TEE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL.

Otago Witness, Issue 715, 12 August 1865, Page 2

TEE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL.

(From the Daily Times, August 8.)

His Excellency the Governor is a man of mystery. His ways and doings are for the most part hidden from the gaze of the Colonists, and when glimpses of them are revealed, they present themselves in a shape inexplicable to ordinary men. Sometimes the curtain is lifted by the aid of a few official documents, and then it is seen that he has been very busy disagreeing with somebody, haply with his Ministry, or with the Commander of the Imperial force 3. Memoranda numbered 1 to 40 or 50, unfold the accusations, the defence?, the rejoinders, the replications and asseverations on one or both sides, and it is notable that these lengthy correspondences only appear at the exact moment when some special purpose is to be answered by their publication. It is something, however, to know that so much deference is paid to public opinion as to lay the matters in dispute before the world, although occasionally the statement is purely ex parte. Ot this one-sided character is the very imperfectly explained quarrel with General Cameron. It ha 3 been thought necessary by Sir George Grey and his Ministry to refer to this for political purposes, although it must have been plain to them that that ofScer could not from his position have equal liberty in reply ; but it is remarkable that this disagreement did not reach its height until it was evident the Maori insurrection was so far quelled as no longer to need the active services of the large British force in the Colony.

Since that time, it is plain to the most cursory observation that, systematically, there has been an attempt to raise the prestige of the Colonial forces at the expensa of the British soldiery. It is too late now to criticise each special event, nor do we wish to withold our testimony to the dash and gallantry displayed by the Colonial troops on all occasions in which they have been engaged. However trifling the apparent results, there has never been any deficiency in strategy on the part of the officer?, nor any lack of courage on the part of the men. So manifest have these been that they might fairly have stood before the world on their own merits, without by implication beirjg compared with the operations of the regular troops. But this would not have served the purposes of the Governor and his Ministers. A theory has been enunciated that the Colony is equal to conducting its own Maori wars ; and that the British forces are costly and inefficient. It was evidfntly deemed necessary, therefore, whenever an opportunity' offered of killing half-a-dozen Maoris, although no other result followed, that the dashing exploit s) ould be performed, as an instance of the superiority of the tactics of the Colonial force over the more orderly and systematic operations of the regular troops ; and coupled with other circumstances, it is impossible to dissociate the Governor's capture of the Wereroa pah from the political doctrines so widely connected with it. Read apart from this idea — were it not that fifty prisoners were captured — the whole offair has the appearance of a sham fight. It cannot be forgotten that, for reasons not explained, but which, when told, will most probably prove ample, General Cameron made no attempt to taKe this native fortress. That it was not essential at the time to occupy it as a stratcgetic position is proved by the fact that tiie v.ar was bi ought nearly to a conclusion, while it remained in the hands of the ratives. There is, therefore, prima facie evidence that, with the correct perception of a skilful soldier, General Cameron saw the wantonness of sacrificing life in attacking a position, the present uselessness of which was manifest to him. Confirmation of this view is afforded by the result. In order to retain it, a large native force was necessarily withdrawn from active operations elsewhere, and these at last, apparently wearied by inaction and a sense of isolation, made overtures for the peaceful surrender of the place. So nearly were the negociations concluded that one officer wrote that the taking of it was unfait accompli, and the accounts received immediately after the contretemps which ! prevented the negociations being brought to an amicable arrangement, were to the effect tliat if the Governor would go up it would be surrendered to him.

Bearing in mind Sir George Grey's vacillation under similar circumstances, at the commencement of the war, when he refused to go acd receive the submission of the native chiefs at Ngaruawahia after having agreed to do so, the course he would pursue seemed doubtful. However, he did go vp — not with the olive branch of peace, but with the sound and pomp and circumstance of war — not as a Governor ready to receive the submission of natives tired of strife, worn out with long continued service, short of supplies, dwindled down in numbers until they had not wherewith to man their rifle pits or defend the extensive area of their pah — but as a general, directing warlike

operations, claiming only the moral support of a few regular troops, and bent on showing to the world that he, with a small and comparatively poorly-appointed Colonial force, could accomplish what General Cameron with his thousands had not dared to attempt.

Carefully weighing the terms of the despatch detailing the operations of th-j troops, it is impossible to avoid arriving aL the conclusion that either there was a sense of perfect consciousness in the mind of the Governor that no effectual opposition would be offered to the movements of his forces, or that however successful, the enterprise was characterised by consummate rashness. T 1 c description given of the pah, proves that notwithstanding its one weak point, it was a position of formidable strength. The necessity of dividing the small force employed, in order to occupy the heights commanding it, had there been any number of men within the pah, rendered each seperate party liable to be cut off in detail. This was proved by what happened to the division under Major Rookes, who with fifty prisoners was so hampered that his force " could undertake but little;" and when forty friendly nativts and forty regular troops were sent to take the duty of guarding the prisoners off his hands, the force in front was so weakened that a determined sortie from a strong garrison would have utterly annihilated it, without the possibility of assistance being given by the detachments in the rear of the pah. No wonder that " the friendly Chiefs left in " the camp were so much alarmed at the " position in which they were now left, " that it was necessary, in order to re- " assure them, to get even a small rein- " forcement up as rapidly as possible."

It is needless further to analyse this singular despatch. Throughout, although witti careful qualifications, it reads like Caesar's '-Veni, vidi, vici,' amplified and illustrated. It is impossible to believe that a commander, even the least experienced, would have exposed his troops to starvation or destruction, such as might easily have happened to them through the operations detailed, had he been apprehensive that serious and determined opposition would have been encountered. But however necessary further explanation is to a full appreciation of the motives of the Governor in this curious affair, there can be^othing bnt admiration expressed at the conduct of the officers and men. It detracts nothing from their gallantry that only an old woman was captured when the pah was taken. It certainly may require an answer to the inquiry how it was that with such cunning strategy, the natives, if any occupied the place, contrived to escape unharmed. But the alacrity and energy displayed by the troops in executing the various movements, and the capture of the native auxiliaries on tbe ; r way to strengthen the garrison, are sufficient to prove that had occasion offered their conduct would h .ye been such as to deserve the highest commendation.