PATER'S CHATS WITH THE BOYS.

Otago Witness, Issue 2399, 22 February 1900, Page 64

PATER'S CHATS WITH THE BOYS.

"THE MAKING OF A FRONTIER."

This is the title of a veiy interesting took written by Colonel Algernon Duranrl, C.8., C.1.E., who was, British agent at Gilgit, 1889-1894, and military secretary to the Viceroy of India, 1894-1899; and the volume may be classed with those books describing the events which make for the expansion of the Empire. I wish all my readers could go through it : they world then know what our frontier officers face, and see how conquest is forced upon us in spite of ourselves. LITTLE ENGLANDERS. There are many among us who cannot understand why we are always annexing territories. If they only read history, worked out the course of current events, and saw what other nations are doing, they would, I am &ure, modifj- their opinions very much. I dare say that Dimmd had such well-intentioned but narrow-minded people in his mind when he wrote this : " There is a certain school which is never tired of accusing soldiers and political oificers on the frontier of stirring up strife, out of a desire to extend the limits of our power at any cost, and to snatch personal distinction from the resulting war. If these critics had ever commanded, even in the smallest expedition, they would understand the terrible responsibility which rests upon a leader, not alone on account of the hundreds of lives dependent on his judgment, but from the fact that the honour of his country's arms and its good name for truth and honesty are in his hdnds. Had they once felt what this means they would be less free with their unworthy imputations. If there are responsible English gentlemen who would plunge their country into the smallest war tor the pure love' of conquest, or for the sake of their own paltry ambition, I thank God I have not met them. Such men -must be few and far between." Naturally the author has something to say about the Russians, who by their plotting are responsible, more or less, for most of our frontier fighting. Colonel Durand was directly connected with' the Hunza- | Nagar campaign, in which these wee piincipalities threatened Britain with the wrath of the three Empires — Hunza-jSTagar, China, and Russia. The help expected, particularly from Russia, was not ioriheoming, and the promptness of the colonel's action shut out Russia from what is from her point of view a valuable strategical position, a situation which a Russian statesman sums up in the sentence, " They (the British) have slammed the door in our faces." Of Russia's onward and irresistible march he writes: — "The Great Empire — the coming shadow of which Napoleon saw with prophetic eye — is expanding in many directions. Central Asia is now hers. That her soldiers, and the ablest of them, consequently .believe in the possibility of conquering India, no one who has had the chance of studying the question can doubt. Her diplomats may not consider the task one to be undertaken — they arc fairly busy elsewhere. None the less do her tentacles creep cautiously forwaid towards our Indiali frontier. To-day it is the Pamirs, tomorrow it will be Chinese Turkestan or part of Persia, which is quietly swallowed. 'For every point of possible attack gained is to her advantage, and eveiy man of ours who can be kept locked up in India, or guarding its frontier, when the Battle of Armageddon does come, must be withdrawn from the real chessboard, wherever that must be. That, to my mmd, is the crucial point." In another part of the book, when the occupation of Gilgit is considered, the question is asked, "Can Russia invade India V" And it is answered something like this : Russia had advanced to the Hindu-Kush ; it was necessary to see that she did not cross. jSTo man in his senses ever believed that a Russian army would cro&s the Pamirs and attack India by way of the passes of Hunza and Chitral ; but we could not overlook the fact that in 1885, when war hung in the balance, some thousands of her troops were moved down towards the Pamirs. What was this for? — hlardly for change of air, or to shoot big game, as the 'British public were asked to believe later on, when similar moves ere made. The object was to get a footing on the south side of the Hindu-Kush, and to paralyse numbers of our troops who would have to be kept in observation of possible Russian lines of advance "Further," the writer adds, "I have no hesitation in saying, and 1 know every inch of the country, and every im- j porlant man in it, that at the time of I am writing, had war broken out between us and liussia, there vra.s absolutely nothing to prevent a Russian officer with a thousand Cossacks from reaching Astor in , 10 days after crossing the posses of the I Hindu-Kush, and from watering his horses in the Woollar Lake four days later. The Kashmir troops usualjy kept on the frontier would have gone like chaff before ike wind, and there would have been no local opposition ; far from it, an invader promising the loot of Kashmir * would, have been welcomed. W.&. should

have been treated in India to a bolt from the blue. Tint a thousand Cossackb could not hold Kashmir is perfectly true, but think what the effect in India would have been when the Maharajah and his Court, the Resident, and any Europeans in the country came tumbling out of Kashmir, flying from a Russian force the strength of which no one could tell. There would have been no British troops within 200 miles of Kashmir, all eyes would have been turned to Peshawar and Bolan fronts, where our troops would have been massing, and the woid would have suddenly gone forth: — " The Russians have turned our flanks, they are in Kashmir, and will be in the Punjab and on our lines of communication in a week." The consideration that though the main fact might be correct the deduction from it was unsound would have carried little weight. Public opinion, both in India and England, could not fail to be seriously stirred by the invasion of Kashmir, the wildest rumours would have been credited, the mo^t dismal prophecies believed. The alarmist within the country is a worse enemy than the foe at the gates. For the moment the effect would have been stunning, and though in the end we should have recovered from the blow, it would have been a terribly effective movement with which to open a campaign. Let people consider lor a moment what a born leader like Skobeleff would have made of a chance like this, and they will, I think, agree that, expensive as the Gilgit game may have been, it was worth the candle."' And as it was with the Gilgit campaign, so it is with others. As instance what millions of money and loss of life would have been saved if Gladstone had taken more effective action in the Soudan and the Transvaal, and if Delagoa Bay had been acquired when it was under offer for a song? "War is bad enough at any time, but mis-managed war is hell:" and it is just as bad a thing when a small war is evaded only that forces may gather for a larger one. TRANSPORT. We have more than once expressed our impatience at the want of land and sea transport in connection with the present wpv. But in doing so we forget the almost insurmountable difficulties and the immense expense. Within a very short time 120 transports were sent to the Cape, a fleet more * than equalling the entire maritime fleet of many Continental nations. Durand tells us of ' the work he had to face in wintering Iris garrison. Five hundred tons of grain had to be brought into the Gilgit district, and before he had mule tracks constructed all his wonts were met by a coolie service ; now, a« a coolie could only carry from 601b to 801b, with five day's' provisions, the organising necessary for his 500 tons can be worked out : then increase that transport service for, say, 200,000, and though this will be in excess of South African requirements, it will be seen that in a hostile'country a transport department has to be exceptionally well organised, and have almost unlimited control of money to carry through an effective service. Durand, later on, had 1000 mules to take the plnce of coolies : at the Cape we must have tens of thousands pressed into the service. Colonel Long, General Gatacre, and Lord Methuen have all fallen into traps ; but their losses pale before the losses in the frontier passes although the population in the Pamirs and highlands is not very dense. In one place we are told that a pass was blocked up both ends, and the force trapped, to the number of 1200 wiped out ; but in anothei Chitrali defile 7000 men were destroyed or taken prisoners. These losses occurred in local disturbances, not againsi us. We deplore the lamentable loss of life in our recent mistakes, and the humiliation of surrendering men to men whom we look at as being inferior in civilisation to ourselves, but these reverses are a bagatelle to what thsy could have been, and to w.hat they probably will be, if we are ever at war on land with one of the military powers. I have already exceeded my space, so I shall write no more on " The Making of a Frontier " ; but get it added to your library if you have one, and "if not, combine with two oi three more, and get books direct from the Dunedin Athenaeum. I am sure we are all very much more buoyant now that the tide has turned so definitely in our favour, though we are not out of the woods yet ; and I do hope that when terms of peace come to be arranged, France and Russia will have no opportunity to interfere. Lord Roberts has crossed the Modder," and though he ha.-n't burnt his bridges to prevent retreat (don't be critical, and say he had no bridges tv burn, and the drifts cannot be de&xroyed), we may make pretty sure that it will be something extraordinary that will now make him turn his face to Capetown.