FROM MAJUBA TO OMDUR MAN.

Otago Witness, Issue 2368, 20 July 1899, Page 59

FROM MAJUBA TO OMDUR MAN.

(By '1 B. Townshend, in Chambcis'r Journal.)

To learn from your enemies is a maxim ■which has lost none of its force down to the present day; and it interests everyone amongst us to knoAV Avhether the British army is in the hands of men avlio are capable of profiting by the lessons that from time to time are rudely administered to us by our foes. Most of us remember only too ■well the short-lived English domination in the Transvaal during the later part of the seventies, as weir as the way in Avhich misfortune seemed to dog the steps of those on whose shoulders fell the burden of upholding it there. We had -found the country in a bankrupt condition, and had refclored its finances ; we had found it threatened by the formidable Zulu monarch, Avith his army of 50,000 fighting savages, thoroughly drilled and in a state of high military efficiency. After a desperate struggle, in •which we suffered some very severe losses, including the battle of Isandula, where our camp was taken and the whole of its defenders slaughtered, the British -arms finally achieved a complete but hard-Avon triumph. We had broken the power of Cetewayo, and dispersed' his regiments of " celibate, man-destroying gladiators," to use the phrase in Avhicli Sir Bartle Frere once described his justly-dreaded Jmpis-. Subsequently, in the Transvaal itself, we liacT overthrown Secocoeni, a poAverful native chief who had successfully defied the Boer Government ; Avhile enterprising British traders had supplied an abundance of excellent sporting rifles to the people of the country, avlio earned not a little money by shooting doAvn the game Avith them. In brief, we had removed one by- one every obstacle to a revolt on Ihe part of the emigrant farmers, who made up ths bulk of the poulation of the TransA'aal outside the towns. The revolt folloAved, as might have been expected. It broke out in the month of December, 1880, during the Avarm summer of the Southern Hemisphere, and it came to au end Avith the peace that A\as concluded after the disastrous battle of Majuba Mountain on February 26, 1881. The tale of misfortune begins Avith the affair of Bronkerspruit in December. The 941h Regiment, forming a part of the British garrison of the Transvaal, had been ordered to concentrate* at Pretoria, and was on the march thither. No actual fighting had as yet taken, place ; but the Boers had held a mass meeting, proclaimed a republic, and announced that they Avere going to begin. At Bronkerspruit they laid a carefully-prepared ambush along the road by which the 94th were advancing and awaited their victims. The British colonel had. been warned to look out for traps, but as far as can be knoAvn he had no idea that these sharp-shooting farmers Avere really in earnest, and he failed to profit by the warning. The 94th Avere strung out for half a mile along the roa<J|;>Hie Aveatlrer was hot, and many of the soldiers had put their rifles in theAvaggons ; in short, the inarch was conducted as if in a lime of profound peace. At a certain spot the long column Avas halted by a Boer patrol. There Avas a brief colloquy between the colonel and the Boers ; they ordered him to fo back, and he refused. Nobody seems to aye noticed the ambushed riflemen, or to have observed the little heaps of stones with which these skilled hunters of Avild game, old hands at s-hooting over the bare veldt, had thoughtfully marked out beforehand at one hundred, one hundred and fifty, and tAvo hundred yards, their exact distance from their intended targets. The Boer rifles cracked, and in 20 minutes all the officers and half the British troops were shot doAvn,-' and the rest Avere made prisoners ; the loss on the side of the farmers Avas almost nil. As a Western American crudely observed, it was a case of a lot of first-class frontiersmen talcing in a crowd of tenderfeet out of the Avet. It A\ r as a terribly seA'ere lesson that in the face of a possible enemy a soldier must never be ojf his guard.

After the Bronkerspruil disaster the Avhole country \va& up. A-ll the British garrisons in the TransA'aal Avere beleaguered by the Boers ; and one garrison, Potchefstroom, Avas knoAvn both by them" and by Sir George Pomeroy Colley, the general in command in Natal, to be short of provisions. Colley gallantly determined to cut his Avay in, if possible, and relieA'e it. He knew Avell enough that ere long an army from overseas must be sent to retrieve the honour of the British arms ; but he Avas also aware that it must ineA'ilably arm-e too late to save Potchefstroom. The Boers had occupied Laing's Nek, the pass leading into the Transvaal from Natal ; and, with the small British force he had at his command, he hoped to be able to dislodge them and clear the road. General Colley was considered to be one of the veryvbest officers in the British army. He had had some experience of actual fighting in China, and he had exhibited extraordinary skill and courage and resource in the A r ery difficult task of organising the transport in the Ashanti fcampaign. He certainly could not be called a novice in Avar. Bui, unfortnnutely, there Avas one thing of which all his previous experience had taught him nothing, and that Avas lioav to fight against good shots armed with modern breechloaders.

On January 28, 1881, Colley moved upon Lang's Nek Avith about 1100" men and six guns. The force of Boers opposed to him is said by Alfred Ayhvard, avlio appears to have acted as their military secretary, to have numbered 1437, undei Generals Jonbert and Smidt. The Boers had no guns, and dreaded artillery fire more than anything else ;- accordingly, they dug some- dummy ireiiches in soft ground on a conspicuous part of the Nek, and then judiciously disrjoscd themseh'es in safety elseAvhere. Colley's guns opened fire at a mile and a half, and appear to have principally occupied themselves in shelling the empty trenches, as, according to Alfred Aylward, no one Avas hurt or even frightened by the cannonade. It may be noted that Alfred AylAvard\s figures are not contradicted by Sir William Butler iv tfr " Life of Sir George

Colley " which he has recently published ; and, indeed, with reference to this particular action, General -Colley himself deplores the ineffectiA-eness of his artillery practice in one of the letters printed by his biographer.

.. Posting the naval brigade, Avith the rocket apparatus and some of the 60th Rifles, in an enclosed ground, Avhere they were under cover,' and keeping about half his force in reserve, Colley despatched five companies ot the 58th Regiment, numbering 480 bayonets, together Avith about 100 mounted men, to assault the left of the Boer lines. In broad daylight-, the foot adA*anced in column of companies across tho open ground and up the hill, against nearly thrice their OAvn number of the best shots in the world, avlio were under cover and armed Avith good modern rifles. The charge of the dervish host at Omdurman Ava.. not so gallant or so futile. In a fcAv uiinutes the handful of mounted men Avere scattered and one-third of the 58th lay dead or wounded on thai bloody slope. The s.ii-'-ivors drew off, re-formed their shattered lines behind the 60th Rifles, and retired in good order. The Boer loss is said to have been two. It avc;s magnificent, but it was not Avar. It j.-i-ovcd, if 'any proof A'-ere needed, that for iu**:intry in column lo charge in broad daylight works thus .strongly held by resoiu'.e men who can handle breech-loaders is to court ruin and disaster.

After Laing"s Nek the exultant Boers threatened Colley's communications, and on Bth February lie sallied out from his campat Mount Prospect tv clc.iv the road in his rear. This time \vi took with him five companies of the 60lh Rifles — avlio. being in reserve, had not been cut up at Laing's Nek — .md four guns', together witli 38 mounted men. A feAv miles from camp he left a half-company and tAvo guns to guard the drifts of the flooded ]ngogo River, and a mile or two farther on ha encountered a strong party of Boers. With a confidence begotten of their easy victory at Laing's Nek, the Boers did net Avait to be attacked, but, without hesitation, assumed the oft'en-siA-e. Colley took up a position on a flattopped hill, and stood on his defence, having 110AV about 300 men and two guns Avith him. According to Alfred AyiAvuid, the Boer patrol numbered 167. The Jj^ers look coA'er all round the hill and a prolonged rifle duel ensued between the lavo forces. Avoiding the British tactics at Laing's lSek. the conditions of Avhich were exactly reversed upon this occasion, the Boers refrained from any attempt to take the hill by direct assault in a Hotly ; but as independent shart-shoolers they kept up an incessant rifle fire until near nightfall. In accuracy of shooting, and in the skill Avith Avhich they sheltered themselves, they piwed to be superior to the defenders of the hill. They drew off at last with a loss of 32 killed and 14 wounded; but the defenders had actually lost six times as many. The sharp-shooting skirmishers had put no less than half the force they were attacking hors de combat. After the withdrawal of the Boers, Colley, whose horses Avere nearly all killed, with great difficulty succeeded in saving the guns, doited all ovei as .they were Avilh the splashes of the Boer "bullets ; and, by a desperate night-march, he regained his camp, under cover of darkness Avilh the remnant of his forces. England had to learn by bitter experience that valour without good shooting is but a Avasle of the lives of her bravest sons. The spirit and staunchness of the British troops Avere admirable ; and Colley's own letters warmly acknowledge the fact. But as: .shots they wore completely ouf classed.

Reinforcements nmv began to arrive. Colley's force at the front, Avhich had suffered so heavily in these tAVO engagements. Avas strengthened by the arrival of the 92nd Highlanders, fresh from their victories in Afghanistin ; and with them he resumed the offensive. This time he decided to avoid making a direct attempt 011 Lamp's Nek, and aimed at turning that position by occupying the Majuba Mountain, which overhung the pass on die south-Avest. After Laing's Nek, Colley had promised the survivors of the 58th to give them another chance of trying conclusions with their opponents : and to seize -Majuba he took with him a force composed of three companies of the 92nd, two of the aßth, and two of the 60th, supplemented as before by a naval contingent.- By a skilful and daring march, on the night of 25th February, he occupied, Avithoul apposition, this post of vantage, Avhich appeared lo him impregnable. "We could slay here for sver," he remarked to his chief of staff when daylight ioA - ealed the nature of the ground on which they stood : and he sat doAvn in fancied security to hold it till further reinforcements should arrive, intending then to make Avilh their aid a combined movement against the Nek. Bui. unfortunately for Colley, the position he had seized was not so strong as he had imagined. The Majuba Mountain Avas what Western Americans would call a belted mesa — it Avas a flat-topped, or rather a saucer-lopped height, with a belt of perpendicular cliff running round it a little beloav the summit, broken only here and there by a few gullies, through Avhich access to fhe summit might be gained from the loAver slopes. These loArer slopes Avere steep, and the upper parts of them were screened from vieAv from the summit by being beloAv the bell of cliff Avhich looked so formidable to the eve. Technically speaking, they Avere " dead" ground.

In his fancied security, Colley omitted to fortify his position, the very error which two years before had led to the disaster of Isandula. He allowed his staff tc distribute most of his men around the rim of the saucer-shaped basin, where they contented themselves with piling up little heaps of stones to lie down behind. " Oh, it's all right, sir ; it's good enough for what .we shall want up here ! " said a Highlander confidently to an observer who suggested that such a protection was hardly sufficient ; and against a distant enemy perhaps the man Avas right. The ide? of the Boers even attempting to take such a position by storm appeared preposterous. Ala? ! it was not so preposterous as it seemed. As soon a? daylight revealed to the force holding Laing's Nek that theii flank was threatened, they began indeed to prepare to send their Avaggons to the rear ; but they determined also before retreating to

•try. the effect of a direct assajult .upon Majuba. According to the account given byGeneral Sir William Butler, some of the Highlanders* showed themselves boldly' on the sky-line in the morning light, shaking their fists defiantly at the hostile camp, which lay 2000 ft below, and of which tliev could now see every detail. " Come up here, you beggars," they cried ; and, if Alfred Aylward may be trusted, 223 Beers accepted the invitation. Part of the Boei- assailants took cover at once with their usual skill, and opened a long-range fire on the summit of Majuba. This fire did but little execution, though a single shot at 900 yds mortally wounded the 'brave Romilly. commander of the uavai contingent. Bui, generally speaking, the defenders of the hill took good care not to expose themselves unnecessarily to the marksmanship of the Boers, with the result that the actual loss inflicted by the long-range fire was small. Though the Boers kept it. up incessantly all that long summer's morning, scaicely any one except poor Romilly was touched.

Nevertheless, the Boers were not throwing away their poAvder for nothing. They succeeded in their object of compelling the defenders of tho hill to keep closely under slieltei, and prevented them Irom observing ; what happened on the slopes below the' encircling girdle of cliff. 'Protected thus by the fire of 'their companions, small parties of -Boers were creeping as stealthily as deerstalkers oAer wide spaces of the mountain side where the clift'" wall above screened them both from the sijrht and from the fire of the defenders. Sir" William Butler gives an excellent map, shaded fo ;'3 to exhibit clearly the " dead " portions of the hillside across which these experienced hunters made then.* way unobserved. So stealthy and so cautious were they that they look the whole morning over iheii stalk ; but their caution and skill were crowned with perfect success. At one part ot the circumference of iEajuba there is a little outlying kopje, or peak, ■which is ltjally the key of the position. With unerring instinct one of the Boer leaders made for this point. According to Sir William Butler, he had about 60 men with him ; and when he arrived quite near it, with his party still undiscovered, ho detected a picket or several soldiers who were standing in an exposed position, unconscious of the near neighbourhood of their foes. The Boer leader ordered a number of his men to hold their rifles at the " present," step back out of cover, and fire a rapid volley. The manoeuvre Avas skilfully executed ; the whole picket was clean swept, away, and mi a few minutes more the Boers had got the key of the position in their hands.. By this success they had turned the left of the British troops, who were holding the northern face of the rim, and took them in the flank. The troops, thus suddenly surprised, fell back from the rim, and immediately other parties of Boers rushed up by another #ap, and seized the abandoned positions. Practically, Jlajuba was taken by f-urprise. Till the enemy were actually on the top, the general and staff never dreamed that they could lose the hill. But, once established on the summit, the rapid and accurate fire of the Boers swept away the defenders. It seems ys if no provision had been made for the ure-xpected contingency of the hill being stormed ; no second line of defence had been provided, and such reserves as existed were either not ready or could not be got into place at the critical moment ; and a general sauve gui peub followed. It is a scene thai one does not care to* think about. Collev, endeavouring to rally his broken line.", despairingly fi'onfced the hailstorm of bullets that mowed down his men, and fell with his face to the foe. Nearly half the British force were killed, wounded, or made prisoners. The Boer losses are given "by Sir William Butler at six, of whom only one was killed. Here, indeed, was a lesson to every commander to secure his weak point. Like every other post of vantage, Majuba Hi!! liad its vulnerable spot, ancl that spot was neither sufficiently fortified nor guarded.

There is one other matter that should be mentioned. The absurdly small loss inflicted on the men who .stormed Majuba would be incredible but for one reason. It has bean already observed that the fire which covered the stealthy advance of the stormers was all at long range. The British soldiers replying to it, fired also at the same range ; nor n«ed we be surprised that, against an enemy &o skilled in selecting sheltered positions, their firp. did not affect much. But, a& it was :i ion c-range duel, they were of course compelled r o raise their sights, with the result that v.-iicn they were suddenly rushed by the Boer storming parties, they all had the sights of their Martinis set to 500 and 600 yards,' elevation ; but the stormers were at point-blank distance. Consequently, the volleys fired at close quarters by the defenders of the hill ■went harmlessly over tlr heads of their assailants. Proof of this was found in the hundreds of rifle,s picked up by the victors after the action was over, all of which, by their account, had the long-range sights rained. So we may add yet another lesson,, and that is the necessity of perfect firecontrol on the pai'b of the officer immediately in charge of the firing line. The bescaimed volleys fired without strict attention to the regulation of the sighting are only too likely to waste themselves in empty air.

With Majuba hostilities came to a standstil. That well-equipped army, indeed, for which Colley had hoped arrived in South Africa after his fall ; but il was not allcwed to retrieve the tarnished glory of the British arms. For good or for evil, a peace was, made, which doubtless seemed to be honourable and satisfactory to those who was responsible for it, believing as they did that to continue the war would involve us in the sin of blood-guiltiness. However, the remote consequences of our actions are often far other than we expect ; and" the many and bloody battles we have fought since then in Egypt and the Soudan, down to the recent reconquest of Khartoum, may be traced to the loss of prestige that unquestionably followed the disasters in South Africa. The belief that the power of England might be defied with impunity emboldened Arabi Pasha to head a military revolt against 0111 protege, the Khedive, at Cairo. He was wofully undeceived by the

"crushing British victory at ,Tel-el-Kebir, in / 1882, - tTJe~^^t*3 c -^is^<«-s^ftf~Trftei* > -Sfftjuba^'BllF* < lessons taught in South Africa had- been : laid to -heaTtr^True, at Teliei-K'ebir works ! held by riflemen were assaulted by infantry ; in front ; but the infantry was brought 1' { close up to their objective tinder cover of i ( night ; and it Avas. known that the Arabists ' were no such marksmen as the Boers. And , now ifc was the Arabist rifles that were j picked up in hundreds after the victory, | 1 sighted for an idle long-range fire by the j j express orders of their leader ; while it was . ■ a British regiment that attacked in rushes, | ' halting every 50 yards to fire volleys at a stated range fixed by their musketry in- ( structor. One dare not say that the mis- ] takes made in South Africa will never be , repeated. To err is human ; and we have } high authority for saying that he is the ; best general who makes fewest blunders. ; s But it becomes possible to look forward > hopefully to the future if our leaders show ' that they do not despise the lessons of ex- ' perience. The late campaign in the Soudan ( \vo\ild seem to indicate that these Jiave at ' ' last been laid to heart, and the result has , been in gratifying contrast to the failures j of 1881. Failures they were, and the, fact • , must be acknowledged ; yet in* speaking of 1 them we would guard ourselves from using ' any language that may seem to reflect upon 1 the devoted men in the service of their ' country. As the thought of the lonely : graves that mark "their last resting-place ' rises before the mind, one seems to behold the pallid line of ghosts, the victims of the war-god : — } Slowly comes a shadowy train, • | ' Souls of warriors brave in vain. 1 ft was not all in vain that they fought and fell, if those who come after them have striven, under happier auspices, to surpass them in skill and not to fall short of them

in valour.