NOTES ON THE WAR.

Otago Witness, Issue 2389, 14 December 1899, Page 25

NOTES ON THE WAR.

By Major Kennedy.

December 5,

The news from Cape Colony is very far from, being satisfactory. In all the Dutch centres of population local rebels are joining the enemy's ranks, and, in conjunction with the Boer ' commandos from "the Free State, it is reported that they are attempting to flank General Gatacre's command. Steynsburg, mentioned in the despatch, is situated just north of Stormberg, in the Colesberg district, and Sterkstroom is in the same district, but situated about 30 miles from Stormberg, between that" place' and Queenstown. It is the junction of the railway line that runs out from the East London-Norval's Pont system to Indwe, and for administrative purposes it is partof the Colesberg district, although it is nearer to Queenstown than to Colesberg.

Reading between the lines of the cable message one can understand why Generals Gatacre and French have not been able to make headway in clearing the northern districts. It is evident that Stormberg and all the country east of there and south as far as Putter's Kraal is under the control of the enemy. Venterstad is close to Burgh ersdorp, and not far from Steynsburg, so it is clear that the Boers and their Dutch allies are well around the right flank of Gatacre's division, as from latest-advices he was north of. Arundel, somewhere in the vicinity of Rendsburg and Plewman.

Latest cables give the strength of- the various commands as follows : — General Bulier, 23,000 men ; Lord Methuen, 10,000 ; General Gatacre, 6000 ; General French 3000— .i total of 42,000 officers and men. In addition to these 8000 men, under General Sir F. Walker, are holding the lines of railway. Besides there are garrisons at Capetown and King Williamstown and other places, and General White has about 9000 men under his command. We have, consequently, nob less than between 65,000 and 75,000 men in South Africa, including volunteers and irregular troops. But our most useful arm for actual fighting is too little cared for, and we are usually taken at a disadvantage, as we have an army practically out d?" touch with the enemy for days at a stretch.

The cables just received clearly indicate the condition of affairs throughout Cape Colony has not improved. From Capetown, dated the 4th, we learn that a combined force of cavalry and infantry from General Gatacre's command found the enemy in great force at Rendsburg Kopje, to the north of Arundel — in fact, the enemy were regarded as too strong to attack, as our forces retired to Naauwpoort Junction. We may as well.be prepared to hear that Generals Gatacre "and French will have to act on the defensive until large additions are made to the forces under their command. There is no use disguising the fact that very many thousands of the Dutch colonists have joined the enemy, as th». numbers that are reported to' be in the tlmerent districts are greatly in excess of the whole population of the two Republics, and the continued occupation of British territory by the enemy is giving confidence to the Dutch rebels.- It is poor policy to allow this condition to exist, as every day that the Boer forces remain in the Cape will add to the number of Dutch recruifs, and the only way to drive them north is by sending every available mounted soldier that can be obtained into the districts at present held by the enemy. The retreat of Gatacre's command to Naauwpoort is a plain confession that his force is too small to offer battle to the enemy in front of his position ; and add to this the fact that to the east and south-east of Naauwpoort the- enemy seem to be in full and undisputed of the country, they haye leisure time in which they hold, auctions of the cattle and , effects of the British loyalists. So confident are they of ultimate success that even houses and landa are included in the sales. This belief in the final overthrow of British power must be strong when at this stage of the war such transactions take place, for the Boer is not inclined to treat such matters lightly, and unless they were very confident the Dutch would be more careful in word and act. But until our troops inflict one or two crushing defeats on them treason is bound to spread. The sooner these defeats are administered the easier it will be to stop Dutch rebels from taking up arms against Great Britain.

Let us then see where the troops are to reinforce Gatacre and French in sufficient numbers to bring about defeats that are necessary to change the conditions that exit and bring about a more desirable stiAC of affairs. Cable messages inform us that 8000 troops are at the present time guarding the lines of communication between fie Aar and the Modder River, a total distance of 122 miles. Now if it takes 8000 troops to guard this 122 miles it will certainly take a proportionately greater number to guard the 60 miles between De Aar and Naauwpoorb, leaving every additional mile of railway in the rear out of the question. At the time of writing we have no assurance that in the Cape, or on the way to the Cape, are troops in sufficient number to be found available to supply the additions required, for yesterday's cables informed us that the five leading commands absorbed 50,0U0 of the troops now iv the country, without allowing for those retained for garrison purjioses or for communication duties on the other lines by which troops and supplies must go to tho front

At -the present time Lord Meth'tfeii^Sjf waiting for reinforcements, while Gatacro and French are unable to move owing- to the weakness of their commands. Under these conditions one cannot at this time! seo any indication for a rapid advance iqi any part of Cape Colony or Beehuanaland,* and, in fact, no great surprise cead be fel<{ if Gatacre and French are forced uaek_ou De Aar.

It is with . regret that I record thdi stranding of the transport Ismore ' at St.< Helena Bay, Cape Colony, about 100 miles north of Capetown, on the west coast. There is practically no harbour there. Ifc is a very dangerous shore, and there is hardly any possibility of the ship being saved, and very little chance that the horse 3 on board will be landed, as for miles from the coast the surf breaks over a series of reefs. This is to be greatly regretted, as the lack of cavalry and artillery is the greal cause of the British being unable to bring matters to a nead more promptly.

Turning, to the Natal side, we find the conditions much improved, for there it -appears General JBiiller has quietly-concen-trated -a' much more'numerous arijf powerful force than we, had any reason to expect.Recent cables state that 'he has 23,000 men under his' command, which, added to the 9000 of 10,000 men under General White/ would -make the British forces superior to' ' the Boer forces opposing them. Under these conditions we may:expecfc jthat things, will change very 'rapidly, as ' it -is not; t r o>^ be expected that the Boefs are capable 'of offering battle to the advancing "column in' such strength that they would, have any reasonable chance of success. Unless they are able to stop Buller's advance they must ratreat, in order, to keep the roads in .their rear open, otherwise our -cavalry N and mounted infantry forces would be likely to attempt to gain the passes of the Draken-' bergs, and thus stop their only means- oi retreating after defeat. lam confident that the Boer reign in Natal will soon be a matter of past history. I only wish W6 •• could say the same regarding their oocupa- < tion of the Cape

Major-general Kelly-Kenny, C.8., P.S.C. (inspector-general of auxiliary forces and re--cruiting since 1897), was born in 1840;: served in the Chinese war of 1860, and was' mentioned in despatches, and receivedmedal with clasp. He also served in the Abyssinia" campaign of 1867-8, .was mentioned in despatches, and wears the medal for that war. He was" promoted major-" general in 1897. - ■"" >

The use of cavalry in modern warfare ia ( somewhat different from what it. was irt._ the days of the. muzzle-loaders, and yet(, there are times even now when cavalry are! just as necessaiy to complete a victory or. to capture an enemy's artillery as it was inf the days of Napoleon. But it is very differ< ent work that the cavalry is called \ipon' to do in the war in South Africa ■ front x - what it would be required 'to perform if. we were fighting a European ,army. How-; ever, the duties of the cavalry soldier today when he takes, the field are not made up principally of fighting, but of watching the enemy and reporting .his movements, and on account of the small number, of cavalry attached to our forces in South! Africa the Boers move about the flanks ofl our army and forage and cut the lines' of communication at their leisure. It is on account of this freedom of action that our, troops have been unable to obtain any ad« vantage over the enemy, for the Bpersy being all well mounted, can move out of the range of our infantry rifles whenever ifc' suits their purpose, and this is really whab has happened at Kaffirskop, Grass Pan, and Modder River. .Had we had cavalry in anything like sufficient force it is very] likely that the whole course of the war 1 a would have -been changed, and, instead ofi. allowing the Boers to obtain a ifooting in, British territory^ the war could- have had! its centre in the Free State, and ere this Pretoria would have been in General Buller's hands.

But as I started to tell of the cavalryman's duties, I will try and explain them so that a civilian may fully grasp my mean* ing. When near the enemy a cavalry force is always sent out in front 'and on the flanks of the main column to feel for and find the enemy, and to report upon tha country through which the troops are about to march. The- cavalry are sent forward in squadrons under command of squadron. j commanders, and have a regular system, of marching by throwing out advanced guards'' and vedettes at stated intervals, while, the *main column follows to reinforce if neces-.^ sary. or to furnish a base for the advanced guard to fall back upon if attacked by. superior numbers of the enemy.. , These squadrons, in military parlance, when once in touch with the enemy, the commander of the contact squadron must keep his command in such a position that they can watch every movement made, by that portion of the enemy that he has under his: observation, and from time to time send reports to the commandant of the body in, the rear, so that the position and inter.-' tions of^ the enemy may be known to thb' general * officer commanding. . Under nc circumstances' must a contact squadron re^ linquish or lose sight of the enemy t until properly relieved, and, no matter how. difficult or dangerous the service may b« or how long without food or water, and regardless of exposure, this squadron must perform the duties devolving upon it until the arrival of sufficient force to relieve it* when it is allowed to go to the rear of the column. Of course it is always the cus*, torn as far as possible to relieve squadrons which have been in contact at regular in-; tervals, but it sometimes happens that this cannot be carried out, and on such occa- # sions the duties are very arduous, but unavoidable. The rear of an army is covered by cavalry, just the same as the front, with this difference, that no contacts squadrons are in the rear. It is on this account that cavalry are said to be tha eyes and ears of an army. In the war now in progress in South) Africa cavalry is more essential than in -any; other in which we are likely to be engaged,^ and proportionately greater numbers are re=» quired. Two reasons may be assigned for this — first, the conditions of climate am

such that infantry regiments are unable to march with any rapidity or for long dis- - tancas ; and, secondly, because every ..man in the Boer ranks is mounted. He can at all times move out of the way of our infantry and flank any position they may take .up, -^ness sufficient cavalry forces are on Hand to turn them and hold them in check until the slower moving infantry can come -in range. Two very .important cases in point which have occurred during .the present war may be cited in proof of this statement, the first of which occurred in Natal, when, about ten days ago, Boer commando's, moving from both the right and left flanks .of Joubert's army, passed rapidly .to <the south," and took up positions on the flanks and in the rear of General Hildyard's position at Estcourt. The se6ond occurred within the present week in Cape Colony, when General Gatacre, finding the enemy had moved around his right flank and had occupied Steynburg and - Sterkstroom, covering a -wide expanse of country, where they are at the present time in full control. It is safe to state that had a sufficient force of .cavalry and mounted infantry been attached to Gatacre's command they could have stopped this movement on the part of the enemy, which would have rendered the clearing; of the; north-eastern district a much easier task than it will shortly be found. . • December 6. Acts- of individual bravery, such as the swimming of -the Modder River in the face of the heavy rifle fire of the enemy, by soldiers' and officers are recorded, and it is very probable we ; shall be able to add to the list of those who have the distinction of wearing the Victoria Cross the name of Captain Sellheim, an Australian. But there is another -of humbler fame whose •name ought to be • made known to the public, for. the dead hero who was found in the enemy's trenches grasping one of the Boer rifles ought to have his name handed .down to posterity as an example to those , that come after him of the way a . British soldier can do and die. - For while we can show gratitude to the living aud confer honour upon them, we can only record in history the deeds of the dead who by their acts have helped to build the Empire.' jjieutenant-colonel Alfred E. Codrington, P.S.C., commanding the first battalion Coldstream Guards, was born in 1354, and attained his present rank in 1889. He served in the Egyptian campaign (1882), and received the medal with clasp and bronze star, and was decorated with the Order of the Medjidie of the second class. Particulars of the battle of Modder River* eliow that the victory of the British over .the enemy was very. far from being as complete as at first reported. At daybreak (Which occurs about 3.30 a.m. at this season of the year) the battle commenced with an artillery duel,, lasting five hours, . or , until about 8.30 a.m., xvhen the Scots Guards advanced, believing the enemy had abandoned his position. But as the Guards advanced they were met by so withering a tire from the enemy that they were forced to lie down to avoid the terrible risks. The Grenadier Guards took the right, and •were supported by tho Coldstream Guards and the Argyle Highlanders *(91st) took the left, supported by tho Naval Brigade, and advanced as skirmishers (bo as to avoid as far as possible the terrific fire from the enemy). They attempted to cross the bridge, but the enemy's fire was so severe that for two whole hours they were exposed, as, owing to the flat-- nature of the _ plains over which they had to pass to reach the Boer position, very little, cover could be obtained. It was here that the Argyles lost so heavily, as the machine guns and picked riflemen on the north, side ■of the river raked them as they tried +o force a passage of the river. Notwithstanding, bur troops succeeded in obtaining a footing on the north side of the stream, and when darkness set in they held the position gained during -the fighting. General Melhuen gained an advantage over the enemy, but it cannot be called a decisive victory, as the Boers retired during the night, taking their v guns and ptores with them. - The battle on the Modder was in no way a decided advantage to our arms, and it is (significant that General Methuen has found it necessary to await reinforcements before pushing on to •Kimberley. The British loss was very light, in view of the fighting, that took place. But we are not quite -satisfied as to whether Boer or Briton secured the ulti-

.mate advantage when the losses and other ' items are counted.

The arrival of the New Zealand contingent .at Naauwpoorfc, the base of General Gatacre's command, is reported, and we may expect to hear that our lads have had a brush with the 6iiemy, as from a personal acquaintance with Major Robin, his officers, and men, I feel certain that the enemy will - not have to look very long for a fight. If our contingent, in the ordinary course of events, come in contact with them I feel confident that the New Zealand Government and people will haye every reason to feel proud of their countrymen, when in the course of .their duty to the Empire they receive their baptisms of fire. Having had ample opportunity of judging officers and men alike, 1 can only say that any officer might well be proud to serve with such a command, and doubly proud of having the honour of leading it into action. It is a great pity that it was not 1000 instead of 213 that composed its strength, and particularly so in view of the necessity of mounted troops and the especial fitness of mounted infantry for service against the Boers.

Cables report that a portion of the enemy became demoralised during the battle on the Modder and bolted from the positions they held, and the Free State's artillery are especially mentioned for cowardice. These reports come from correspondents at Capetown, and do not seem to be justified by previous reports of the battle or of the official reports by Lord Methuen. He stated that the enemy fought with great bravery, and the fact that they held their position from early dawn until darkuess set in and were able to carry off their artillery is strong evidence for believing ihese reports of cowardice to be groundless. It is probable that the portion cf

the enemy that occupied positions south of the river were forced to retire, and in doing so moved to the eastwards towards Jacobsdal, in the Free State, and the movement of these troops may have given rise to the reported act of cowardice by persons not capable of judging the difference between a hasty retreat to escape capture and an act of cowardice. The report that the enemy used ths Red Cross of Geneva as cover for their forces is nothing unusual for them — in fact, such trickery is to be expected, and does not call for much comment ; but, as' H pointed out on previous occasions, these acts will continue until severe punishment is meted out to some of the prisoners that are captured after committing such offences. The report that the Boers fought steadily throughout the engagement has far more truth in support of it than the later report that Commandant Cronje whipped them into fighting, as the Boers are in a great. measure independent of their officers, and in that respect they are in about the position of the private in our volunteer forces under existing regulations, where the soldier is often the superior of the officer in all that goes to make up the qualities of the soldier — to wit, obedience, discipline, aud knowledge of his" .duties. The report that the enemy retreated to Langeberg and Jacobsdal in the afternoon after being shelled by the 62nd Battery of Royal Field Artillery is very conflicting, as Jacobsdv is in the Free State, between the north arid south forks of the Modder River, and Langeberg is in Bechuanalaud, in the vicinity of Kuruman, fully 110 miles to the north-west of Kimberley, and not less than 140 miles from the battlefield on the Modder.

December 7.

By this time the situation atr Mafeking must be very serious, as there is no doubt about the withdrawal of the bulk of the enemy's forces from, the immediate ( vicinity of the town to assist in the endeavour to stop General Methuen's advance on Kimberley. The reported raising of the siege of - Mafeking is no doubt premature, but the- fact that Colonel Baden-Powell hos niada no - move to defeat ths small fores that is now investing the place plainly indicates that the sickness in the garrison has assumed serious proportions, and the the number fit for service is exceedingly small, otherwise Baden-Powell would bo just the man to take advantage of the reduction of the investing force. The necessity for the immediate relief of the town is imperative, as there "is a possibility that medical supplies in such a place as Mafeking are short, and, even at the best, fever at such a place is very destructive.

The reported arrival of big guns and supplies for Lord "Methuen's command is somewhat ambiguous, for we have had no reason to suppo.se that he needed big guns, which 'we would understand to mean guns suitable for a siege train, and we were not aware that he was in any way short of supplies, as the reports hitherto received have stated that lie was waiting for reinforcements before proceeding to renew the attack upon the enemy's lines. Reading be-, tween the lines, it seems that he has been rather severely handled by the enemy, and that Cronje's forces are much stronger than we had any reason for believing. This view of the situation is the only one that can explain the delay in raising the siege of Kimberley, and even this hardly explains why a junction has not been effected between General Methuen's column and that of the garrison ,at Kimberley. There is nothing to stop General Methuen's command from making a fiank movement to the left, and, avoiding the Eoer position at Spytfontein, draw the enenry into the open from his present entrenched position, or compel the enemy to allow him to enter Kimberley unmolested.^ As the country to the left of Spytfontein is a level plain I cannot understand why it is necessary, or that it should be considered imperative, to attack Cronjo on ground of his choosing when it is possible to flank the position and draw him to an engagement on ground less suited to Boev tactics. The only apparent reason for General Methuen's inactivity is the weakness of his division or th» unexpected strength of the enemy.

From native sources comes the report that the Boers have not lost any oi their old confidence in their ability to capture Kimbeiley, as the natives state that the -Boers boast that they will capture Mr Rhodes and exhibit him in a cage. This" , would indicate that' the recent battles between Commandant Cronje"s forces and General Methuen's division have not very materially affected their purpose, and have not demoralised them to such an extent as was anticipated some days back and as later cables led us. to believe. Putting the matter squarely before my readers, I must state that I believe that' the three battles in the vicinity of the Modder were decidedly indecisive in their character, and that the Boers on each occasion retired without suffering any more, material damage than they inflicted upon General Methuen's relief column. I trust, however, that a sufficient number of troops from the 8000 said to be guarding the lines between De Aar and the Moddev River can be withdrawn from such duties and despatched to reinforce General Methuen's command, particularly so as that force must number in its ranks a large proportion of mounted infantry, aa the whole of the Australasian contimzents are said to be a port-ion of these 8000, and there can be no doubt but that a thousand mounted infantry would be of greater service in flanking Cronje's position than three times the number of infantry.

The situation in the north-eastern districts of Cape Colony is not at all reassuring. The reported abandonment of Arundel by the enemy and their occupation of Dordrecht practically means nothing, save that possibly they have exhausted the supplies obtainable about Arundel, and have consequently moved their forces from that point to another where supplies arc more easily obtained. It is stated that General Gatacre has checked to a large extent the rebellion from proceeding further south than Putter's Kraal, to the x north if Queenstown. Po-«'bly the advance of a strong force of Biitish troops in the dis-

trict has checked a rising of the Dutch in that locality for the time being ; but if' the rising is only checked by the presence of a strong force in the district, as soon as they are withdrawn the rising Avill take place, unless forces can be permanently located there. Until the enemy is driven north of Burghersdorp there is no assurance that the checking of the rising noAV Avill be of any material advantage.

Turning to the condition of affairs in Natal, it is hard to explain the apparent inactivity of General Buller, as, Avith the force at his command, there seems to be • no reasonable cause for delay. This is par- ; ticularly the case since the bridge at Frere ' has been completed, and "it seems . unreasonable to suppose that Joubert has anyj force south of the Tugela River capable of ! resisting the advance of a poAverful force similar to that under Buller. It may be that the portion of the enemy stUl in the vicinity of Weenen, which General Clery , has been sent to cut off, is much more powerful than Aye have anticipated, and r that consequently it is dangerous to advance before they are dispersed. But if , the conditions at Ladysmith Avere of such a nature as to demand immediate relief

some three weeks ago, it is very certain that time liss not improved these conditions, and that every day's delay makes matters Avorse.

Colonel Yule, Avho succeeded General Symons in command of one of the brigades

at .Ladysmith, is reported to be broken in health, and about to return to England ; but Aye have no means of learning hoAV he

is to escape from Ladysmith in order to reach Frere, as the 50 miles intervening between Ladysmith and Frere' is occupied b3 r the enemy, and it is hard to believe that they Avill give him safe conduct through

their lines.

under date of December 6 it is reported that the hills around Ladysinith and Colenso are dotted Avith large guns. Presumably these guns belong to the enemy's batteries. Twenty-six are said to be

around Ladysmith alone — a number almost equalling the siege train that was reported

•to be in readiness at Woolwich for shipment to South Africa. If such is the ca<-e is is hard to understand how Ladypmith is

holding out, as »ye know that there arc only tAvo 4.7 in 50-pounders and a number of field guns in the British lines, and the field guns would be of too short range to materially assist in off-setting the combined fire from the enemy's batteries.

it is said that six months' provisions are

stored in Pretoria for the use of the Boer forces, but, if such is the case, one cannot quite understand Avhy the Boers in the vicinity oi Ladysmith have so often been

without adequate food supplies, for Avith

such quantities of food in Pretoria, within less than 20 hours' rail frem Ladvsmith, it

is hardly conceivable that General Jmiberl would allow his men to become so short when there was* no transport diih'culties to be overcome. It is plain that either the enemy were not phort of food supplies at the time stated, or the stocks said to be in

Pretoria do not exist

The fact that the foundation piers of the bridge across the Tugela at Colenso are in good condition will materially assist our sanners in repairing the structure, provided the enemy is kept from doing any further

damage,

The mobilisation of a seventh division at Aldershot will shortly be proceeded with. This means that another 11,000 men will be made ready for despatch to South Africa. The mobilisation of this division means that at last the authorities have risen to the occasion, and have determined to despatch a sufficient number of troops* to end tlTe war within a reasonable time. Had they^ realised the gravity of the situation two months ago, instead >of waiting until half the Dutch in South Africa were under arms, the war would not have reached anything like the dimensions it has at present. \ i October 8. ! Late 'news is to the effect that General Joubert has been compelled to relinquish the command of the Boer army in Natal .to Commandant Scbalk Burger, and that he is . now at Volksrust, 911 tho Transvaal ' border, under medical treatment. Mr Schalk Burger, who has assumed command of the Boers, was born in the Transvaal, his father being. President of the Republic* at the time (1877) that Sir- T. Shepstone annexed the country to the British Crown. Mr Kt'halk Burger was one of the candidates for the Presidency at the last general election in 1898 in opposition to Paul Kruger and Joubert. Mr Burger stood as ) a Progressive candidate, and was backed up by the Chamber of Mines of Johannesburg, : as prominent Uitlanders believed he could carry the burghers with him to adopt , liberal measures. But the progressive , burghers divided their support between ' Joubert and Burger, and many progressive Boers became disgusted, and would not support either of the two candidates, so ', that Oom Paul was returned to power with ' over two-thirds of the burghers in support of his policy of repression. Mr Schalk Burger was educated at Durban and at Gray's College, Bloemfontein, in the Orange Free State, and speaks and writes English freely. He has occupied the position of Chairman of the Volksraad, and was very ambitious to carry out his ideas in regard to the treatment of the Uitlanders. Mr Burger is a member of the Executive Council of the Transvaal, a posi^ ' tion equivalent to that of Minister of the Crown. He has also served on many imporlant committees-, and pat as one of the ' committee appointed by the Transvaal ' Government to inquire into the dynamite factory concession and other grievances of the Uitlanders, but the judgment rendered ' by that committee was never carried into ' effect, as its unanimous verdict was in favour of the contentions of the Uit- j landers. Had the recommendations of that committee been carried out the present war would have been avoided, and that would not have suited President Kruger, as he realised that in order to

gratify his ambition to become the chief magistrate of a Dutca South Africa a successful war was an absolute necessity. Let Kruger's admirers look at the facts, and

they cannot find any other reason for the Transvaal Avar of 1899.

News from Natal leads us to suppose that the position at Ladysmith is not altogether as rosy as could be wished. Sickness is reported to be- very prevalent, and, although the relief column under General Clery is connected by flash signals with General White, still there is no indication that relief will come for some time yet to the beleaguered town. The reduction of the rations of the garrison is another matter that makes the thing look serious, as it is evident that food supplies are running low, otherwise a reduction of the rations would not have been ordered, in view of the nearness of the relieving force. Some serious difficulty must be in the way of Clery's advance, or else a supreme effort would be made to effect the raising of the- siege, and it is evident that immediate relief cannot be effected, and that some time must elapse before Clery's troopers enter the town. It is very probable that the fever in White's camp is very severe, as the troops are constantly exposed to a tropical sun and every afternoon to a thorough soaking by the thunder showers that come down in torrents.

Coupled with the news, of the seriousness of the situation in General White's camp comes the report that the enemy are moving towards the Drakenberg Mountains ; but there is no evidence worthy of serioHS consideration that they are moving towards Pretoria, as the despatch would leave us to believe — in fact, the reverse is the case. If they were moving away from. Ladysmith | there would be nothing to hinder the a(Jvance of Clery's column, and, even if the ' enemy .vere still holding their position on tho north side of the Tugela, River, I cannot understand the reason of Clery'-s delay in pushing on as far as Colenso and takiug possession of that town, so as to threaten the force that is supposed to be resting in the vicinity of Grobelerskloof. Grobelerskloof is situate to the south of the railway j and north of the Tugela River, between j the Tugela and Pietevs Station, and the j Boei- guns stationed ,above the Kloof to a j certain extent "command the town r.f Co- j lenso. The distance is so great, however, that the Boer fire from that position would not 113 very effective, and the longer range naval guns that accompany Clery's command would have little trouble in dislodging the enemy by making the position untenable. I am of opinion that there is some serious cause for tho delay in Clery's advance that is not hinted at in tho cables, ' and it is probable that the Boer forces at Weenen mi his right, rear, and flank are far stronger than the cables would lead us to suppose, as. being in communication with General White «nd knowing that the town is- short of provisions and J ever raging, he would move more rapidly to its succour if possible.' "On Sunday, the "3rd inst., 7000 of the enemy were reported to li'ive passed through Weenen on General Clery's right flank and rear, but we are in ignorance as to the direction of thoir march. It is reasonable to suppose that they would be moving east and south in an endeavour to repeat their former raid and cut the railway in the rear of Clery, and draw off a large fores from his command to try to stop them. It .seems to be a case o f hare r«id hounds, and the hare in each case Ins the best of it. There is little prospect of. changing this state of affairs until large additions are made to out cavalry and mounted infantry, as it is out of the question to expect the weak cavalry force now with General Clery to he able to stop such a larern mounted force. Oar infantry are perfectly useless to operate against such a body moving rapidly. The presence of this commando in such -a position is probably the cause of the delay in Olrry's rdvance to Colenso. It is Very exasperating to be in command of a huperior force and yet be unable to bring the enemy to action. The critics and public will not, and cannot, understand the diffi- j culties of a general officer Commanding a j large and well-equipped force in bringing about the defeat of such an enemy. But thoss acquainted with the country know the advantages the Boers possess by reason of th?ir ability to move rapidly and avoid our infantry. The success of our troops thus far in the war has seemed marvellous. It must be i - emeir>bered that every move mnde by our troops is necessarily slow, and is reported to the enemy by ihc traitorous rebel Dutch, who have not I lie coin-age to jo;n the enemy oponly, but who act as spies on ouf^moveinents and keep- the Boers' commanders informed of every move of our forces. To the west of Ladysmith the Boers are said to be bombarding the town at 4000 yards range, and at that distance their melinite' shells ought to do a great deal nf damage, if their fuses are properly timed to explode the shells before striking, or by impact. But from the reports of the inefficiency of the Boer artillery it is likely that many of their shells do little damage, as there seems to be a lack of intelligence amongst their artillery officers in the matter of fuses, and this i 3 in a great measure account* for the little damage that has been effected by their bombardment at Ladvsmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking ; while, on the other hand, the effectiveness of the 8.-itish artillery in every engagement to date has been caused principally bvthe scientific^ accuracy displayed in exploding the lyddite shells at the proper ranee, nnd is not due to the weapons with which the artillery are armed. Had our artillery been armed with a modern weapon, the Boer losses would have been immeasurably greater, and it would be impossible for the Beer artillery to have maintained their position. It' is to be hoped that the lessons taught us in this campaign will result in giving us modern quick-firing guns of a power equal, if not superior, to anything that can be brought against us. General Buller is said to estimate that the losses of the Boers in front of Ladysmith on November 9 amounted to 800 men, but there is no evidence at hand to show us on what he bases his opinion. It is a difficult matter to come anywhere near estimating their losses, as after the battle they maintained their position and removed their own dead and wounded ; consequently it can be only guessed at, as they are not

likely in any way to allow their losses - fco Ibecome knoAvn if they can avoid it. It is gratifying to learn that ■ some of the English blirghers- of the Free State have refused to taße up arms against GreafcBritain, and are noAV being court-martialled by the Boers for refusing to serve. It isvery probable that many in the Boei' ranks have been compelled hy_ force of 6ir-*' cumstances to take up arms, and are conse-' quently very unwilling soldiers, and will,, if given the slightest opportunity, desert. Under date December 7, the cables inform us that the Canadians and Australian* Have been formed into- a brigade, and Havi been sent forward .to reinforce Lord 1 . Methuen. This seems "to be a very -wise, move, and there is 'no' doubt that the colonial brigade will give a good account of itself. HoAvever, no sooner had we been informed that Methuen had been reinforced than we hear that 3000 Boers have been, sent from Natal to reinforce Cronje, This, hoAvever, I believe to be a mistake,, as.; coming all the way from Natal, they wou^l -arrive too late to be 'of any asistance, as it is hardly likely that Methuen will delay an hour longer than is absolutely . neces-' - sary, and the reinforcements sent to hintought to be in his lines before this time" It is more than likely that the reinforce- p ments received by Cronje have been despatched from .the vicinity 1 of Colesberg; and Burghersdorp, as the Boers from that quarter can reach Cronje's lines Avithin a-, reasonable time. -From Natnl it would be impossible for them to do so. It is quite- > evident that General Burger - Avill -need 1 every Boer that ho can get, if lie intends I. to hold his position around Ladysmith. t against the approach- of General Clery'a. [ army. i Cables report the Boers to be maasing ; at Spytfontein Heights, digging rifle piti, and erecting batteries. This is the place that some days ago Aye said Avould be the ; I next scene of strife betAveen the contending ! forces. There is no doubt about the advan- | tages of the position taken up by Cronje, I but I cannot understand why it is neces1 sary to attack, as, by moving to the • Aveft by the left flank, an engagement can.. 'be avoided and the siege of Kimberley , • raised, and- later Methuen's, division can, j surround Cronje and cut off his supplies, i and bring him to torins very shortly witiij out serious fighting. In fact, it ought nob, I to be difficult for the besiegers to become the besieged. Ths rebuilding of the Modder River bridge is said to be the cause of great de1 lay. and that immense labour is required Ito complete it. Lord Methuen' is reported to bo convalescent. .Further- risings of rebel Dutch are re-r ported, and from Griqualnnd comes- the ra-. ! port that the Butch inhabitants are- jubi-"" j lunt at being annexed to the Republic. This is one more proof, if a^ddeJ to the' ! list- already long, that the- statements made,jto the British Government .by its own... i officers and by prominent British resident*' !of tho Cape' AYere' true, and it is my I opinion that martial law ought to have1 bt-cn proclaimed long ago. and the persons, suspected to be leaders ought to have been placed under arras I from one end of theCapo to the other. October 9. Following up the report that conditions at Ladysmith were looking serious, comes tho very Avelcome news that at last the British 4.7 in naval guns have opeued fire on the position occupied by the <• Boer 40-pounder guns, known in the Britisii ranks by . the familiar name 'of " Long Tom." From previous cables we learn that the Boer position i.s in the vicinity of Grobelerskloof, just in the hills across the flat thac extends along ,the Tugela River opposite Colenso; and as the position^ isnot less than 5000 yards from Culensx) the.' British guns have a. very jtecided advantage over the enemy's 40-]>onnders, as therango and power of these naval guns ift/ much greater. By the ( fact that thenaval guvs have opened, 'fire at Colenso we have positive proof that at last General Clery's relief ) column has reached thevicinity of Colenso, and that we paay expect to hear to-day that an attempt has. been made, to gain a .footing, for the advanced brigade of' the relief force ori th&i north side of the Tugela. 'I* cannot thirrk. it possibla for the Boers to make stand against General Clery's adA'anceV i^ it is pushed vigorously after the first brigade of his army gains the north banfc of the stream, for, "if once across, they can., soon deploy and advance so as to cover the bridges and drifts, and practically give, their supports an uncontested passage across the river. This should be made Avith little (sacrifice of Ufe by the effective, fire of the 4.7 in guns. In^ vie Air o£ the seriousness of the reports from General White's camp, General Clery Avill not allow the grass to grow under the feat of his troops, but Ayill push things on until he has effected a junction betAveen hi.s troops and General White's Avell-tuied and hard-pressed veterans. As 23,000 men, fully equipped, with the usual number of' guns (not less than 46), ought to be able to force back any numbers that the Boers can bring into action at any point between Colenso and*"*Ladvsmith, I am confident that if General Clery is of the rjght sortv of metal Ladysmith will be relieved before another issue of this paper is placed in thehands of its readers. The report that a battery of Royal Horse Artillery and the 12th Lancers haA-e been' despatched to reinforce General. Methuen> is very misleading, to say the least, for at best only a portion of the 12th. Lancers could be sent, as a part (probably two_ squadrons of that- famous corps) is with General Clery in Natal. It is only a' few, days ago that the 12th Avere reported to have charged and cut up a Boer, relief column at Weenen. It i.s plain that tho portion of the 12th which has. been attached to General Gatacre's command has been withdnuvn from that division, and hurriedly fonvarded to assist General Metbuen. It is to lie regretted that ifc should be necessary tc AvithdraAV any portion of Gatacre's force in order to assjat Methuen, as the number of troops that ware under the combined commands of Freuoh and Gatacre Avere altogether £<y

few "to clear the enemy out of the northern and eastern districts of the Cape, and it is particularly necessary, if we are allowed to_form an opinion on the subject, to increase the cavalry attached to these commands instead of diminishing the number 'by sending the 12th Lancers to Methuen's division. It may be taken for granted that the despatch of these reinforcements was prompted by the appearance of the enemy in great strength in front of Methuen's position, and it is just possible that Cronje has recei T id such additions to his command by the rebels ' of the Cape and Bechuanaiand joining him that it has become a matter of supreme importance to forward to Methuen every available man in. order to avoid any possibility of defeat •when he determines to attack the enemy at Spytfontein. It would be a very serious matter to receive a defeat now, or even a check to the further advance of the relief column, for the relief of Mafeking within a short time is an absolute necessity, and, even if the enemy have to be allowed a free field in Cape Colony for the time being, Kimberley and Mafeking must be succoured promptly and at all hazards. It ■would be the worst possible event that could occur to our arms if either of these two places should fall into the hands of the enemy, and a defeat or partial defeat, or ev;en any delay, may be the cause o* .Mafeking capitulating. I ask my readers to. bear jn- mind that if Methuen succeads in ' giving Cronje's commando a good, sound thrashing at Spytfontein, and capture or compel the retreat of the enemy by way of Bultfontein or Jacobsdal on Bloemfontein, the relief of Mafeking is only a question of a few days, or a week at most, as in that case it would be only a matter of despatching a flying column of horse artillery, cavalry, and mounted infantry to the relief of Colonel BadenPowell and his plucky little garrison, for, after the defeat of Cronje at Kimberley, no serious opposition would be met with north of Kimberley, as there are no very large bodies of Boers along the line of march thaft a relief force would take to reach its destination. General Lord Methuen's force must be quite equal, if not superior, to the force under Cronje,' as cables from Capetown estimate the strength of the enemy at Spytfontein at 11,000 men. It is to be regretted that the loss of the transport Ismore has reduced the actual fighting strength of our cavalry army by the loss of so many valuable horses. At the same time, I cannot understand why the thousands of splendid horses that were easily obtainable in the eastern province of Cape Colony at the outbreak of the war were not commandeered, as the British Government had the right to take all horses that it required under the Dutch Roman law that is in force in Cape Colony. Had proper steps been taken at the start every British soldier that could ride could have been well mounted as soon as he arrived at the base of the command to which his corps w,as attached, and, instead of having the great bulk of our men dismounted, we could have had over onehalf our infantry in the saddle. It seems to me that until a thorough reorganisation of our military system and a complete turning out of the officials that hedge about imperative changes with so much red tape has taken place no efficiency can be obtained in our army. What is the use of having the bravest and best officers and men obtainable if a few civilian officials at the \var Office hold control? In the hands of these (often petty officials) the victories and defeats of our gallant little army rest. Efficiency plays second fiddle to the requirements of a system that might have been permissible in the year 1800, but will not work in these days, when hours are of more consequence than months were at that time. •

The arrival of President Steyn at Syptfontein is reported, but I cannot see what material oi other advantage the Boers can receive by his presence. In fact, I can see some chance that his appearance at their camp just now may arouse the feeling of hostility that is known to exist between the progressive section of the Free State burghers and the anti-English party that forced the Free State into the war as the ally of the non-progressive Transvaal Boer. The outburst of indignation that will be sure to come when defeat is assured to the Boer forces is certain to cause dissension in the Free State ranks, and if it is generally believed that President Stcyn sold the support of the Free State to President Kruger for £50,000, as reported, he may run seiious chances of being severely handled by his countrymen.

Whatever the outcome of the battle at Syptfontein may be, Kimberley is safe for five or six weeks, as, with plenty of water and food supplies to last that time, there can be little hope for the Boers as far as the capture of Rhodes is concerned. I can «cc no reason why General Methuen should hesitate a moment in his march into the town, unless he is determined to give the enemy the advantage of position by directing an attack on their lines at Syptfontein and Sholtzkop. I hardly think General Methuen will attack those positions in front, but will endeavour to flank them and gain his object by drawing the enemy out of his entrenchments.

The arrival of the West Australian contingent os a reinforcement for General Gatacre's division will act as a partial offset for the withdrawal of the 12th Lancers, and the New Zealand and West Australian boys wtil be able to cultivate a comradeship ju&b as the other contingents from Australia will form friendships with their comrades of the Canadian Regiment.

The reported organisation of another cavalry brigade at Aldershot for service at the seat of war will help to bring about a more desirable condition of things at the Cape, but 2000 men is only a half-measure. •What is really needed at the present time is the despatch of 10,000 Indian cavalry for service in South Africa. It seems unreasonable to keep such a fine cavalry force idle in then camps and barracks in India ■while Aye have work for them to do at the Cape. That our Indian cavalry regiments would be very glad- to take part in ■iho campaigns is beyond dispute, and,

knowing the value of their services under existing circumstances, I consider it to. be poor policy to allow rebellion to spread when we have men and the means to stop it at once and for ever. The employment of our Indian troops in the Cape would be an object lesson to Europe, and there is no good reason that can be advanced why the finest cavalry soldiers in the ■world (outside of our Imperial regiments) should be deprived of reaping laurels in the service of their Queen and the Empire. The day is coming when we will have to use our Indian soldier in defence and offence as we do our white troops. Why not do it now? December 11. General Gatacre states that the spread of the rebellion in Cape Colony is seriously hampering his division in clearing the rebels and their allies out of the colony, and although sufficient reinforcements have reached him to bring his command up to the strength it possessed prior to the withdrawal of the 12th Lancers, still the additions made are mostly infantry, and consequently are not quite the thing required for effective service, x A commando of Boers, 1000 strong, under General Prinsloo, of the Orange Free State, has appeared in the rear of General Methuen's camp, and, moving rapidly, destroyed the railway. It became necessary to despatch a considarable body of troops from, the Orange River to co-operate with a strong force sent from General Methuen's command to drive the enemy back and restore the railway. Manoeuvres of this description prove my contention regarding the ability of the enemy to flank our army whenever they choose to do so, as in this case Prinsloo moved his force away from the. main body of the Boers that are now camped about Spytfontein, and, without being observed, marched around Methuen's flank and crossed the Modder River, and then took up a position at Grass Pan, where they destroyed a culvert and did the other damage stated. Late reports convey the intelligence that the New Zealand contingent formed a covering party during the detraining of a force under General Gatacre ; so they are now at the front, and we may expect to hear that they are in the thick of the fighting whenever a chance offers itself. Further reports state that the Imperial officers are pleased to note the efficiency of the Australians. Given two or three months' service Major Robin's "command will be the equal of the best of them, and probably superior to many. The occupation of Cradock by General French's troops is no doubt meant to check any further advance of the enemy to the south, and to stop their forces from swinging to the west, and thus cutting our ( troops from the seaboard. If the Boers were allowed to continue their march unopposed they would very naturally change front to the right from their present position at Sterkstroom, and move in the direction of Graaff Reinet, cutting the Port Elizab&th and Capetown systems of railways a,t Fish River bridge, and again at Baroda, about 20 miles north of Cradoclc, leaving a force there to occupy the passes in the mountains and recruit amongst the Dutch residents. They would get control of the third line of railway at or near Graaff Reinet, a stronghold of the Afrikander Bond. From that point a march of 100 miles west would bring them to Nelspoort station, on the Cape and Bulawayo railway, well to the south of all the British forces in the field, and would give them control of all the railways, as they pass through the Drakenbergs. It has been evident for some time that the Boers were not seeking an engagement with either Gatacre or French, but were intent on flanking their positions by moving round their right flanks and trying to obtain strong positions in the mountains to the rear of, the British around Naauwpoort. But if French is strong enough in cavalry and mounted infantry his presence in Cradock will stop the Boer manoeuvring.

Cables to hand state that it is reported from Pretoria that the British .attacked the Boer position at Sholtz Nek, south of Spytfontein. It is probable that if the attack took place it was Sholtz Kop, one mile from Spytfontein station, that was the place of attack, as there is no such place as Sholtz Nek anywhere near Spytfontein. The report coming from Pretoria is a- reasonable cause for doubting the truth of the cable, as Lord Methuen would have been able to send such news via Capetown to London direct, but we hear nothing from him regarding the action reported to have taken place. I do not take much stock of cables coming from Pretoria at any time. It is always safe to ignore them, or else to warn the public against placing any reliance on them.

General Buller is reported to have requisitioned for 2200 bearers to go to the front. He must be expecting very severe fighting to require such numbers; as it is presumed that the Royal Army Medical Corps has a large number of bearers in pay now.

Cables, dated the 10th inst. from Durban, indicate that General White is watching every opportunity of inflicting punishment on the enemy. On Thursday, the Bth inst., Major-general Hunter with 600 mounted troops attacked a commando at Lombard's Kop, destroyed two large cannon belonging to the enemy's siege train, captured a Maxim gun, and returned to camp. The loss sustained was only one killed and one wounded — a trifling one considering the work accomplished and the characte. of the enemy and position of the battery attacked. • Lombard's Kop lies to the north-east of Ladysmith, about two miles and a-half east of the railway line and about five or six miles from Whitens camp. The main waggon road that winds its way through the' hills passes close to the base of the kop, and the Boer battery that Hunter destroyed probably commanded the road, and at the same time the 6jn gun (a 100-pounder) could be used against Ladysmilh.

During the same night a force of cavalry belonging to the Ladysmilh garrison attacked the Boer laager near Besters, and burnt it, so it is presumed that a cnusider-

able quantity of supplies and a number of transport waggons are destroyed. Besters lies about 12 miles due west from Ladysmith, and the railway that runs through Van Re^nen"s Pass to Harrismith. About one mile south of Besters station the old coach road from Pietermaritzburg to Bloemfontein passes, and thence through Brakwal and on over the De Beers Pass. A force occupying Besters easily commands the road leading over these passes, and by moving a small force four miles further full control of Cundycleogh Pass could be obtained. It is very evident from the success attending these two raids from Ladysmith that the bulk of the enemy's forces are to the east and south of Ladysmith, ready to meet and contest the advance of General Clery's army in the vicinity of the Tugela River at Colenso and watching any other manoeuvres. Clery may attempt to obtain a crossing for his troops to the north of the river. Coupling the movements of General White's force ' with the impending attack by General Clery on the Boer army it seems probable that as soon as Clery secures an advantage over the enemy in his front, White will attempt to cut off their retreat to the west and north. They will then be forced to attempt a retreat via Tintwa,- Bezendenout, and Oliver's Helk Passes, further to the south, unless General Cleiy can despatch, a mounted force with sufficient artillery to seize these passes and cut them off. I fear the small number of mounted men attached to Clery's command will make this last move impossible, and that the enemy will be able to reach one or more of these passes if defeated and thus secure a safe retreat through the Free State to take up the defence of Pretoria. Had the original plan of campaign succeeded, either General French or General Gatacre would have been in possession of Harrismith before this time, and the retreat of the Boer army via any of the passes named would have been impossible, as a comparatively small body of our forces could have taken up positions in the passes by moving from the west or the Free State side, and thus cut off any chance" of the Boers escaping. The failure to send sufficient mounted droops at the start and the rebel risings in Cape Colony are the two causes that have worked so much in favour -of the enemy. The extra cost of the- war \uat will be added by reason of the inability of the War Office to send cavalry to crush any rebel movement promptly would have quadrupled our cavalry and paid ev---ry additional expense incurred by such increase for the next four ye«rs. It is easy,' then, to determine whether it is cheaper to increase our army in time of peace or to prolong the wars we may be involved in in such a way that it means the expenditure of millions of pounds, as well as the sacrifice of life that could have been avoided.

The reported attack on a Boer laager at Se'kwain, on the Marico River, by Captain Holdsworth with a force of the British Border Police from Mochudi, a place in Lebele's country, 94 miles north of Capetown and 124 miles north of Kimberley, will come as a surprise, as it was generally supposed that nearly, if nob all, of the British Border Police were with Colonel Baden-Powell at Mafeking. If my readers will look at their Avar maps they will find British Bechuanaland is divided into three districts or territories under native chiefs. Each district is governed by three chiefs, under the observation of a commissioner appointed by the Colonial Office, and under the commissioner there is appointed a resident commissioner located at the chief town of the district he 'has supervision over. To assist these commissioners a body of 400 Avhite mounted police has been formed to maintain laAV and order, and to give effect to the claim of British right us protector over the country. The southern district, just' north of Cape Colony's territory, is ruled by Bathoen. The middle district is under the rule of- Chief Lebele, and Chief Khama holds sway in the northern district, the limits of his country being the southern boundary of Matabeleland. These three chiefs created a great stir in England in 1896 Avhen on a mission to protest against their country being included in the Chartered Company's territories. Palapye, Avhere the Boers were defeated some time ago, is Khama's chief town. Moehudi is the seat of the Government of .Lebele, and Gaberones is the principal toAvn in Bathoen's country.