THE BRITISH SAILOR AND THE BRITISH NAVY.

Otago Witness, Issue 2293, 10 February 1898, Page 50

THE BRITISH SAILOR AND THE BRITISH NAVY.

It has ever been a favourite occupation with philosophic speculator* to discuss the vres and cons of the conditions which would or might obtain did we becoma engaged in a dispute vrith Home powerful maritime State. The usual form which this mental problem takes is whether or no the British fleet would be sufficient to protect our commerce, and also if the vessels themselves were adequate to the task could we obtain the requisite men to place the navy on a thoroughly efficient war footing. Now, such brain-searching as this is nol only interesting, ib is useful, for it accustoms the public mind to grasp hypothetical situations which some day or other may be converted into stern reality. _ The return recently issued by the Registrargeneral of Shipping throws an important sidelight on the number and occupation of the men engaged in the British mercantile marina, and from this data a writer in the

United Ssrvice Magazine proceeds to discuss the extent to which these crews would be available for the British fleet in case of emergency.

From the return above-mentioned it is calculated tbat there would be employed, or available for employment, in the British Merchant Service between the ages of 16 and 45 a total of 125,800 officers and men. In case of a naval war, however, all merchant shipping would not lie up. We would still be dependent upon over-sea supplies of food and raw materials, and foreign customers would still continue to purchase our manufactures and coals. There would obviously ba a very serious interference wish the transaction of this commerce, and the foreign-going sailing vessel particularly would perforce be compelled to lie snugly in port. This means tbat two and a-quarter million tons of sail would remain in enforced idlensag until peace was restored. Wif.h regard to steam tonnage, too, the slow veseels would necessarily csase running, and thus the calculation is made that wore we engaged, let us say, with France and Eassia, something like ihree million tons of British shipping would cease to earn freights, while France and Russia would each reduce thsir sea-goiug toneage by 250,000 tons. Assuming, therefore, fcbaS the withdrawal from the aodve list would ba what we have stated, there would ba available, after the wants of the merchant tonn&ga were supplied, a paper reserve for warships of 6000 officers and 30,000 men. Bat ■uch figures as these must be accepted guardedly, for granted that a section of our msrcautila flset continued, or attempted to continue, its work, it is obvious than more hands would be carried, and also that the enhanced remuneration offering would eaBure that the pick of the merchant sailors would still be employed on merchant vessels. The next question, of course, which comes up for settlement is whether this reserve is adequate— i c., is it equal to the combined forces of Fra»ce and Kusaia? The French navy is credited with a psrsonnel of 40,000, and in addition has a reserve of 90,000 to fall i bick upon, while Ru3-»ia can boast 36,000 men, plus a reserve of 10,000. Great Britain, j to meet these possibly hostile forces, baa 100,000 men in her navy and a reserve force of 26,000. That total, it is held, should be increased to at least 70,000. This, of course, could not be done with the f re« bands from the the mercantile marine. There would be altaost sufficient seamen, but the engineering and i artisan departments of the short-handed war | vessels would ahow a great shortage. These calculations, howevar interesting they may be, and serving the ««aful purpose of approximately indicating she probable ex'ent to which the Royal Navy might in case of an emergency recruit itself from the ranks of merchant seamen, are cot altogether pre fitable or logical. It is one thing to reckon that in case of war a certain number of British sailors would be available for service ' on war vessels, but it is quite another thing to guarantee that such service, even if engaged upon, would be worth the payißg for, save and except a probationary period of special training ware insisted upon. The average British tar is — v.i.b sorrow be it Baid — not bo much of a Bailor as his name would Bsem to imply. Soawt^iag more than j a tenij>orary sojourn in the Ecrceaatle is j needed to warrant the honest bestowal of the > title. 1