DR FEATHERSTON'S SPEECH.

Otago Witness, Issue 890, 19 December 1868, Page 17

DR FEATHERSTON'S SPEECH.

At the public meeting held in Wellington on the 3rd inst., Dr Featherston took the chair. His speech is reported as follows in the Independent : —

This meeting, as you are aware, has been convened for the purpose of taking into consideration the present state of native affairs in thiß island, and to express heartfelt sympathy with the friends and relatives of those sett lers who have been so atrociously massacred in Poverty Bay. Although the duty which devolves upon me as chairman is to maintain order and to Becure for every speaker a fair and impartial hearing, and to confine the meeting to the objects for which it has been convened, still I trust I may be permitted to make one or two observations. In presiding on this occasion, I am naturally anxious there thould be no possible misconception about the views I ectertain as to the present almost desperate condition of native affairs, or aa to the means which. I believe, are alone calculated to extricate us from the difficulties whioh seem to threaten to involve every man in this island with utter and actual ruin. I must say that, whatever opinions you may in times past have expressed ; however strongly you may have committed yourselves to any particular policy, the time has now arrived that you should re- consider those opinions, and review that past policy, and then say whether, under the altered circumstances of this island, in a different state of affairs, and with the benefit of your paßt experience, you are ju&ti. fied any longer in advocating a policy or maintaining a course of action which has already been fraught with such grave and frightful disasters. — (Cheers.) And my fellow settlers, however much we may have disagreed and still differ on many questions, I feel assured thtre is one point on whioh we are of one mind ; that never since the foundation of this colony has it been in Buch imminent danger, has there been such a sacrifice of life and property, such an utter sense of insecurity, such complete unpreparedness to cope with an enemy (cheers) whose uninterrupted successes have inspired him with almost unbounded confidence, and rallied round his Btandard a large number of natives, who had before been either loyal or neutral, and have not tended to raise the spirits of our fellow settlers and of those natives who still and ever will remain staunch and loyal to us. I repeat, you are bound, and especially in this city, which, in all probability, will not be exposed directly to the misfortunes of war ; where you will not yourßelvea be exposed to personal danger, or witness the destruction of your property — you are especially bound in the interests of the settlers of the outlying districts to calmly and maturely consider the present position of this Island. My views with respect to the native question, and the best means of defending this Island from native aggression are too well known and have been too often repeated in this hall to justify me in reiterating them. I will only say that far from seeing any reason for modifying, or altering, or changing those views in the slightest degree, recent events have only further confirmed me in them, and made me regret that the warning I gave when the proposal for removing the troops wa3 first made, was entirely ignored and almost unanimously scouted. I Relieve , 1 need not remind you, that after General i Chute returned from the "West Coast campaign, having given orders to his officers to allow the enemy no peace, but to harasß and attack them day by day, he was so impressed with the conviction that the withdrawal of the troopa would render the campaign fruitless, and would lead to a rising ; that at his request I went to Sir George Grey, so aa to have his opinion placed on record that it was absolutely necessary for the peace and safety of the colony, that at least 3000 Imperial troops should be retained in the colony. I entreated — I almost went on my knees to Sir George Grey to have this opinion recorded, while General Chute would not take on himself the responsibility of re-

moving a single soldier until an answer was received from the Imperial Government. Si* George Grey said he could not adopt suoh a course, except on the advice of his reaponsible Ministry j and they refused to give any advice on the subject, or to Bay yea or nay, because they said that to retain the troops implied a payment of L4O a man. General Chute had then no alternative but to carry out his instructions, abandon his posts, and send away the troops as faßt as transports could be obtained. I will venture to say there is not a single man in this room or in the colony who will not say that the advice of General Chute was the wisest and most! prudent which could have been adopted; nor any one who is acquainted with the natives, who will say that that advice was unsound, or that if it had been followed, this rising would ever have taken place, and the colony would have been spared aa awfulsacrifice ot lite and property. — (Cheers. ) I know that ■advice was net acceptable at the time to the majority of the setters ; I know not whether it wiil be more acceptable now, !-ut I never will shrink from discharging that which I believe to be my duty to my fellow colonists, whether they think it right or not. — (Cheers.) I feel further bound to tell you that within the last two or three weeks I have not hesitated to give Sir George Boweh similar advice. When I heard of the disasters at Wanganui, I urged Sir George Powen to charter a veasel and demand all the available troops in the Australian colonies. I believe Sir George Bowen concurred in that opinion, and would have acted en it, but he also is in the p stolon of bir George Grey, and could, not i act on it except on the advice of his responsible advisers, but they declined a second time to give that advice. I do not know whether you will concur with me in' giving that advice, but I believe it will be I utter ruin to this island, unless such an appeal is immediately made to the Australian colonies. — (Cheers.) I never did believe in I what is called the self-reliant policy, and still less do lat this moment. I ever denounced it as a sham and a delusion, and a piece of maudlin sentiment not worthy of the name of a policy, and I now denounce it as a policy, if it can be called so, impracticable and impossible to be carried out, for two simple reasons— first, you have not in this colony the material for constituting an adequate colonial force ; and in the second place, you have not the wherewithal to pay them. "When I say you have not the material in this colony to form an adequate force, let me not be understood to cast a slur on the gallantry of such colonial forces as you have raised ; for probably few men in the colony have had more opportunf* tieß than I have had of seeing the gallantry of our own troops, when properly trained, properly officered, and properly led. But I say it is all very well for the Middle Island to clap the Northern Island on the back, and say "go into the field, and trust to your own Btron« hearts and stout arms," but I cannot see in the Middle Island any inclination to afford us assistance either in men or money. Nay, it is easy for the citizens here to tell the country settlers to go into the field and protect themselves. It appears to me that self-reliance simply means that the out-settlers must be called on to protect themselves without aid from the settlers in the centres of popu* lation, and to sacrifice their lives and properties ; but were they justified in running this risk, it is idle to expect untrained men to go into the field to meet such a foe as we have to contend with with any reasonable chance of success ; but I will go further and remind you that the moat powerful nation in the world seldom trusts to its unaided resources in time of need, but almost invariably bff ore unsheathing the Bword seeks the support of other nations. Why then should we hesitate to seek extraneous aid ? But in addition to our utter inability to form a colonial force, ready at this moment to take the field, we have this further difficulty— that we have not the sinews of war— the money to pay it. We have now a force of 2,000 men in the field at a cost of from L.250,000 t0L.300,000 for the year, and yet no man believes that lesa than double or treble that number of colonial forces will enable us to hold our own. You know we have abandoned territory after territory, thereby incurring claims to compensation, which already amount to an enormous sum. The Imperial Government has long expressed its readiness to give the colony aa many regiments as it desires for the peace and safety of the country, provided they are paid L 40,000 for every 1000 men ; so that 6000 Imperial troops wouldcostthecolonymuchless than 2000 colonial forces ; and I for one, who have witnessed the conduct both of the colonial forces, of our native allies, and of the Imperial troops in the field, have no hesitation in Baying; that one thousand troops are equal to 3000 colonial forces. Looking at it in a money point of view it seems madness to trust any longer to our own unaided forces, or to hesitate in asking that those Imperial troops which should never have been removed Bhould be restored to us. I never expected my advice would have been so well received, but I felt it my duty to give it under the former conviction, that unless you speedily obtain Imperial aid such further disaster will follow that you will be obliged to abandon the outlying districts and fall back on the citiea alone, and entail a sacrifice of life and property, which it is impossible to estimate.— (Cheers.) Having im. pressed on you with all the warmth I could command the advice by which alone I be lieve the colony can be saved, I will now simply call on the gentlemen who convened the meeting to submit certain resolutions to you.— (Loud cheers.)