THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

Otago Witness, Issue 1001, 4 February 1871, Page 2

THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

The reform of the Upper House of Assembly may not be a subject of supreme importance at the present moment ; but it appears, nevertheless, to be after the great political questions of the day — one of the most popular. So far as we can ascertain the state of feeling on the subject, there is a very general desire to see a reconstitution of the Council on an elective basis. This desire would appear to have sprung from lack of confidence in the present House. It is not on any general ground of obstructiveness, or of too great conservatism, that objection is taken to the nominated branch of the ' Legislature. A want of confidence in its fairness and impartiality is freely expressed in many parts of the colony. This objection, and the grounds on which it rests, were very forcibly stated by Mr Macassey during his recent political canvass of Dunedin. In what he said on the occasion we refer to, he gave expression to the generally prevailing tone of feeling — whether that feeling be altogether justifiable or not is another question. Evidently, then, it is the personnel of the existing Legislative Council which is primarily objected to, and it is out of this objection that the demand for a reconstitution of that body has chiefly sprung. To the system of nomination is traced the presence in the Upper House of men who are accused by the public of being swayed by class interests. This appears to be the history of this growing agitation. It is, however, a movement which will go forward and adopt for itself much more solid grounds thaa the mere personal question in which it has originated. As our correspondent .']Let Well Alone' has justly remarked, a Legislature nominated by the Crown is an institution which is not at all in accord with the ' spirit of the times.' We may go further and »&y that the mere fact of its being onljr

a legal fiction that ' the* Grown' is really the nominator, but thafe these appointments rest entirely in the hands of the Ministry of the"day, does not^mitigate in the least, but confirms all the objections to the system.

What is to replace the existing method when the inevitable day of change comes 1 All testimony appears to us to be in favour of some form of that system of * mediate election which our correspondent ' Investigator' so warmly advocates. The whole spirit of our institutions is too thoroughly democratic to render it probable that the election of the Legislative Council will be confided to any restricted class of electors, acquiring their franchise by property qualifications of a higher order than those of the general body of electors. Either we shall have the Upper House a purely representative assembly, chosen by the same body of men as the Lower House, or the method of Electoral Colleges in one or other of its many forms will have to be adopted. And the longer the delay which may occur before the reform is attempted, the more certain — as it appears to vs — will it be that no scheme for making the upper division of the Legislature a special representation of the property of the colony will be accepted by the people. Property — (we do not use the term in the restricted sense of landed property only) — does not require any such special representation to protect its interests in a democratic country — ats we know by the example of the United States, it is extremely well able to take care of itself by the influence which it can bring to bear upon individual members of the Legislature. The object sought in adding an Upper House to the Legislature is not, and ought not to be, the protection of any special interest, bat to give greater stability of purpose to the Legislature itself, aiid to protect the people from itself in those moments of popular excitement which are of such frequent occurrence in the history of all countries. Special propertyqualifications for electors and for candidates will do nothing to secure this — such at least is the conclusion we ourselves draw from the history of those colonies in which this system has been tried. Whatever trde conservatism has been displayed by the elected Upper Houses of other colonies may be attributed almost entirely to the greater security and longer duration of the tenure of a seat in the case of these bodies as compared with the other branches of the Legislature. The idea that the possession of a property qualification in a new country is any guarantee that a candidate is likely to weigh all questions that come before him, more carefully than an ordinary representative of an ordinary constituency will do, is not one which will find acceptance with manypeople who are acquainted with the political history of these colonies. Equally foolish would it be to rely on a similar qualification in the elector as likely to be associated with greater discrimination in the choice of a senator than would be displayed by the average of mankind. From our own observation, are should be disposed to believe that the result will in most cases be entirely the reverse. But if two Houses of Assembly are needed at all, it is surely on the ground that the higher one will act as a Court of Review, which may always be depended upon to mitigate the effect which popular excitements and clamour might otherwise have on the legislation of the day. How are we to secure a body which can be trusted -with such functions if we abandon the present method of selection, and mistrust the system of property qualifications as it exists, for instance, in Victoria ? The answer appears to us to be quite plain — we must adopt some form of ' mediate election/ The people must elect, not the senators themselves, but those to whom it will confide the choice of senators.

Our correspondent, who advocates the ' mediate ' system, suggests that the existing 1 Provincial Councils should be entrusted with the task of electing the Upper House of Assembly. The example of the Netherlands is quoted by Mj& jn. the letter publish to.<Jfty

as^pertirient to otir own case, : andifavourkble to his suggestion. Too much stress may readily be put upon examplefe of this kind, by which, the method* of political procedure which work satisfactorily in other communities are held up as models to a people whose circumstances are entirely different. Whilst the abolition of the Provincial system is daily discussed, not here only but in all parts of the colony — whilst we are evidently drifting towards constitutional changes, which will either sweep away Provincial Councils or deprive the General Legislature of much of its present over-riding power, it would- appear to be very undesirable to thrust upon the Councils a new, iunction of, such great importance. Another objection to this suggestion whiph appears to us to have some force, is the comparative smaUness of the bodies to whom the election of Legislative Councillors would be thus confided. Whilst, however, these and other objections to the particular method proposed' readily suggest themselves, we most cordially endorse the opinion , our correspondent, that some system of double or, mediate election is the true solution for the question under consideration.