NOTES ON THE WAR.

Otago Witness, Issue 2388, 7 December 1899, Page 25

NOTES ON THE WAR.

By Majob Kennedy. November 28. Lord Methuen's protest to the commandant of the enemy's forces at Belmont against the use of the dum-dum bullets and the employment of the white flag as a decoy comes none too soon, but it will have little effect on the future use of either by the Boers, unless retribution shall be meted out to all parties of the enemy that may be captured after the commission of offences of the nature complained bf. Protests are of little use in such cases when dealing with such people, for, although the Orange Free State and the Transvaal subscribed to the terms of the Geneva Convention, the troops of both are prepared to fire on the Geneva flag at any time, if there is a possibility of hitting jn rooi baaljie (a British soldier) ; it is as useless to protest to the Boers as.it would be to a North American Indian, or as it was to the mutineers in India in 1857. But notify the Boer officers that after the war they will be held responsible for every act of treachery committed by their commands, and complaints, will be unnecessary in the future. From Colesberg comes the news. "that s Commandant Groebler, of the Orange Free | State, has seized ten of the leading British j residents of that town as hostages for the j safety of "V auransburg, the Dutch colonist, who was arrested .by General Gatacre for treason. Commandant croebler threatens to shoot the ten if Vauransburg is shot as a spy. 'This is in keeping with the threat of Rcitz, the State Secretary of the Transvaal, in connection with the spy Meyer at Ladysmith. From Lady Grey, near Wellington, in what is known as the Paarl district, with3 in 65 miles of Capetown, comes the tidings j that the rebel Dutch have risen and seized j the town. Our readers will find that Lady j Grey is situate just south of Wellington, | where the Cape and Bulawayo railway makes the big bend to the north. The seri- ! ousness of this rising can be better underj stood when it is pointed out that the whole ] population (outside of a few merchants) all over the country from Capetown to- De Aar (General Buller' s base) are Dutch and rebels lo the last man. Consequently the lines of communication between De Aar and Capetown are in extreme danger of being interrupted, and it will be very unsafe to attempt to move troops or stores by rail over this line until heavy reinforcements arrive to guard the whole right of way. Bub to show how extensive has become the spread of Kruger's gospel of Africa for the Afrikander?, the cables inform us that 400 ' Dutch, including the magistrate at Barkly j East, have joined the Boer ranks. Barkly i -will 'be found to the east and south of ' Aliwal North, in the district of Griqualand i East, on the borders of Kaffraria. I The authorities at St. James's have been aware of the existence of the spirit of rebellion in and throughout the Dutch centres of the Cape for years past, and ! many warnings have been given by wellknown British agents and by prominent British subjects who were in a position to be able to form a correct opinion on the subject. The sortie of the troops under the command of Major-general HiJdyard from Estcourt against the Boers at Willow Grange, to the east of his camp, resulted in a surprise of the enemy, as our infantry had again an opportunity of using the bayonet ; but again the inferior range of our guns gave an advantage to the enemy, which ! good generalship could not guard against. It is very unfortunate that our soldiers, who cost more to keep and equip than any other army in the world of equal numbers, should have to fight with inferior weapons, and attention may be called to the fact that : our New Zealand defence forces are a good deal worse off in this respect than even the British soldier. It would be well if the ! people were to insist on seeing that modern ! weapons of defence were at once obtained to give our forces an even show with the j enemy should occasion demand that our 'i volunteers and militia would be required I to defend- these islands from an enemy's ! attack. Frequent inquiries having been made as to the reason why the British sokliei- is not supplied with the dum-dum bullets in the present war, we .can only give the following answer: — It will be remembered that during the sittings of the Peace Conference at The Hague one. of the resolutions brought before the conference condemned ! the use of the dum-dum bullet, on account of the severity of the wound it inflicts, and the representatives of all the Great Powers,with the exception of those representing Great Britain and America, voted in favour of discontinuing the use of that missile in ! future. The object of the other Powers in [ doing so evidently was not that of the humanitarian, but in order to cripple the ! effectiveness of the British and American J small arms now in use, and to enable Con- j tinental Powers to have an advantage over any coalition that the Anglo-Saxon nations ! might form for mutual defence of their interests against any combination of Euro- j pean Powers. This bullet adds very ma- ! terially to the effectiveness of the Lee- ' Metford and Krag-Jorgensen rifles used by ' the -British and American armies. | Basing their views on the opinions of these foreign representatives at the Peace j Conference, sentimental cranks throughout the British Empire have brought influence to bear on their political representatives in Parliament, and these, in turn, have' brought influence to bear at the Horse Guards, until it has been decided to change the ammunition for use in civilised war- j fare and only use the dum-dum when fight-

ing savage or semi-savage enemies. Cheering news comes from Lord Melhuen's division again. At Grass Pan, about 10 miles north of Bclmont, the Boers attacked his rear guard, but were driven back by the Grenadier Guards. The enemy appears to have secured a strong position, bub the Naval Brigade, Yorkshire, \

and North Lancashire- Regiments' (so thi, cables state) advanced and' captured ' the' position after four hours' bard fighting. Ib will be found that the cable is in error: about the Lancashire Regiment, as J;hat< ; corps is shut" up in Kimberley. It is~jusb : possible that the Northamptonshire wa^ the regiment that took part, as that corp^ is a pare of Lord Methuen's division ; but whatever regiment it was it did not matter < much, for it little matters which one geta ! a chance : it does its share of ' the work ; well. At Grass Pan army and navy adj vanced, and carried the enemy's position -, with great dash and brilliancy, driving ths < Boers out, and when the report came i through the Lancers were still in pursuit \of the fleeing enemy. The cable mentions J the 9th Lancers, but that corps is with j White's command, and it is more than proj bable that it was the 12th Lancers, and I not the 9th, that were engaged. '• From Natal also comes good news. ; Barton has been reinforced by three bats' teries (18 guns), and has advanced from ? Mooi River to Estcourt, relieving the latter • place. And then comes the" better news , that the Boers are starving, and that • : Joubert is retreating on Ladysmith,-' and' ; that our 4roops have started in- pursuit' of him from jiTstcourt, so that the „ arrival of additional troops has -had a marked effectalready on affairs in Southern Natal. We; may reasonably hope that the- turn of ths ' < tide has now eet in, and that iV will' be one continual victory for our arms. r. „ i - November .29. Yesterday morning's cable messages from, j Capetown report that the Boer commando J which has for some time been in and about ' the .Kuruman district, in Bechuaualand, \ has retired, having lost over one-ninth of { its strength in killed and wounded. The i town of Kuruman held o\it during the siege, which was hardly to be expected, as its garrison consisted of a small body of ! police and the loyal farmers of Bechuanaj land. Kuruman will be- found to the i north-west of Taurigs, and distant from it : about 100 miles. The British'loss is,re- ! ported to have been small, and the Boera are evidently retiring to join with their forces. to^th&jiorth of Kimberley at War- ! rentou. It is probable they will be "Eenfc ' down to reinforce the enemy in the vicinity j of the Modder River, and they will no ! doubt use every effort and every man ! available in their attempt to check Lord j Methuen's advance, and the raising of tha I siege of Kimberley. ) From Natal comes the cheering news that j 10,000 British troops are marching north.* j ward towards Ladysmith. The Boers have • destroyed the Frcre railway bridge, which, j is just north of Ennersdale and about 12 j miles north of Estcourtj between that place j and Colenso. , The destruction of this ] bridge will hinder .the British, from using ' the railway, and consequently hamper tha transport operations, bub the o? 10,000 troops on the' line, of, march is. bound; t to hasten the retreat of Joubert. * It is eyi< ! dent from this message that our forces in, I Natal must have been largely increased/ j otherwise ib would nob have been possible j to have spared so many trtfops for the advancing relief column and leave sufficient! garrisons at Durban, Pietermaritzburg,' and Estcourt and to provide for troops along the line of communication. The report( that three batteries of artillery- have joined Major-general Barton'B brigade is more en* couraging still, as it- is evident that tha shortness of artillery recently complained ot has been made up as far as possible. There is no doubt that there are sufficient guna j now with the relief column to enable the | troops to advance under cover when rei auired.

It is to be regretted that the range ot our fiejd guns is so inferior to those of tha enemy, and it is lucky that their gunners are not very expert in the use of theit weapons, for, if they were, the loss in tha ranks of the British forces would have been much more severe than it has been up to the present. Within ' a week the junction: of the forces now advancing and General White's command may be expected, and, with about 20,000 troops -under him; will' then be able to take the offensive, and drive the enemy back into the Drakenbergs. It is to be regretted >that the lack of sufficient: mounted troops will deprive General White of any possible chance of capturing tha passes of the Drakenshergs before tha enemy can reoccupy them. ' <

In the early stages of the war, and; in fact, prior to actual hostilities having taken place, I pointed out th 6 necessity; of sending large bodies of mounted troops,' , as in fighting the Boers it is of paramount importance to be able to move as rapidly,or even more rapidly, than they. -Their successes up to the present have been dud • to the fact that the bulk of our troops have* been infantry, who, under the African sun, were unable to move with anything lika the celerity which was necessary. ' It is little use to have efficiently trained infantry, armed with the best weapons, and commanded by brilliant officers, jf the enemy can move out of range of their rifles," and we have neither cavalry nor artillery in force to hold him in check to give out infantry an opportunity of showing their mettle. On the few occasions that our infantry have had the opportunity of coming to> close quarters with the^ene'my they havo shown what they cduld do, for, owing to the superiority of their numbers the Boers were over-confident that they could over- . whelm our force, and this gave our infantry the chance they wanted, and on every occasion the over-confidence of tha Boors proved their downfall. Our infantry, with all the dash of old, were capable of defeating more than double their numbers when they got to close quarters, and had we sufficient cavalry to complete the work so well started the war of 1899 would hava been a matter of past history, and tha British ensign would now be flying in Pre-i' toria. "In time of peace prepare for war '*-, has ever been sound advice, and never, more so than it is to-day, when rapiditva of mobilisation and marches are the twi^ very foremost features of modern warfare. ,;t From Natal comes the information thata General Buller has arrived at Maritzburj V and that lie tas complimented Mai/ :<j

general Hildyard on the success of his operations at Willow Grange. It is also pleasing to note that the advance of Hildyard with 10,000 men to Frere has practically cut off the Boer forces that are in the vicinity of Weenen, who have either .to fight Hildyard or make a long "detour by moving to their right if they want to join forces with Joubert. It is very probable that this commando could be easily defeated "pind captured if we had a fairly large tiavalry force Tinder Hildyard at this time, but as it is, by moving off to their right, they can escape. Ladysmith- reports are encouraging. From Cape Colony General Gatacre is reported to be pushing into the territory held by, the Boers, so as to engage their attention and keep them from concentrating against Lord Methuen's division. There can be no doubt about the iwisdom of this move, as it will keep a large force of the enemy fully occupied to keep Gatacre back. General French is reported to be reconstructing the railway north of Naauwpoort towards Colesberg, so as to use it for future _

Commander Alfred Peel Ethelston, of the (Naval Brigade, who was killed at the battle

iof -Belinont, was appointed commander of - H.M. ship Powerful when that ship was commissioned for, service on tha Qhina station in 1897. He had previously served in the operations about Suakim in 1884-85, tfor which he received the medal and bronze Btar. Major John H. Plumbe, also killed afc Bolmont, of the Royal Marine Li^ht Inlantry, was born in 1858, and received his majority in 1895. He served in Egypt in 1882, and received the Egyptian medal, with tlasp and bronze star.

Lieutenant Guy Senior was born in 1875, *nd Avas appointed to a commission in the .Royal Marine Artillery, receiving a lieuiienancy in 1894. He was attached to the battleship Monarch prior to his being "chosen for service with the Natal contingent n©AV serving Avith Lord Methuen's iivision.

Later. There is little news at hand this morn-

big from either Cape Colony, Bechuanaland, D/ Natal. The questions naturally come to the fore, Where is joiiberfc, and with what portion of the enemy Avere our troops engaged as alluded to in the cable message received yesterday by tho Premier? The report that Major-general Hildyard's command had advanced to Frere, a fetation on the railway line north of his flbase at Estcourt, would naturally lead us ffco i'Jfer that he had encountered the outyosts of the enemy at that place, and that lighting was in progress. . If this view of *, ho situation is the correct one it is pro- )• iVi r>o£ t\ ie forces of the enemy engaged ] ■ -=-i ' % -,t jointly Avere deported to r i' -'\2 a.c nit.y of Ennersdaie, reinforced • -.ih lir vr-i under the personal command hi Gennv.i Joubert, who, after destroying the railway bridge in front of tho British Advance, took up a strong position in the tough country round Frere, covering the j-oads over which the British advance Avould we compelled to move. The country around {[Frere, and from thereon to within about fbhree miles of Colenso, is very rough and Admirably suited to the Boer conditions of laghting. From there on to within one anile of Pieters station, or thereabouts, the ■country is more open and not at all suited }i» the Boers, and it is hardly probable that fen the vicinity of the crossing of the iTugela any very serious fighting -will take place, unless combined action by the British forces of the relief column and General CWhite's troops sallying out from LadyWmith may compel Joubert to offer battle °n a position that he would not otherwise fchoose. It is probable that in the vicinity fcf Frere, or immediately north of it, will be the scene of a hard-contested battle, rtvhich will decide whether the relief column mow under Major-general Hildyard will reach Ladysmith without Avaiting for additional reinforcements. What the strength Vif the Boer forces in the vicinitA" of Wee-

ixen, on the right flank of Hildyard's position, may be will materially affect his movements. From tho latest information bbtainable I estimate the strength of this fe'orce at about 6000 men, but it is possible that this force has been increased by the [Boers that were routed by Hi'dyard at iWillow Grange, as their retreat Avould be fihorter and easier ■ via Weenen and with liess obstacles and more hope of success f.-han if they had gone via the Mooi River &o- effect a junction Avith the forces that lately defeated by. Barton's brigade. '.These latter have evidently retreated past lEnnersdale, and are up noAV in the lines of rbhe enemy that are opposing Eildyard at IFrere.

'Another important factor that will "iveigh very considerably Avith the movements of Major-general Hildyard Avill be }the strength of the garrison he has been »hle to leave behind at Estcourt. Are they strong enough to engage the enemy at Weenen, and keep them diverted, so that they Avill be unable to make -a flank movement on Hildyard's right and assist Joubert's defence of the position he lias jtaken up? I am anxiously awaiting further intelligence from these forces before I can form any definite - idea as to the possible result of tho attempt to relieve LadyEmith.

Turning to the scene- of operations in Cape Colony and Griqualand West the latest information as to the possible renewal of fighting, and the conditions under which our forces -will meet the enemy, as judged by the latest cable messages, we Jiave every reason to expect that severe fighting will again take place before our .troops under Lord Methuen haA T e been able to force a passage through the drifts of the Modder River. Looking at the country from a military point, of view, the, enemy has many adA\intages in taking up strong positions for defence against our advancing troops. But there is every reason to believe that in Aveight of metal and number of guns Methuen's division is much superior to the enemy, and it is probable that there are enough naval guns of a range of at least equal to the Boer guns to more than offset any advantage that the enemy Avould otherwise have had over our field artillery. The efficiency of

our naval guns wherever engaged go far during the campaign speaks volumes in praise of the British Admiralty, and shows how much, better the navy is prepared for war even for land service than the army.

I am hourly expecting news as to the movements of Major-generals- Gatacre and French, as the latest oable messages informed us that Gatacre's division was advancing to engage the enemy so as to check any possible flank movements that the Boer forces might make from the vicinity of Colesburg on Lord Methuen's right flank and rear. It is very probable therefore that we shall hear of heavy fighting by the combined divisions of Gatacre and French with the enemy in the vicinity of Colesberg. We can only form an estimate of the strength of these divisions of our army by the merest guesswork, but there is no doubt that they .are largely made up of colonial forces, and that a large percentage are mounted Afrikander corps, and therefore of a very serviceable character, being particularly useful owing to the nature of the country in which they will have to operate. It is more than likely that the New Zealand and Australian contingents will ba sent to reinforce these divisions, and that they will be in the thick of the fighting within a week from to-day. There is little doubt that Gatacre's and French's divisions, leinforced by theso contingents, can handle the forces of the enemy that now occupy the northern and eastern districts of Cap 9 Colony very easily; and although the work may be slow on account of the rough country that they Avill be compelled to traverse, still one of these divisions ought to be" able. to cross the Orange River well inside of 10 days, while the other SAvings to tho right and clears tho Barkly and Aliwal districts before advancing, via ths Caledon River, on Harrismith and the north.

From every side news that Boer spies are carrying on their nefarious works comes to hand. The latest is a report of one of these having enlisted as a trooper in the Natal Imperial Light Horse, where he was found attempting to poison the horses of the command. This shows how the Boers fear our mounted forces, and recognise the fact that, whenover we have a large mounted force that can move rapidly and head them off, or flank them, their opportunities of successful resistance will be greatly diminished. It is well-known that they have always despised our infantry, owing to the inability of the latter to corner them, as they could always move out of range of the infantry's rifles whenever they choose to do so. The attempt, therefore, to poison the horses of our troops may be considered to be from their point of view a piece of first class strategy, and it is a matter of congratulation that the scoundrel Avas discovered before he had done material injury. "" Too much care cannot be exercised when enlisting these irregular troops in South Africa, as it is difficult to determine who are loyal and who may 'be disloyal and paid spies of the enemy. My experience in the Transvaal, and in fact throughout South Africa, led me to be suspicious of every man with whom I came in contact, for even Englishmen are not above suspicion, as many professing to be loyal subjects of her Majesty were the paid spies of the Transvaal Government, and it is probable that the scoundrel just -shot Avas one of thsse, or a British Afrikander, Avith Dutch sentiments. Unfortunately wo have a few of these to contend against, such as Mr X. Merriman, tho English Bond member of the present Cape Ministry.

The report that Mr Saver, Crown Commissioner of Public Works, is in the disaffected districts, supposed to be exhorting the Dutch to remain loyal, is a matter for serious consideration. The charge made by the loyalist' refugees that Mr Saver' s presence there at that time is an encouragement to the disaffected who rebel is no doubt the correct view to take of the situation. It is wonderful the patience shown by Sir Alfred Milner in dealing with the Bond Ministry up to the present, but there is no doubt that he has had good and sufficient reasons for the patience he has displayed, and although some may be inclined to consider that he has been "too forbearing, it must be remembered that he is on the ground, and has carefully studied the situation during the years that he has been her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa.

Information is to hand that the transport Warbba, which left Durban for Capetown with a portion of the 9th Lancers after their arrival from India, eucountered a heavy gale off East London, and was compelled to return to Durban, where she arrived about October 14. The Mien were transferred to the transports Avoca and Nevada, and carried on to their destination. Another portion of the same regiment was embarked on the Nairrung, at Durban, and taken on to Capetown, and arrived at that port on October 14. It is probable that this portion of the 9th Lancers is the part of the regiment about which no information as to its whereabouts has been obtained, and which was sent in pursuit of tha enemy after the engagement at Grass Pan, and has been unaccounted for since. It is to be hoped that they have met witli no serious mishap. It is possible that they may have fallen into an ambush, or the enemy attempting to cut them off tLey may have been forced to make a detour, so that it may be sn:nc time yet before we will have serious cause for concern regarding their safety.

November 50,

Official reports to hand give particulars of the most desperate battle fought during the Avar. Lord Methuen reports finding the Boers strongly entrenched Vitli :i number of heavy guns at the Modder River, in a position where it was impossible to out-flank them, so that it was imperative to attack them in front. This naturally meant a trying situation for the attacking force. We have no definite information as to whether the engagement took place on the south or north bank of the Modder. but it is natural to suppose that the Boers would choose the latter of the tAvo positions, and that this in a great measure hindered our troops in all attempts to flank the enemy's position, as, with one flank resting on the river, their front

covered by the river, and their other flank covered by a strong mounted force, the cavalry we h^ve Avith Lord. Methuen's division would be powerless to successfully carry out a flanking movement, as tho enemy Avould ahvays outnumber them and move quite as rapidly. It is no Avonder then the fight is reported to be one of the hardest in the annals of our gallant army. When we . oonsider the staying .qualities and t-ha determined bravery the Boers haA r e shown in all previous engagements Avith our troops, the successful carrying of the enemy's position speaks in glowing terms of the fighting qualities of the modern British soldier, and plainly shows that the short-service system now the rule jn our military service has not caused any deterioration in him. Special mention is made of the distinguished services of the Artillery and Naval Brigade, so that it is probable that the first part of the engagement opened with a heavy artillery duel, in Avliich the superiority of the British gunners clearly manifested itself, showing that training and intelligence will always* pi T ove their worth in contests of this nature. It ia evident that our artillerymen made it too Avarm for the enemy's gunners, and silenced their batteries before our infantry came into action ; otherwise it Avould have been a which would have tested double the numbers of Lord Methuen's division to have carried a strong position from the front when held by a determined enemy armed with modern weapons such as the Boers possess. But, even with their artillery silenced, Iho advance of infantry against such a force must have been very trying, and must have caused a great deal of havoc in the ranks of the advancing battalions unless the enemy had been considerably demoralised by tho previous bombardment, and even then the advantage of position and coA r er must have ' told terribly.

The rout of the Boers at this point practically leaves tho road to Kimberley open, as from recent advices Aye knoAv that the enemy had mustered every available man to contest the passage of the 'Modder RiA'er. From heliographic information received by Lord Methuen from Colonel Kelrewich we have news that Cronje, with 3000 of his command, assisted the Free Staters at the battle^ of Grass Pan, and it is very probable that the 500 Boers who retreated from Kuruman on Warrenton have since joined the Boer forces between the Mcdder and Kimberley, which all goes to prove that the Boers are making a very determined effort to delay the advance of Lord Methuen, and to defeat him before he can enter Kimberley, as they regard this point as the key to the whole position on the west. With Kimberiey relieved, the Boer plan of campaign on the west will have become a failure. In A'iew of this fa<:t the cheering news of their defeat on the Modder will be hailed with joy AvhereeA r er the British flag waA'es. It is further ground for satisfaction to learn that at last Aye are able to form a correct opinion as to v/hy the Boers around Mafeking had been decreasing. It is hoav certain that they Imve been draAvn off from that point, and are amongst the enemy's forces around Kimberley, and . have not been sent to Natal to reinforce Joubert, as information soms days aso led us to suppose. Consequently the defeat of the Boers has placed them in a much more serious position than would othenvise -have been the case.

News of the arrival of General Gatacre at ' Bushman's Hock has been received. Bushman's Hock is north of Arundel, in the vicinity of Plewman, and from this point there are good roads leading to Colesberg and Norval's Pont. The country round the Hock is very roufi[h, and splendid positions on every hand for defence is obtainable, but, as the numbers of the enemy on this district cannot be equal in strength to Gat-acre's column, it is A-ery likely "that in three or four days we will hear that Colesberir has been occupied by our forces. NeAvs is to hand that the New Zealand contingent his gone north to De .Aar, and on their arriA'al there it is more than probable that they -will proceed to reinforce General Gatacre's diA~ision. But it may bo possible that they Avill be sent to General French's force, as he has now one l)ortion of the New South Wales Lancers under his command. Following on the heels of the New Zealand contingent we may presume that the mounted men of the A'arious Australian contingents- Avill be despatched from CapetoAvn for the same part of the country, and they Avill have a chance to try their mettle before long under conditions that Avill test their ability. The addition of such a strong force of mounted troops to the force operating in the northeastern districts Avill add very materially to the British chance of success in that locality, and will hasten the departure of the Boers across the Orange River.

With the collapse of the Boer plans of campaign in Cape Colony and Becbuanaland a hasty retreat on the part of the enemy through the Free State may be expected, and a rapid advance of our troops along the lines of the Free State railway as far as Bloemfontein Avitliout meeting serious opposition may be looked for, us the conditions on the other side of the Orange River are altogether unfavourable to Boer modes of fighting, and unless faA*ourable positions can be taken up and made use of the Boers are nol likely to meet our troops, as they have a great respect for their oAvn personal safety, and Anil not willingly risk their chances on anything like equal terms.

Turning to the Natal side, I am pleased to note that additional artillery has been sent from Capet oavii, making our forces more equal in that particular than they have hitherto been

It is to be expected that Joubert Avill try and prevent our troops from gaining a footing on the north side of the Tugela, and the destruction of the Bulwer and railway bridges will materially assist him in his efforts, particularly so at this time, as it is reported that the river is in flood, and, like all other African rivers, it is a very dangerous one at such times — difficult to cross and difficult to bridge. HoAvever, the fact that Major-general Hildyard has tAro or more 4.7 in naval guns at long range with him will materially assist in the work of bridging, .as our workinjg parties

■ can be covered from an attack by the Boers' artillery and from sharpshooters and machina guns, -which could be posted to render the construction and placing of pontoons dangerous work. With the naval guns once in position working parties could carry on their task without being seri- ] ously interfered with, as these guns are of , superior range and fire heavier metal than the best of' the Boer cannon. It is now certain that General White did not attack the enemy and carry the position and guns held by the besiegers after , Joubert had marched south with reinforce- .' ments for the attack on Hildyard, and it is i very likely that Joubert did not take a i | very large party with him. He may have j left his lines in front of White's position ■ with a large portion of his, army, but it is ! an old dodge of the Boers to move off, or | appear to do so, so as to draw their enemy • into pursuit,- and then turn sharply round | and inflict "an unexpected blow upon their pursuers. Doubtless Joubert tried to draw White from behind his entrenchments in the old-time fashion, but White knows ■ nearly all that can be learned about Boer I strategy, and was not to be caught so [ easily. I stated some time ago my belief r that Jouberfc would not attempt to go to j Pieternvaritzfburg, and leave White itnde- -, feafc: * in the rear, as it would be too i hazardous to do so. Seeing how little the j advance of Hildyard has been opposed, I „ am confirmed in my belief that the por-' ! tions of the enemy who penetrated as far j as Ennersdaie and Weenen did^not exceed ; one-third of Joubert's total strength, ai.d ■ it is probable that the various commandos . which ravaged the Mooi River country as | far as Nottingham road and Highlands did , not exceed 3000 men, and Avere merely large j foraging parties sent south to divert Hildyard from carrying out his designs, and to gather such supplies as the country con- ! tamed for the use of the Jorces around

. Lady smith. I The Avhereabouts of the Boer commando of 6000 or more men who were in or about [ Weenen is of considerable importance, as ■ it is a serious matter to leave an enemy of ' such strength unoccupied in the rear and on the flank of Hildyard's adA'ancing ' column. This is all the more a matter of s concern in vieAv of the possibility of the passage of the Tugela being disputed.

j December 1. I The latest news oy cable confirms my ! opinion regarding the position of the enemy. When they were attacked by Lord Methuen's column on the 28th our troops found thani posted in a strong position on the north side of the Modder River, Avith 1 four large Krupp and two field guns in I position covering their front. The artili lery opened the fight, and then the four } battalions of the three regiments that ref present the Foot Guards, or what is known f as the Guards' Brigade, moved forward to ' the attack, covering the British right, ( Avhife the' North Lancashires, • Yorkshire, j Light Infantry, Northamptonshire, and j Northumberland Regiments, Avith tho j Naval Brigade, formed the British, left, as, in skirmishing order, our troops advanced to the attack. It is Avonderful to [ relate the success of our troops against .a I force so strongly posted, when it Avas imj possible to turn the enemy's Hanks. But ; the splendid service of our guns told against the enemy, and discipline and training once | again proved superior to longer-ranged and better Avea-pons. Skill and pluck, not Aveapons, won the battle of the Modder River. That our artillery and naval gun•ners worked their guns well is very cvi- ; dent, as the Boers' position on the north ; bank was hid away amongst the kopjes and ' ridges that are so prominent a feature of •' the north bank of the Modder, being all the more noticeable on account of the extreme flatness of the greater portion of the '■ country for many miles to the. north-east and west of the* immediate position occu- [ pied by the Boers' camp. There is every reason to think that ths tAvo drifts (or shallow places) where the roads cross the river A~ere AA-ell covered by the enemy's batteries, and that before a single man of our forces could cross to the north side our sappers (i.e., engineer corns) had to bridge the. river, and it may be taken for granted that the Beer Staats Artillery and sharpshooters" made that work a difficult and dangerous undertaking. The superior handling of our guns in reply to those from across the stream drove the enemy further back, and made their gunnery less effective than it would have, been if opposed by artillery poorly placed and served. It Avas the superior way our •batteries Avere fought that enabled our infantry to cross the river aid move to the attack. Yet it is very plain that tho task of our infantry as they advanced across the river and deployed into lines of skirmishers Avould have made almost any other troops hesitate. But with the steadiness so characteristic, the Guards Brigade took the right and the regiments of the line the Jeft, and the sharp "ping" of the LeeMelfords were added to the din of battle, a3 our troops advanced in very open order to face the terrible fire that belched from the muzzles of 8000 Mauser rifles until forced to relinquish their position. The enemy withdrew after a most obstinate resistance, lasting 10 hours. It must be expected that our leases Avere A-ery heavy ; probably they av ill exceed the loss experienced by the enemy. But the fact that tha Boer position was carried is in itself a matter of great importance, and will impress itself on the minds of the Boers, Avho have until quite recently believed that the British poldiei' could not and Avould not fight an equal number of Boers. The . lesson Avill ; be sure to "bear fruit, and it will be difficult to get the burghers to risk an engagement with our troops again, unless they have everything favourable on their side. . A ' cunning, tenacious fighter, believing in his OAvn prowess, the Boer has hitherto regarded British infantrymen very lightly. But the lessons given him at Kaflirskop, Grass Pan, and Modder River will have changed all this, and it is doubtful if Cronje can induce them to risk another battle in the vicinity of Spytfontein to endeavour to stop General Methuen's advance, for if General Methuen is to be stopped Spytfontein is the only place be-

tween the Modder and Kimbarley "that ' offers any advantage in position to the

Let my readers refer to their maps, and mark the distances' between the Modder and Kimberley while I explain in detail the country through which our troops musti jpass and Avhy tho Boers cannot have any choice as regards a place to offer further fight, but must meet our troops ■at Spyt* fontein, if at all. The Modder is 625 miles north of Capetown, and at an elevation 1 of 3668 ft above sea level. From there north to Spytfontein the country rises to an elevation- of 3994 ft, being a very,, gradual' rise until past Merton's Siding, when it changes to a steeper incline, and a^ Spytfontsin, 11 miles from the river, some sharp ridges are found. About . one mile east of the railway station Sholtzkop rises to an elevation of. 4178 ft, and offers an excellent position, commanding the railAvay and waggon, road leading to Kimberley; through Beaconsfield, 642 miles from Capotown. At that point the country dips down to 3970 ft, to rise again to 4012 ft three miles further north at Kimberley, 647 miles • from Capetown. It Avill be readily understood that in passing through -the ' 25 ~ miles separating the Modder from Kimberley, Commandant .Cronje Arill -endeavour to gather every man that he can obtain, _ and trr to resist General Methuen's. advance, asit would be madness to allow the British 1 relief column to reach Kimberley if if is possible to stop its progress, and it would •> be equally foolish to offer resistance at any place nearer the beleaguered town, as to do so would be to offer an inducement to tho garrison to make an attack on ihe lines of the besiegers at the same time thafe Lord Methuen attacked, so that instead of having a chance of fighting Lord Methuen's column unaided, the Boers Avould have to fight the combined British forces operating from two different directions, and in the middle of a large plain, Avhere the British cavalry could do great damage to the retreating burghers if they were defeated. Giving due consideration to all the circimi- , stances and conditions, I have no hesitation in saying that the enemy will offer battle at Spytfontein, and, if defeated, will endoavour to retreat on Bloemfontein, via Jacobsdal, and, oAring to the small number of caA-alry under Lord Methuen, the Boer commandant will bo able to effect a retreat with the bulk of his command, although it is probable that large numbers of transport animals, waggons, and many of the" guns now in position before Kimberley, and such stores as the. enemy have on hand, Avill be captured by our victorious troops. The Guards Brigade is made up as follows : — Ist Battalion ' Grenadier Guards from Windsor; 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards from Gibraltar; Ist-Battalion"Cold-stream Guards from Gibraltar; Ist Battalion Scots Guards' from Chelsea. ■These Avere despatched from the stations named to the seat of Avar.

Yesterday I Avas in doubt about'the-posi-tion" of the enemy's forces that had previously been reported to be raiding the country around Weenen and GreytoArn, Natal, but tho afternoon ■ cables inform us that the 12th Lancers inflicted great loss on a Boer relief commando in the vicinity : of Weenen, so it is evident that our troops have surrounded the Boers at that place, and that Joubert sent • a force to relievo | them, and it is this commando that has ! been defeated by the 12th Lancers. The i cable also clears up the question of the | force of cavalry that is attached to Majorj general Hildyaxd's relief column, and at ; the same time enables us to locate one of j the finest cavalry regiments in the service; ■ about whose doings or location we were [ absolutely in the dark. j The information that General Buller is ; about to assume personal command of the 1 relief noAV under Majdr-general Hildyard, and the lack of information regarding Major-general Clery, whom the cables in- ' formed us some time ago had been appointed to that command, comes as a surprise, particularly so in view of tho sue- ! cessful way General Hildyard has disposed of the enemy's forces that were sent' to' oppose his progress. | ' December 2. TLs list of killed at -the battle, on the' i Modder River include* Lieu'tena-nt-colonel Henry, P. Norlhcote, C.8.,- P.S.C., late ■ major of the Leinster Regiment, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General on the staff of Lord Methuen. first division of the first array corps. He was born in 1856, and took part in the Sherbro (West Coast of Africa-) expedition in 1883, and Avas mentioned in despatches ; in the Zulu Avar of 1878, as i deputy assistant adjiitont-^renernl ; in thei Ashantee expedition (1895-96), for Avhich he. received a bronze star ; the expedition to v Karaga (1S98). and Avas created C.B. He Avas on detached service as commissioner and' commander of the troops in the north territories of the Gold Coast during 1897. Amongst the wounded was Major Count Gleichen, C.M;.G., P.S.G., Grenadier Guards, Equerry Extraordinary 'to her Majesty tha Queen, staff captain of the Military Intelligence department of the Horse Guards, S.W. He was born in 1863, and promoted major in 1898. He served in the Soudan in 1895, and received medal and two clasps ; in the Dongola. expedition in 1896, medal Avith clasp andTurkish medal. He Avas serving with the • first battalion of his regiment Avhen Avounded. The determination of the War Office to ' despatch a second army corps, ""the second • division of which will leave this week ia veVy significant in that it ' points, out tho'> , fact that the conditions at tihe"' Cape are" regarded as 'unsatisfactory. "The despatch of the remaining division ""to complete tha second- corps may be expected shortly. ' The arrival of these additions to the strength in South Africa Avill enable General Buller to fully garrison the principal towns and provide troops to guard his lines of com- ■ munication, and provide in overwhelming force for operations against Pretoria. The cable report that fighting betAveen the outposts and Ladysmitn is in progress is very far from being satisfactory, as anyone having any idea of military affairs — and, in fact, civilians in general — know - that such fighting has been ha uroares*

ever since the investment of the town by the enemy whenever an opportanity presented itself for a skirmish. ,In the same despatch we are told that the commander-in-chief is at Frere with- 18,000 men, and that in the vicinity of Colenso the Boers hare massed 2000 men to reeist him when he attempts to advance.. Now these figured iaust be misleading. It is very likely that tie total number of British forces in Natal outside of Ladysmith does not exceed the numbers said to be at Frere, and from these Sufficient troops will have to be deducted to garrison Pietermaritzburg and protect tha railway in Buller's rear. It is improbable that Joubert would attempt to resist Buller at Colenso, or anywhere else, if Ixe were advancing at the head of such a force, and certainly would not try to do co ■with 2000 men, hampered with 300 waggons, laden with loot. It isw probable that the Tugela River remains high, but all Bouth. African rivers rise and fall very rapidly, and Joubert would be the last man in the world to depend too much on the chances of the .weather under such circumstances, for as soon as it stops raining the Tugela will fall rapidly. If tie Boers mean to contest the passage of the river they will do so with every man they can spare from the various commandos around Lady«mith. If Buller gets a single brigade across the Tugela nothing . will stop his advance into Ladysmith, and, with the British forces combined, Joubert knows his game is up, and a hasty retreat to the Drakenbergs will be his only chance of Raving his army from defeat and capture. Looking at the situation from a military standpoint, I consider that as soon as the river is normal the British relief column will force its way to the north bank of the stream, and then a flight of the Boers may be expected to take place. It is possible that the river may remain too high for Buller's purpose for some days yet. I look for no serious fighting after our troops once get a footing on the plains north of the river, but our troops will probably suffer somewhat before they get through the drifts or over the bridges constructed for their passage.

December 4.

Complete news of the losses sustained by the British forces at the battle on the Modder River is to hand, and in my opinion they are comparatively light, as I expected a much heavier loss, considering the numbers, engaged, the strength of the enemy's position, and the disadvantages at woich our troops were plaoed. With the news of the losses comes cheerful tidings that the wounded are progressing favourably. This is what might be expected, ex- ( oept where the wounds are of a particularly severe nature, as the climate is very favourable in that part of the country, as, no matter how hot the days are, the nights are cool and pleasant, and in consequence of this the wounded are able to obtain rest and sleep. This tends greatly to improve the chances of recovery. I can speak very highly of the climate of Becliuaualand and Cape Colony during the summer months, and can assure the relatives arid friends of the contingent that it would be difficult to find a better- climate or a more genial sky under the whole canopy of hc-aven for life in bivouac or tent, and while the rough life of a soldier in the field may try the mettle of which our lads are made I am sure Major Robin, his officers, and men have much to be thankful for. Had they been sent to Natal instead, they would have had African and typhoid fevers and heat and rain'to add to the ordinary discomforts of the campaign. . The cable received from Mr R«eves stating that the British cavalry was deficient, and that the New Zealand contingent was therefore specially welcome, adds one more to the list of authorities which I can cite in confirmation of my oft-repeated assertion regarding the necessity of a large increase in the cavalry arm of the service. Probably it is just as well that the Boer war has come about, as the lesson it teaches may bear practical fruit, so that «hould we unfortunately become embroiled •with one of the great Powers we will have had an opportunity of remedying the defects of our system and increasing the number of men and horses in our artillery and cavalry corps somewhat commensurate with the requirements of the service.

It was very evident that the defeat of the Boers at the Modder River was far from being conclusive, as Lord Methuen fcas found it necessary to await for reinforcements before proceeding. This delay is unfortunate, as it will give Cronje time to collect his forces and to entrench at Spytfontein.

Mr Schreiner and treason, and where he draws the line between that and what he considers loyalty, is hard to define. It appears from the cables received that, as Premier of Cape Colony, he has complained to President Steyn- of the Orange Free State that the latter has made a breach of an understanding that existed between Mr Schreiner's Government and the Boer Republics wherein the Boer Governments arranged to respect the territory of Cape Colony, and not to invade its soil if war should result. We have no means of knowing at the present time what service Mr Schreiner and his Government were expected to render to the Boer cause in return for the favours to be extended by the Republics.

We are anxiously awaiting news from the divisions under the command of Majorsgeneral Gatacre and French, particularly so »& it is. very probable that our New Zealand boys arc attached by this time to one of these commands.

The news from the northern part of Cape Colony is not of an assuring character, for the cable plainly slates that the young men of the border country have joined the enemy's ranks, and that only those who have property at stake remain on their farms. I might add that these are not Uukewarm supporters of the Boer cause, but only remained quiescent on account of the danger of confiscation of their property. It would be decidedly an easier task for the officers and troops now clearing these districts 'if they could arrest every- Dutch fanner, and send him to the rear as a jriaoner of -war or a suspect, or until after

tie enemy had been driven beyond the border, as there is no doubt many of these will be found snipping at our men whenever the opportunities present themselves, and under the circumstances they are harder to deal with and more dangerous than if they were in the enemy's ranks.

Again we are taught something in a most forcible way in the matter of dress m the loss sustained by the Argyle Highlanders (91st Foot), a grand corps that has seen more than a fair share of service in South Africa. It is one of the regiments that took part in the capture of the Cape from the Dutch in 1806, and since that eventful time it took its share of the fighting from 1846 to 1853 in two campaigns, and again in 1879, so that the war at present in progress makes the fifth "South African campaign for the regiment since it helped to add Dutch South Africa to the Empire. On its colours are to be found nine of the most important battles our army fought against the French, when British bravery saved Spain from becoming a French province, and to these are added Alma, Balaclava, Sabastopol, and Lucknow. It is high time that the kilt ceased to be a part of the field service uniform of our Highland regiments. It ought to be abolished, unless for ceremonials, as it causes the loss of many a good soldier by furnishing a target for the enemy that is distinguishable at long distances.

Lieutenant-general Sir Mansfield Clarke, X.C.8., was born in 1839, and entered the army in 1856. He served in New Zealand from 1861 to 1866, and was mentioned in despatches and received the New Zealand medal. He also served during the Zulu war (1879), received the medal with clasp, was mentioned in despatches and created a C.B. and breveted lieutenant-colonel. He was appointed to the command of the forces at the Cape<irom 1880 to 1882, inclusive, and was in command of the troops during the Basuto war of 1880 and 1881. He was deputy adjutant-general of the Horse Guards for the years 1892 and 1893, and since that time has been lieutenantgeneral in command of the forces in Madras, India. He has now been appointed to tbe command of the third division of the second army corps, which makes the sixth division of General Buller's army. This division is now* being organised at Aldershot for service at the Cape. General Clarke is a very strict disciplinarian of the old school. He knows the Boers of 1880 very well indeed, but it is doubtful if he will have much opportunity of turning his knowledge to account. It is probable that by vie time bis division arrives at the Cape the Boers will hnve retired to Pretoria, and the troops under his command will be assigned for garrison and communication duties until the close of the war.

The losses of the Royal Marine Light Infantry at the battle of Grass Pan tells of honour added to the wonderful list of triumphs of that grand old corps. The Royal Marine Li^ht Infantry takes precedence after the 49th Regiment of the Line, the Royal Berkshire Regiment, and its record as a fighting corps is as creditable at sea as on shore. It shares with the Royal Horse Artillery the proud distinction of a!wavs being able to boast that it can find recruits to fill up every vacancy in its ranks to the full strength allowed on the establishment, and this, too, in spite of the fact that it is the hardest worked infantry corps in H.M. service. Well done was the work of the New South Wales Lancers as it charged the retreating Boers, and drove them back into the lines from which they were attempting to retreat. 'Ine number of Boers reported killed in the battles of Kaffirskop and Grass Pan and Boer prisoners would indicate that at least 1500 are placed out of action, a-s the number of killed is stated to be 540. and if these figures are correct 960 would not be too large "an estimate to make of the wounded.

Cable messages at hand report that the Australian and Canadian contingents, with three battalions of infantry, have been despatched to guard the line of railway between De Aar and Belmont. It is probable that a good portion of this force will be pushed forward to reinforce General Methuen, as tlie message states that horse artillery are included in the force, and consequently the whole force mentioned cannot be intended to act on lines of communication, since horse artillery batteries always serve with cavalry brigades and divisions, and never with infantry, and are' far too valuable to be detained on service of the nature referred to in the cable.