BATTLE OF MAGERSFONTEIN.

Otago Witness, Issue 2394, 18 January 1900, Page 37

BATTLE OF MAGERSFONTEIN.

GRAPHIC DETAILS. BY OUR SPECIAL WAR CORRESPONDENT. TELEGRAPHED FROM WELLINGTON. Modder River, December 13.

The engagement commenced on Sunday afternoon, December 10, at Magersfontein. On that day our artillery commenced to shell the enemy's position, and a terrific bombardment of the Boer entrenchments was kept up until dusk. The following morning, as <3awn was breaking, Lord' Methuen's division moved out on the enemy's position. Our forces consisted of the 9th and 12th Lancers, the Naval Brigade with a 4-.7iri gun, the G Battery of the Royal Horse Artillery, the 75th, 62nd, 73rd, 18th, and 65th Howitzer Batteries, the Highland Brigade, the Guards' Brigade, the 9th Brigade in reserve, the Mounted Infantry, Remington's Guides, with details of the Army Service Corps and the Field Hospital Corps. THE ENEMY'S POSITION, -which had been carefully chosen, was situated •on a high kopje, and had been magnificently •entrenched. While it was yet dark the Highland Brigade was advanced to the front of the ikopje. In the black darkness of the hours just preceding daybreak they were moving •forward, when a deadly fire was poured into 'their ranks from one of the enemy's rifle pits, upon which they had stumbled u/.awares. They paid heavily for the misadventure, and tinder a withering fusillade were compelled *c retire to cover.

A FEARFUL CANNONADE. Soon after daylight, and an hour or two after the advance of the Highland Brigade, our artillery opened fire on the enemy's position. Never in modern warfare has such a terrific cannonade been witnessed. From 38 guns a tremendous bombardment was continuously maintained, the din being appalling. Our guns were excellently placed. " Joe Chamberlain " played long bowls from the west of the position, and from this point round to our centre and right the batteries were disposed with consummate skill. From dawn till dusk, with a brief lull at mid-day, our guns were kept going, their shot and shell playing all the time apparently upon the enemy's rifle pits, but as no artillery was brought into action against us the exact positions were difficult to locate. Meanwhile the rear, fallen from its coign of vantage, was giving valuable information as to the enemy's movements. So searching was the fire of our 38 guns, and so accurately did our shells burst, it seemed scarcely possible that anyone could live in the trenches. But, notwithstanding that, whenever our front line of attack advanced within range of the pits, they learned to their cost that the riflemen were still there. AN UNSUCCESSFUL MANOEUVRE. The Guards' Brigade were told off for a flank movement on the enemy's left, and were deployed to our right with this object in view. Had the manoeuvre been carried out it would have been a very paying move on the part of the general. But a reinforcement of about 2000 Boers, who took up a very strong position on our right flank, effectually checked the attempt, and as nearly as possible turned the day against us. Towards evening a general assault of the enemy's position was spoken of by many, but the Boers continued to stick to their trenches with dogged determination, and the undertaking was of too hazardous a nature for our force, tired by the day's hard fighting, to attempt. ADDITIONAL PARTICULARS. MODDER RIVER MILITARY CAMP, December 23. General Methuen returned to the camp at Modder River yesterday, bringing the dead and wounded from the Magersfontein battlefield. Our losses were heavy. The ambulances were out for a greater part of f^e

night on Monday, and brought in all who fell. They report that they saw the Boers dragging their dead to the trenches wherefrom firing had taken place during the battle, and covering them with a light sprinkling of sand, no effort being made to give them decent burial. I have interviewed one of the wounded Boers captured by our men, and he tells me that our lyddite shells were exceedingly effective, and one of our wounded who lay on the battlefield the whole night says that he saw one trench alone filled with over 150 dead Boers. Our ambulance stretcher-men were not interfered with during their work in the night, though they were repeatedly fired on during the fight. THE HIGHLAND BRIGADE. One of the most extraordinary features of the fight was the manner in which the Highland Brigade was surprised by the enemy. The advance of the brigade commenced shortly after 3 o'clock on Monday morning, and the march took place in dense darkness aud with heaw rain falling. They were marching in quarter column formation, swinging along in the familiar manner in which men inarch back from parade. Suddenly and without the slightest warning a single rifle report rang out on the air. This was apparently the signal of a Boer scout, for in an instant the whole length of a Boer trench immediately before the brigade burst into flame. Just for the moment there was something of a stampede on the part of the Highlanders. Our men 'fell like ripe fruit drops from a shaken tree. Then they rallied, and with a rush and a cheer flung themselves with the bayonet upon a party of Boers whom they distinguished by means of the rifle fire. There was hot work for some time, as the men cut and thrust, and the Boers replied all along the trenches with a tremendous fire. The brigade appear to have got into this warm corner purely by mistake. The idea of the brigade was that they were to march to a distant kopje, take up a position, and attack the enemy from the further side. Soon after the fight commenced, 'Xs£E AttIIJULERT came into action, opening fire from four field batteries. These were in the centre, and opened fire from a mile range. The Horse Artillery on the right and the Howitzer Battery on the left shelled at four thousand yards. Eight lyddite shells burst on the kopje be1 neath which the enemy were entrenched, and then the Howitzer Battery, coming closer, vigorously shelleu the trenches below the j kopjes, and gradually checked the enemy's I rifle fire. Apparently, however, we did very little damage in this engagement, for when the field gun moved closer to the right the J limbers encountered a tremendous fusillade j from the enemy's front. By the time the eni gagement became general it was found that the enemy extended all along our right flank far in the direction of the Modder River. Hiding behind stones and in the thick bush, they poured in a terrifio rifle fire, effectually checking all cavalry movements. This necessitated the Guards Brigade being brought into action in order to defend our flank to support the right centre. THE GORDONS' MISFORTUNE. The misfortune whioh befell the Gordon Highlanders later in the morning belongs to the category of the unpreventable developments of the battle. The Gordons were in support of the Highland Brigade. At about 9 o'clock in the morning they were brought up to the right centre. The Boers were splendidly concealed in the trenches on the right, hidden by leaves and bushes. They allowed the Gordons to pass them without firing a single shot, and they attacked the flank of the column in the rear, while others in the front poured in deadly volleys as the men swung along. The men staggered under the terrifio onslaught, and Colonel Downman, seeing the state of affairs, turned to his men and cried " Come on, Gordons !" and then the men rallied and fought like lions. Unluckily, the men got into a crossfire between our field guns and the Boer t-I.arp shooters, so the fight went on, as at Modder River, until our firing line became prostrate under the fierce attack of the enemy. The field battery was now only 1200 yards from the trenches, and kept up a splendid practice, though terribly exposed to the enemy's Mauser fire, the Boers pouring in a perfect hail of bullets. Once again therefore the gunners, though praotioally deserted, came to the rescue, though the Gordons pluckily stuck to their post. Orders then came to the front

from the general Snat the position was to be held until darkr-ess fell, and Ewart, brigademajor, did hie best to carry out the order. The brigade rallied somewhat, and Colonel Airlie gallantly dismounted part of the 12th Lancers and took them into the firing line. The Scots Guards came up in the centre, and together with the 6th Lancers on the extreme right did some fine work checking the hot attack right along the river bank. The hope was still entertained that we might be able to attack with the bayonet. The Boer guns, till now silent, opened furiously on the Highlanders, who were forced to retire, leaving the Guards to hold the whole ground. Obviously therefore a night attack was out of the question. As the sun set one of the enemy's guns was still in action, and compelled us to withdraw nearer to the river. THE BOEUS' TACTICS. Among the notable features of the fight is the fact that the Boers again took up a position in the trenches in the open veldt, an operation whioh they first executed in the battle at Modder River. It is apparent from this that Cronje realised through this new departure that his people are able to resist British troops longer than on kopjes, from which by sheer valour we drove them at Belmont, and again at Grass Pan. In the Modder River fight the Boers entrenched with the river behind them, with Boer sharpshooters on the other (the north) side of the river covering them with their rifles, as if to restrain any inclination on their part to retreat. In the battle of Magersfontein the trenches were dug in front of a large kopje, where many men were stationed, and to run to whf<ih necessitated full exposure to our soldiers v,a the veldt and to the shells from the guns. THE LOSSES. Official information as to our total losses shows that it is 800, including 200 missing. Fifteen officers were killed, five are missing, and forty-eight were wounded, the prinoipa

of whom are General vVauchope Colfnel Goft (Argyll and Sutherland Highlander), Colonel Cood (Black Watch), M**or L&id Winchester, Major Milton (coinmancßng Mounted Infantry), Major Robertson (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders), Brevet-minor Ray (Fifth Fusiliers), attached to fb» Mounted Infantry.