatch ends with a brief request for reinforcements and winter coats. — the last very typical of Lord Roberts's care for his soldiers.

The next despatch is dated March 15, and was penned immediately after the entry into Bloemfontein. It describes in deta'l the whole of the march from Paardeberg to Bloemfontein. It is followed by one of March 31, reviewing the services of the troops to whose bravery and endurance his success was so largely duo. He begins with an appropriate, reference to the gallant Canadians who stoimed Cronje's laager on the anniversary of Majuba : — " I would here like to mention the distinguished part played by the Royal Canadian Regimsnt in its advance on the enemy's trenches on 27th February, and referred to in my despatch No. 3 of 28th February, 1900.

"No account of the recent operations would, however, be complete were I to omit to draw special attention to the good services performed by the splendid and highly efficient body of troops from other parts of her Majesty's Empire, which ha\e, while serving under my orders, borne a distinguished share in the advance into the Orange Free State. The various contingents from Australia, from New Zealand, and from Ceylon, the several corps which have been formed locally in the Cape Colony, and the City of London Imnerial Volunteers have vied one with the other in the performance of their duty. They have shared with the regular troops of her Majesty's f»vmv the hardships and dangers of the campaign in a manner which has gained for them the respect and admiration of all w^o have been associated with them. I trust that your Lordship will concur with me in considering that by their valour and endurance the soldiers and sai'ors serving in the force which is under my immediate command have worthily upheld the best traditions of her Majesty's army and navy." Considerations of space make it impossible to give the names of all the officers and men whom Lord Roberts here selects for special praise.

The next despatch is from Kroonstad, and is dated May 25. Lord Roberts reviews the situation in the Free State after the occupation of Bloemfontein, and explains his determination not to let his general military policy be diverted by the unfortunate incidents at Sannah's Po'at and Devvetsdorp. Between this despatch and the next, dated Pretoria, August 14, there is a long interval. Lord Roberts begins by describing the situation as it presented itself to Him at Kroonstad at the end of Hay and ghing tho reasons which in his view made it imperative to dash across the Vaal and run the inevitable risk of having his communications attacked and even interrupted. "My object then was to push forward with the utmost rapidity, while providing as far as my resources would admit for the pafety of the main line of comnvunication by occupying strategical points to the east of the railway at Winburg, Senekal, Lindley, and Heilbron. I calculated that, as soon as Mafeking had been relieved, a large proportion of the troops under the command of Lord Methuen and Sir Archibald Hunter would be available to co-operate on my left flank, and I hoped Sir Redvers Buller would be able to assist by an advance westward to Vrede, or north-westward in the Standerton direction. But whether these anticipations could be realised or not^ I felt that the enormous advantage to be gained, by striking at the enemy's capital before he had time to recover from the defeats he had already sustained, would more than counterbalance the risk of having our line of communication interfered with — a risk which had to be taken into consideration." •

The narrative of the forced march on Johannesburg is then given, and Lord Robert 3 points out how once again, immediately after the occupation of Johannesburg, he wae faced with the alternative of leaving his communications unprotected or of giving the enemy time to recover and strengthen themselves if he did not march at once on Pretoria. As usual, he took the bolder course.

The despatch goes on to describe the advance on Pretoria and the fighting at Diamond Hill. It then reverts to the " unfortunate incident" of the surrender of the Derbyshire Mijitia at the Rhenoster railway bridge. Once again he restates the causes of such mishaps and his attitude towards them.

"30. The possibility of such mishaps had been clearly foreseen by me when I determined to advance on Pretoria, for I knew I was not sufficiently strong in numbers to make the railway line absolutely secure and at the same time have a force a.t my disposal powerful enough to cope with the main army of the Transvaal supported by forts and guns of position. Now, however, that I was in possession of the capital and the majority of our prisoners had been recovered, I took immediate steps to strengthen the posts along the railway. The liberated prisoners were armed and equipped and despatched to Vereeniging and other stations south of the Vaal, and as soon as more troops could be spared they were distributed along the line between Pretoria and Kroonstad. I deputed Lieuten-ant-general Lord Methuen to superintend these arrangements, and on the 11th June he attacked and defeated the commando under Christian De Wet at the Rhenoster River. The Imperial Yeomanry Field Hospital, which had fallen into the hands of the Boers when the Derbyshire Militia surrendered a few days previously, was recovered, together with the officers and men who had been wounded on that occasion. Other desultory attacks were subsequently made on the railway line and the tiains employed for reconstruction purposes, but the enemy were on each occasion repulsed without serious loss on our side, and in the course of a few days railway and telegraphic communication were restored."

The relief of Mafeking by Colonel Mahon, the advance of General Hunter in the Western Transvaal, the operations of General Warren in the north-western districts of Cape Colony, the advance of General Buller into the Transvaal are briefly summarised The next despatch is dated October 10, and deals with the situation during the months that followed the occupation of Pretoria, and the reasons which made an imniedate further adVamos impossible.

The difficulty of dealing with the Boers when once they had broken up into guerilla bands is thus set forth: —

"The vast area of the country in which the operations are being conducted has also to be remembered The troops have had to march long distances, and,_ though existing railways have been utilised to the fullest extent, the limited capacity of single lines — especially of that between Pretoria and Bloemfontein, — coupled with the scarcity of rolling stock, has rendered it difficult to move and concentrate rapidly according to the European standard of what should be possible in war. "5. To deal with the organised forces of the enemy was a comparatively easy matter ; but in South Africa the problem had been complicated, and the settlement of the country retarded, by t li e determination of some of the Boer leaders to pursue a guerilla warfare after their troops had been defeated in the field. Owing to the non-compliance of the Boere with the recognised custom of war which compels combatants to wear a distinctive uniform, they have found it easy to pose as peaceful agriculturists one day and to take part in active hostilities on the next. Their leaders have also usually found means by threats or by persuasion to induce them to disregard their oath of neutrality, although this was voluntarily taken by men who at the time professed themselves anxious to submit to the British Government. To their honour be it said, a few of the burghers have suffered imprisonment or loss of property sooner than thus break their faith, but their number was not sufficient to enable them to exercise any influence on the general situation.

" Recsnt events have convinced me that the permanent tranquility of the Orange River Colony and Transvaal is dependent on the complete disarmament of the inhabitants ; and though the extent of country to be visited, and the ease with which guns, rifles, and ammunition can be hidden, will render the task a difficult one, its accomplishment is only a matter of time and patience." The narrative continues with the important series of operations conducted in July by Generals Hunter, Rundle, Paget, and Clements, which ended* in the surrender of over 4000 Boers in the Brandwater Basin, a success which was, however, partially marred by the escape of De Wet and Olivier. The operations in the Western Transvaal in July and August and the operations of Sir Rodvers Buller away in the Southern Transvaal are then given. After this follows the detailed story of the march to Komati Poort ending with the final destruction of the last legular force kept together by the Boers.

The last despatch of the series is one written by Lord Roberts on his way to the coast at Johannesburg on November 15, but not actually despatched till his arrival Home on January 3. It begins by an expression of regret for the loss to the field force of thoFe colonial contingents whose time had expired, and who wished to return home, a loss all the more seriously felt owing' to the state of affairs brought about by the dispersal of the Boer forces into guerilla band?. " 3. To meet this state of affairs the army had to be broken up into smaller columns than had hitherto been found advantageous, and the mobility of each column had to be increased. Great difficulty was, however, experienced in carrying out the?© necessary changes, owing to the time having arrived for the withdrawal of the Royal Canndian Dragoona, the Royal Canadian Regiment, the three batteries of Canadian Artillery, and the greater part of the first contingents furnished by Australia, New Zealand, and Tasmania, and allowing the members of \l c several South African corps to letiun to their homes and employments afier having been embodied for 12 months.

" It was impossible to disregard the urgent leasons given by o\ir colonial comrades for not being able to remain longer at the teat of war. They had done admirable B ervice and shown themselves 1 well fitted lo take their places by the side of her Majesty's regular troops, and I witnessed their departure with deep regret, not only on account of their many soldierly qualities, but because it materially impaired the mobility and efficiency of the army in South Africa for the time being, a very critical time, too, until, indeed, a tresh body of mounted infantry could be formed from the nearest available line battaLons, and the several South African local corps could be again recruited up to their original streiv-rt'* " As Lord Roberts remarks later in the despatch, "Large as the force appears to be in South Africa, it has proved all too small for tho duties it has been required to perform." The despatch goes on to summarise the oon fused and intrics'e operations which, took place during October and November. It concludes with a review of the work done by the South African Field Force during the period for which Lord Roberts commanded it.

"32. From thi?. my final despatch, I have been obliged, on account of its great length, most reluctantly to omit many interepiing incidents, and to leave unrecorded many gal lant deeds. As it is, I feel an apology is duo for the almost inordinate propoi tiers which this, as well as my former despatches have assumed, owing to the vastness of the countiy over which operations had to be carried out, the length o[ time to which they have extended, and consequently the great number of events going on in different places simultaneously, which have had to bo ciescubed.

" 33. The magnitude of the task which he/ Majesty's Imperial troops have been called upon to perform will perhaps be better realised if I give the actual number of miles of the several lines of communication, each one of which has had to be carefully guarded, and compare with the well-known countries of Europe the enormous extent of the theatie of war from one end of which to the other troops have had to be frequently moved. "The areas included in the theatre of w?> are as follows : — Square Miles. Cape Colony 277,151 Oiange River Colony . .. 48,320 Transvaal v 113,6^0 Natal .... ,; 18,913 Total -..-? ... 458,030 Rhodesia 750,000 "'And the distance^ troops have had to tiavel are : — By land— Miles. Capetown to Pretoria . •... 1040 Pretoria to Komati Poort — 260 Capetown to Kimberley ... .V, 647 Kimberley to Mafeking ... .). 223 Mafeking to Pretoria „ ,„ 160 Mafeking to Beira 1135 Durban to Pretoria 511 "Fiom these tables it will be seen that, after having been brought- by sea 6000 miles and more fiom their base in the United Kingdom, the army in South Africa had to be distributed over an aica of greater extent than France (204,146 square miles) and Germany (211,168 sqvuue niilep) put togethei, and

if we include that part of Rhodes. a witf» which we h°-d to do, large/ than the combined areas of France, Germany, and Austria (261,649 pquare rime?).

" And it should bo remembered that over these great distances we were dependent on\ single lines of railway for the food supply, 1 guns, ammunition, horses, transport animals, and hospital equipment — in fact, all the reof an army in the field, and thatalong these lines, bridges and culv-erts hac^ been destroyed in many places, and rails were being constantly torn up." These tabular statements show better almost than anything else the wastage of advancing forces and the smallness of the force that even an army of over 200,000 men, continually reinforced, can bring into the field at long distances from its base. The total army with which Lord Roberts entered Bloemfontein wan only just 27,000 men and 7600 hor;e«. At Pretoria on June 5 he had! karely 24,000 and 6000 horses. The force that marched on Komati Poort three months later was under 22,000 (including Genera] Buller's force), with less than 5000 horses.