THE RAKAIA RAILWAY ACCIDENT.

Otago Witness, Issue 2368, 20 July 1899, Page 9

THE RAKAIA RAILWAY ACCIDENT.

THE COMMISSIONERS' REPORI.

THE DRIVER (CARTER) RESPON-

SIBLEv

WOME SUGGESTIONS.

WELLINGTON, July 11.

The report of Mr A. C. Pendleton, of South Australia, and Dr J. Giles, the commissioners appointed to inquire into- the circumstances connected with the Rakdia railway accident, wa» laid on the table of the House to-day.

The Commissioners detail the circumstances j ■under which the accident occurred. On the l 11th March two excursion trains were booked • to run from Christchurch to Ashburton, returning in the evening, and leaving Ashburton at 6.5 p.m. and 6.15 p.m. respectively. The working notice of these trains was issued in due course, and provided for both trains - crossing No. 2X south at Rakaia, and the ' first train, consisting of two Baldwin engines, 30 carriages, and one brake van, left Ashbur- ' ton punctually, arriving at Rakaia two before the booked time — viz., 6.45 "instead of 6.47. The second train, consisting • of one Baldwin engine, 14- carriages, two waggons, and one brake yc_a, was 20 minutes late leaving Aahburton, and the guard of this, train (William Clempson) was unfortunately left, behind, in consequence, as he alleges, of the crowded state of the platform preventing his joining the brake van. The report pro-

ceeds : —

It is not apparent that his absence in any way led to the subsequent accident, but we desire to record our opinion that a guard of such lengthened experience as he possesses ought to have avoided so serious a blunder' as missing the passenger train of which he was in charge. This train, under the circumstances -which are -later on stated, overtook the first train at Rakaia station, and the driver of it (Charles Henry Carter), instead of elopping outside *he first facing poirts, in accordance ■with the rule, overshot the mark, and ran into the front train, with the disastrous results so well known. The coroner's jury, at the inquest held on the passengers who were killed, returned a verdict of manslaughter against Driver Carter, who stood his trial at the Supreme Court sittings in June, and was acquitted. It is 6hown in the evidence which we have taken that the driver (Charles Henry Carter) of this second train started from Ashburton at an unusually rapid rate, and that hJs speed of Tunning on portions of the road, and especially through Cher^ey and towards Rakaia, was not only in excess of the timetable rate — i.e., 24- miles per hour, — but also greater than was laid down by a regulation which limits the speed of his train as an ordinary one to 30 miles per hour. The evidence of Mr Thomas Danks, who, previous to 1878, had 16 years' experience as a driver on the Victorian railways, is very clear upon this point. The etationmaster at Chertsey . also expressed an opinion- that the train ran - through his station " pretty fast," and the guard s. assistant (Burrowe), who took charge of the- brake when he found that his guard • had been left behind, expresses the opinion that the speed was that of an express train. Engine-driver Carter, when called upon to explain his breach of the rule in not stopping outside Rakaia station, pleaded (1) that, his guard having been left behind, the brakes in the van were not applied when called for ; (2) that the Westinghouse brake upon the engine did not. act; (3) that when hie fireman, at his instruction, "cut in," the air for the Westinghouse tender brake failed to act for a few seconds ; (4) that he was misled by the head light of an engine standing on the Methven branch, which he believed to be the head light of No. 21 south, which' train he was to cross at Rakaia ; (5) that he believed the tail lights of No. 1 excursion, standing in the Rakaia station, to be much further away than they actually were; (6) that no danger or stop signal was given to him until he was close to the first facing points.

With regard to these pleas, we have to state — (1) The -evidence of Burrows and of Mr Fitzpatrick, who was in the van with him, goes to show that the brake was applied either at Chertsey or immediately afterwards, and kept on until the time of the accident ; and it will also be noticed that the engine-driver (Hughes) saw that the brakes of the van •were on at the time of the collision. (2 and 3) The admissions of Carter himself immediately after the accident that his brakes were in good order (vide Mr Beattie's evidence), and the fact that the engine and tender have continued to run with those brakes in good order since, suffice to negative his statement . that they did not act properly before the ac : .. cident. On this point Carter, at the inquiry w,hich we held, entirely, failed to account in any reasonable way for the t diff.e.rence between his statements immediately after the accident , and his argument before us to the effect that ' the brakes had failed him. It is beyond question that, verbally and above his signature, he fully admitted, within forty-eight hours of the accident, that his brakes were in good order, and had acted properly, suggesting rather that the accident had arisen either from his misjudging the distance until it was too late to stop, or from the fact that the pre- j ceding train had made, as he expressed it, "bad braking ground." His statement: "I thought I had a clear road up to the platform, and whistled for a platform signal, but did not get one," is very significant, and we are further of opinion that it is in the highest degree improbable that the Westinghouse brake would be in good order at Ashburton and fail to act within an hour subsequently, | and work well without any repair? for three months afterwards. (4) We admit that Carter may have been misled by the head light of the Methven engine in the manner alleged by hini, but this does not in any way exonerate him for running into a station before he received a platform signal, in accord- . ance with the regulations. The Methven engine was not mentioned in his working notice, and the only lights at or near the station by which he should have been guided Were the platform signal, which he did not receive, and the tail lights of the train in front of him. (5) He also probably misjudged Hhe distance of the tail lights of the train i •in front of him, but this, far from being a ] rvalid excuse, 'is rather an admission of a ! serious errof of judgment on the part of an I experienced driver. (6) According to the evidence of Mr O'Neil, who showed the danger or stop signal, it was exhibited about 300 yds from the facing points, a distance quite ade- ' quate, in our opinion, for protective pui;poses. ■But as no rule provides for the_ showing of such a signal, Carter had no right to rely vpou its exhibition, and should have had his train under sufficient control to enable him to stop before reaching these facing points xinlil the platform signal admitting him was Wjojtb, in accordance with the rule*

We are of opinion that this accident arose through Driver Carter maintaining too high a speed in running his train between Cherlsey and Rakaia, and from his misjudging his distance from Rakaia station when he shut off steam. There is not the slightest reason to suppose that Carter was other than perfectly sober, but as in his evidence he has admitted his extreme desire to make up on his journey the time which had been lost -in starting from Ashburton, we believe that he allowed that desjre to override his better judgment, and consequently maintained an excessive speed, expecting that No. 21 south would be in Rakaia in due time, and that the first excursion train would have cleared that station. The supposition that his mind was almost exclusively bent upon this one object peeins to afford a reasonable explanation of the failure of himself and his fireman to see the green light which Burrows (the guard' 8 assistant) alleges that he waved almost persistently between Chertsey station and the scene of the accident.

We believe that we shall not be travelling beyond the scope of your Excellency's commission in making a few comments on the method of working as disclosed by the evidence.

First, the system of crossing passenger trains at a station unprovided with home and distant signals is one which should, withj all possible despatch, be discontinued as dangerous. In this case, had such signals been in existence, Carter would have been instructed, under the usual rules governing their use, to come to a stop at the distant signal, immediately afterwards pulling slowly within and proceeding to the home signal, or as far as any obstruction on the road would permit, the distant signal, therefore, protecting his rear. We beg to submit that every station used for crossing passenger trains, and having a resident staff, should be supplied with such signals, and that where trains have to be crossed at stations without a resident staff the workiug time table should provide for each train coming to a stand outside these points, and specify which train was to enter the station first.

Second, we are of opinion that the practice of running double engine trains, consisting of anything like 30 carriages, with passengers, is unwise, more especially in the absence of continuous brakes. Even with such brakes double engine trains should not be' used for the carriage of passengers, except where such additional power may be necessary to assist a load over an exceptionally bad grade.

We are informed that an expenditure of £275,000 would equip the whole of the New Zealand railway stock with the Westinghouse continuous brake, and as, doubtless, this work could only be done gradually and charged over a series of years, it seems probable that the burden of the annual interest would be less than the cost of repairs following slight accidents on some of the heavy grades worked in this colony.

Third, it would be very desirable to institute a system under which stations in advance of a fixed crossing place should be advised of the late running of a train so booked to cross. For example, if in this ease prompt advice had been g.ven to Ashburton of the late running of No. 21 south, and it had been the duty of the stationmaster to advise Carter to that effect, he would 'have been forewarned, and doubtless would have run more steadily between Chertsey and Rakaia. Forth, we are of opinion that an important rule, such as 317, should not be allowed to fall into abeyance. We are aware that the working book provides a maximum speed for (a) express and (b) ordinary trains, but it does so without expressly amending or cancelling an authorised rule (317), which forbids the making up of lost time, and even these maximums are, we believe, exceeded by the drivers. This is a state of things likely to bring about a comparatively lax adherence to regulations, and we suggest for consideration whether rule 317 should not stand with an added authority to the driver to exceed the time-table speed only at the written request of the guard and within stated limits. This system has been found to work well elsewhere.

In conclusion, we desire to express our thanks to all the officers of the Railway department with whom we have been brought into contact in the discharge of our duties, the performance of which has been facilitated by the courtesy extended and the anxious wish, manifested on all hands to contribute to the efficiency of our work.