KRONSTADT THE IMPREGNABLE.

Otago Witness, Issue 2288, 6 January 1898, Page 49

acute triangle, seven miles long, planted in the Gulf of Finland In an oblique direction, with its base towards St. Petersburg and its apex eeawarda. The broad and eastern end is covered by the town of Kronstadt, the sharp and north-western point being marked by the lighthouse of Tollboken. If, then, any vessel bound for the mouths of the Neva make the Tollboken, she may apparently continue her course either by rounding Kconstadl to the north, and consequently steering between the island and the Finnish shore, or by steering to the sonth of Kronstadt, and therefore between the island and the Ingrain shore. But this northern channel is not available for the purposas of navigation. The Russian Government has stopped the passage by driving a double or triple row of piles, five or six miles in length, which, together with blocks of stone and other obstructive materials, form, between Kronstadt and Lisi Noss, a barrier impassable by any but very small craft. As this is but the application to the sea of the principle elsej where established in the case of river, we feel confident that this work has been ably and effectually performed. The destruction of the Snlina mouth of the Danube is of i itself a " material guarantee " that the enj gineers of the Baltic have not laboured in vain. Cronslotf? is the last of the insular or detached works which defend the passage from the " Great Road " (the space between the four batteries) into the " Little Road " (the narrow anchorage beyond Cronslott). There are two batteries to be noticed, and one of them is, in our opinion, the real bulwark of Kronstadt. First in order is that of the Mole, the line of which forms the seaward flank of the Merchant Harbour, and running for a distance of 1000 yds in a direction nearly perpendicular to the approach, joins the land fortifications which here traverse the breadth of the island. The three basins, of which that allotted to merchant ships is the outermost and most western, are not excavations, but have been made by driving piles so as to enclose the area required. The piles support a superstructure, in some places of timber, in others of granite, sometimes of timber and together J and the fiat too of the

to pay her own way, much less to assist her posse&sor. Bat it; does nob follow &t all from this-that Russia would not conquer India if she could. The trade of India is a vast source of indirect wealth to its owner ; Russia, taking India, would take this trade for herself and shot us out of it. Moreover, the loss of India would be A DEADLY BLOW TO OUR PRESTIGE all over the world. If Bussia wished to strike a mortal blow at us, she conld not do so better than by conquering India. Bat could she do it ? Weiehty opinions might be quoted on both sides, and it is difficult to hold the balance between them. It is believed by military authorities on the Continent — in Fiance and Germany as well as in Raasia— that in case o£ war the conqnesfc of India would only be a matter of time. On paper, it must be owned, the odds look very heavy against us. The Russian army on a war footing counts but little short of 5,000,000 men. The British and Indian armies on a war footing — including militia, but not volunteers, who are not liable for service abroad — counts 500,000 at the very outside. That means odds of 10 to 1 in favonr of Russia, and on this showing it certainly looks as if Russia has only to walk into India at any time she pleases. If it were a mere question of numbers the case would be plain enough. Happily.for us, it is not. Russia's army is practically unlimited ; but there are very rigid practical limits on the force she could use for an invasion of India. • War at a distance is a very different affair from war at home. Troops, horses, guns, ammunition, pioneers' tools, medical stores, engineering plant, and all the waggons required for these various services have all to be brought into the scene of action, and this is an operation involving much time and enormous expense. THE TRUE BASE OF A RUSSIAN INVASION would be Tiflis, in the Caucasus, for between the Caspian and India their garrisons are Baid to be well under 50,000 men. From Tiflis to Quetta v the most advanced British post, is 1750 miles. Bast of the Caspian Sea, which an invading force would cross by boat, Russia has only a single line of railway so far as Mervi thence to. Quetta is still over 600 miles

: enormous. Firstly, how far could Herat and B iifch and other fertile parts of Central : Asia replace the Caucasus aa a base of sup- \ plies 1 The Herat Valley is fertile and well | watered when the snow melts on the mountains, but it is not large. If the Russians owned it they could, no doubt, bring more land into cultivation; but the amount of land that could possibly be cultivated is severely limited by the supply of water. On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent RUSSIA PROM SUPPLEMENTING HER RESOURCES by depots of provisions. Especially if she increased the carrying power of her railway, she could always store up ar,y amount of food and war material before entering upon actual war. Let ue, then, SUPi OSE RUSSIA AT HERAT, AT BALKH, ON THE PAMIRS, with a large force and adequate supplies. The difficulty of transporting thesa &upplies still remains. Skobeleff, the great Russian general, estimated that the enterprise would need 150,000 men— 6o.ooo men to" enter India acd 90,000 to guard the communications. Now in one of his Central Asian campaigns — against the Tekke Turkomans— for only 5000 men he found he needed 20,000 camels. For 150,000 Russia, on this showing, would need 600,000 camels; and it can safely be said that the whole of Central Asia would not furnish them. But this estimate seems an astonishingly high one. Sir Charles Dilke, in his "Problems of Greater Britain," quotes 50,000 baggage animals as necessary for about 120,000 Anglo-Indian soldiers and camp followers. At this rate 150,000 Russians would need not much more than 60,000. These, no doubt, could be provided from the Russian proviuces and from Persia. It would be difficult, and it would take time, but it could be done. Now for the march through Afghanistan. It is generally assumed that the Afghans would fight to the death against the stranger. Then the troops used to guard the line of communication would be subject to continued attacks. A reverse at any point of the line might easily mean the breakdown of the commissariat, and therewith the utter destruction of the whole army. Hitherto all the disadvantages have boea

on the e'de o£ Rueeia. But supposing o] Russian army actually advanced to tha frontier of India, our disadvantages would begin. Our native regiments are underofficered. Many of them, coming from tha lees warlike parts of India, could hardly ba trussed against European armies in a trying climats. Of the remainder, WE SHOULD HAVE TO PUT EVERY MAN OH THE FRONTIER, leaving our worst 'troops to garrison India behind them. Not a man could be spared from England. Our troops at Home are mostly boys under 20, neither strong enough # nor well enougla trained to stand a campaign in Afghanistan. If we sent them out for garrison duty, to set seasoned battalions free for ihe front, they would die off like flies. Toe conclusion, then, is this : It would ba almost Buperhumanly difficult to bring a large Russian army against India, but it would bo rash to call it quite impossible. On the other hand, if it could be done, our forces would have a tremendous up-hill fight to beat back such an army. The advantages and disadvantages on both sides seem so evenly balanced that it would probably be left to the skill and resolution of the generals, the courage and endurance of the soldiers, to settle the great question one way or the other.