PATER'S CHATS WITH THE BOYS.

Otago Witness, Issue 2120, 11 October 1894, Page 42

PATER'S CHATS WITH THE BOYS.

The British Navy. It seems to me that in the near future the question of Britain's position on the sea will be discussed with considerable interest bj us all. Several telegrams have brought the navy under our notice lately. A fortnight ago an armed vessel was necessary to keep the peace in Morocco, and this indicates one of the uses of a navy— to aot the part of the policeman to proteot a Briton on the sea and in foreiga lands, and also to protect British trade. Then we read that the latest naval manoeuvres at Home were on the lines of a descent on the French coast, and that the French ambassador has been reoalled from London because presumably he did not supply his Government with the Information on those manoeuvres that it expeoted. Coming to Eastern waters, we have the China station fleet strengthened ; a sensational telegram to the effeot that a Russian oruisar ran out her guns as a threat to an English war-dog following in her traoks like a sleuthhound ; and, nearer home, an armed cruiser we are directly Interested in— the Ringarooma— has had a few thousand pounds' damage done to her. These all bring before us the necessity for, or the existence of, the navy. Indireotly we are reminded very vividly If we read hittory, of the valae of a navy la the Napoleonic wars Britain had Bomefchine like 900 vessels in commiiaion and manned by about 100,000 men; yet all these fulled to stop the Frenoh from seizing British merchantmen by the hundred. Nile and Trafalgar annihilated the Frenoh navy, just as the Seven Years War (1756-63) had previously deprived her of her colonies. To-day she has another fleet, and has other colonies dreamed of, or founded, in Africa, Further India, Madagascar, New Caledonia, New Hebrides, and elsewhere. It seems generally acknowledged that at the rate things are going there is more than a possibility of a war with [France in a few years; when, if Britain wins, both the fleets and colonies of France will disappear; "but if there isn't to be war it will only be by Britain having a fleet to face the worst v A few facts and figures will show the probability of war and the necessity of having a strong fleet to be ready for eventualities.

With a few countries a strong fleet is a necessity purely from a defensive point of view ; with others it oan only mean a desire to be ready to aot on the offensive. Britain, for instance, mu3t have one, because she is the chief merchant of the world, doing more trade in her bottoms than all the rest of the world put together. Some of the figures in tbiß connection are: World's tonnage, 24 million ; Britain's, 13 million ; France's, 1 million; and Russia's, half a million. So that, judging by aea traffic Britain should have a navy about eight times as large as Franoe and Russia combined. If we take imports and exports we get — Britain 970 millions a year, France 277 millions, and Russia 55 millions— a part ,of the trade of France and Russia being of coarse carried on in British craft. Taking it this way, we see the need of a British fleet at least three times as strong as the combined fleets of France and Russia. Yet we read thai; their combined fleets are quite equal to the British fleet, and in a few years, at present rates, will be much stronger. Further, for the past year they have spent £5,5C0 000 in ships, while Britain has spent only £3,000,000. But even with fleets equal, it is said that 100,000 men are needed to work the guns and ships, and only 75,000 are available; in the engine room and stokehole the vessels are 6000 men short, and there are no reserves worth speaking of for either guns or engines.

Purely as a defensive fleet Britain requires a fleet, to protect her commerce,[her colonies, and to make sure of food supplies ; she is absolutely dependent, rich as she is, upon the outside world for food and raw material, and oannot move troops or war material without extreme danger. Russia is completely self-contained, and the loss of her trade would be a flea bite ; colonies she has none. France is also pretty well self-con-tained as far as food is concerned, and she can draw supplies from surrounding countries. Her sea-borne trade does not compare with Britain's, and her colonies are an expense instead of a profit to her — in any case most of them are as yet undeveloped. Looking at it this way, the large and increasing navies of France .and Eussia must be for offensive purposes.

Now snpposiDg war broke out, what an immense amount of damage could be done to British shipping in a few days. It is calculated that at any given moment there is 150 millions of British wealth floating on the sea; that as 55 per cent, of the food of Britain is imported, in less than six weeks 22 millions would be starving and 4£ millions thrown out of work for want of raw material, for France looks upon food, even if carried under a neutral flag, as a contraband of -war.

I do not suppose things would be quite as black as they are painted, for an enemy's cruisers could not destroy all commerce — they would not be numerous-enough — though they might commit sad havoc in the orowded channel and strait of Dover ; and a good deal of commerce is or could be carried on in vessels as fast as many of the opposing commerce-destroyers; yet untold misery would be the result.

You see that to protect her trade and colonies, and for very life itself, Britain must have an unmistakably superior fleet to any combination that can be brought against her ; that the risk of a defeat would paralyse the nation; that anything like a serious reverse would mean the enemy's hand throttling Britain. In short, tinder present conditions a weak fleet means being inn posed upon in diplomatic affaire, and a sura provocative of war if Britain makes strong objections; but a strong fleet would mean civility and the best guarantee of peace. I£ war came to-morrow I don't think that the British nation would think twioe about providing 100 millions ; but ships and war material cannot be so expeditlously turned out of the dockyards and arsenals as they could In the olden days of wooden walls and smooth-bore muzzle loading cannon. Nor can merchant men be made u«e of in the navy as fornwrlv ■ Curiously, I had written thii before the sensational and disquieting telegrams wera flashed to us telling ot th« friotiw between Jiaact and EnjElajxa*' ,