THE WAR.

Otago Witness, Issue 2391, 28 December 1899, Page 43

THE WAR.

THE BOER CAMPAIGN.

VIEWS OF MR J. B. ROBINSON.

The Afrikander millionaire Mr J. B. Robinson has long letters in the Daily News and The Times on the South African campaign. He gays : —

It must be quite evident that the Beers are fighting well. They have, xip to the pre^snt, got as far as Colenso, and I have no hesitation in saying, from my knowledge and actual experience of Boer warfare, that England has never yet encountered a body of men who will fight with eueh tenacity and with such dier results as the Boer army which it is now facipg. It must be remembered that these' people are fighting with the determination to gain the ascendency throughout South Africa. Their proclamation of British territory clearly indicates that they are resolved to establish themselves as the paramount Power throughout the country. They have, in fact, burned their boats, and the Free State troops now in the Cape Colony, at such places as Colesberg and other localities, ore trying to induce the Dutch there to join them in their struggle against England. It is for this reason that Iso much regret the disaster that took place at Ladysmith the other day, and it is for this very reason that I am moot anxious- that no second blow of the sort should be experienced. Any loss to the British is magnified throughout the whole of South Africa, and will act as a strong incentive to the doubtful element, who arc extremely ignorant, to join the forces of the republics. Even the native mind is very sensitive of these matters, and they also are in the habit of supporting the battalions — i.e., being on the winning side. I may stale that the numbers of the forces which are given from time to time as constituting the two armies of the Transvaal ; and Orange Free State, are grossly exaggerated, I still maintain that the two republics together cannot put more than 23,000 to 25,000 men in the field altogether. They may have in addition to this about 3000 mercenarios, which would bring their totals up to 26,000 or 28,000, and this number has been divided and sent to different points to carry on the operations of the war. They are all splendidly armed, and. as I stated before, artillery forms a very important element in the armaments of the two States, I consider that the Transvaal has expended within the last three years about three millions of money in armament, and in thorough' y equipping its own and t!>e Free State's burghers. I know, as a matter of fact, that cannon was sent from time to time by the Transvaal to the Orange Free State, and that every precaution has been made to carry on the struggle with the utmost determination. The Natal country is, I maintain, well adapted for Boer tactics, and tliis is proved by the manner in which they are operating thero. The Free State is now concentrating pome of its forces in tho Cape Colony, and on the banks of the Orange .River, and is preparing for the advent of Sir Redvcrs Buller. Ido not believe that they will attack any of the Cape Colony's inhabitants, but they are certainly preparing for the arrival of tho troops aud a groat battle. General Joubert will bo. compelled, when the Army Corps gets into the Orange Free State, either to send or bring back some of the men now in Natal to join the Free Slate's foroes. This will relieve Sir George White, and he will be able to fight hip way towards Laing's Nek, with the view of crorang into Trai'flvaal territory. It will come all right later on, but in the meantime the Boers will take porisesiion of Colenso and the Tugela bridge, and will keep this bource of communication open to suit their own purposes. Should a relieving forco be sent to Ladysmith, they will then blow up tho bridge, and destroy the railway line as much as possible. The great battles must -be fought when Sir Redvers Buller moves into the territory of the two Republics. That v where the decisive battle will take place. I feel confident thai if the commander of the Buitifah forces in Natal will only remain quietly in Ladysmith (considering that he has some 10,000 men and 40 or 50 guns), the Boeo forces will be unable to dislodge him or takp tho place. All that is required is to throw up earthworks, winch has doubtless been already done ; but he should continue to strengthen them, and, -as tiio soil where the camp is stationed at present is well adapted for that purpose, defensive walls can be thrown up in a very short space of time to a very considerable height. The great and decisive battles will be fought on the plains of the

Orange Free State and Transvaal, when Sir Redverß Buller moves forward with the troops now oe. the water.

I see that many writers attach a great deal of importance to the cavalry. This is a mistake. Cavalry, in a country like Natal, may act as scouts, but beyond that I do not, consider that they can be used to advantage against the Boers, who are far quicker and more active on horseback than any cavalry regiment that could be sent from this country. The formation of the ground being stony, no cavalry regiment can operate with any chance of success against a commando of Boers. Even wheu the Boers are mounted they, -race over these places, and if cavalry wero to follow them they would jump off their horses, throw themselves behind stones, and destroy a great many of the cavalry in no time. This was done by them at the fight at Glencoe, and this is how they captured so many of the Hussars and mounted infantrymen.

The only chance that cavalry will have" will be on the plains of the Free State and Transvaal, after the Boer army has been defeated, or when they are driven out of one position and aTe moving with the objtct of taking up another. Even then the Boors do not retreat together. They open out and start in different directions in a wonderfully active manner. They know the position that they are going to take up again, and to that position they will all fly and re-form.

It must not be forgotten that every Boer in a commando is not only a unit in tha* commando, but is a general unto himself. His aim and object is to fire in such a manner as he thinks fit and suitable to protect his own life, and to destroy as many of the enemy as he possibly can. He shifts his position when he thinks proper to do so, move? rapidly, and fires when he has taken accurate aim. The officer commanding exercises at that particular moment not the slightest influence on his movements. It is only when a general retreat is to be made, or the commando has to c'.iango its position, that the officer's voice is heard, and at times also when the officers are desirous of instructing their men to fire more rapidly.

On the plains or "flats" (as we call them in South Africa) in the Orange Froe Stato or Transvaal the whole position of^affairs will assume a different aspect. . The decisive battles will have to be fought on those plains, and, though there are neks or hills running through the country, the British army can always continue Us onward "march, to Bloetnfontein and Pretoria by avoiding these hills or neks, a-nd nobody k:iows this better than the officers commanding the Boer nrmies at the present moment. That is ■why they have concentrated their strongest forces and best shots in Natal territory-. They will do their utmost to strike a decisive blow there, but I maintain that they will never lake L»dysmith on account of the open ground that lie 3 contiguous to the town. The Boers do riot fight on tsie military system that is adopted by Em-opean armies. They will nor rush a position that is so strongly defended with cannon and men. and which would expose them on "the flat ground round the entrenchments. The Boer u.ses no bayonet. His strength lies in his rifle, his accurate shooting, rapid movements, and a well-sheltered position.