SCANDAL OF SINGAPORE BASE

Otago Daily Times, Issue 27526, 21 October 1950, Page 9

SCANDAL OF SINGAPORE BASE

“The Hinge Of Fate”

“An Almost Naked Island ”

By Winston S. Churchill No. 7. The hurried efforts made to improvise defences to cover th« approach from Johore are now described. Mr Churchill orders a fight to the death on Singapore, but already he is looking forward past the tragedy of defeat, emphasising the growing strategic importance of Burma and the Burma road.

All that I had seen or read of war had led me to the conviction that having regard to modern fire-power a few weeks will suffice to create strong field defences, and also to limit and canalise the enemy's front of attack by minefields and other obstructions. Moreover, it had never entered into my head that no circle of detached forts of a permanent character protected the rear of the famous fortress. I cannot understand how it was I did not know this. But none of the officers on the spot and none of my professional advisers at home seem to have realised this awful need. At any rate, none of them pointed it-out to me—not even those who saw my telegrams based upon the false assumption'that a regular seige would be required. I had read of Plevna in 1877, where, before the era of machine-guns, defences had been improvised by the Turks in the actual teeth of the Russian assault; and I had examined Verdun in 1917, where a field army lying in and among detached forts had a year earlier made so glorious a record. I had put my faith in the enemy being compelled to use artillery on a very large scale in order to pulverise our strong points at Singapore, and in the almost prohibitive difficulties and long delays which would impede such an artillery concentration and gathering of ammunition along Malayan communications. Now, suddenly, all this vanished away and I saw before me the hideous spectacle of the almost naked island and of the wearied, if not exhausted, troops retreating upon it. I do not write this in any way to excuse myself. I ought to have known. My advisers ought to. have known and I ought to have been told, and I ought to have asked. “Battleship Without a Bottom”

I) Full preparations should be made to use fortress guns against landward attack and effective fire-control should be organised. Report most urgent requirements H.E.,- when possibility of provision will be examined. 2. Land approaches from the straits and landing-places and exits therefrom in the island should be obstructed with wire, mines, booby-traps, or any other means possible.

3. A proportion of beach defence guns and M.G.s should be diverted from the south sectors to the north and west of the island. 4. All boats or small craft in the straits or outside them within reach of the island should be collected under our control or destroyed. 5. Defence .must be based on system of localities for all ground defence sited to cover most dangerous avenues of approach. In view of the difficulty of siting beach defences in the swamps, a good system of mobile reserves ready to deliver rapid counter-attack should be built up. A system of switch lines should also be developed in the interior to prevent exploitation of successful landings. Full use Should be made of all available civilian and military labour for this, and generally for defence works of all kinds.

The reason I had not asked about this matter, amid the thousands of questions I put, was that the possibility of Singapore having no landward defences no more entered into my mind that that of a battleship being launched without a bottom. I am aware of the various reasons that have been given for this failure; the preoccupation of the troops in training and in building defence works in Northern Malaya; the shortage of civilian labour; prewar financial limitations and centralised War Office control; the fact that the Army’s role was to protect the naval base, situated on the north shore of the island, and that it was therefore their duty to fight in front of that shore and not along it. I do not consider these reasons valid. Defences should have been built. My immediate reaction was to repair the neglect so far as time allowed. I at once dictated the following minute; Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee. Jan 19, 1942. I must confess to being staggered by (Wavell’s telegram of the 16th) and other telegrams on the same subject. It never occurred to me for a moment, nor to Sir John Dill, with whom I discussed the matter on the outward voyage, that the gorge of the fortress of Singapore, with its splendid moat half a mile to a mile wide, was not entirely fortified against an attack from the northward. What is the use of having an island for a fortress if it is not to be made into a citadel? To construct a line of detached works with searchlights ' and cross-fire combined with immense wiring and obstruction of the swamp areas, and to provide the proper ammunition to enable the fort-a ress guns to dominate enemy batteries planted in Johore, was an elementary peace-time provision which it is incredible did not exist in a fortress which has been twenty years building. If this was so, how much more should the necessary field-works have been constructed during the two and a-half years of the present war? How is it that not one of you pointed this out to me at any time when these matters have been under discussion? More especially should this have been done because in my various minutes extending over the last two years I have repeatedly shown that I relied upon this defence of Singapore Island against a formal seige, and have never relied upon the Kra Isthmus plan. In England at the present time we have found it necessary to protect the gorges of all our forts against a landing raid from the rear, and the Portsdown Hill forts at Portsmouth show the principles which have long prevailed. Seaward batteries and a naval base do not constitute a fortress, which is a completely encircled strong place. Merely to have seaward, batteries and no forts or fixed defences to protect their rear is not to be excused on apy grbund. By such neglect the whole security of the fortress has been at the mercy of 10,000 men breaking across the straits in small boats. I warn you this will be one of the greatest scandals that could possibly be exposed. Let a plan be made at once, to dq the best possible while the battle in Johore is going forward. This plan should comprise: (a), An attempt to use the fortress guns on the northern front by firing reduced charges and by running in a certain quantity of H.E. if none ex-

6. All possible measures should be taken to guard against attempted night landings succeeding by surprise. In this connection, unlikely landing-places should again be reconnoitred in the light of Japanese tactics and mobility. 7. Adequate measures should be made for defence of aerodromes and other possible landing-grounds in Johore and Singapore against Japanese airborne forces reported under preparation in Indo-China. Full use must be made of RAF personnel. 8. Effective measures should be worked out to disperse and control the civil population and to suppress Fifth Column activity. 9. Personnel for fixed defences should be armed and assigned tasks in the local defence scheme. /

10. The best possible signal communications should be developed through- * out the island, and also to aerodromes in Sumatra, on which close support * aircraft may be based. 11. (We) realise that action will already have been taken on many of these points, in which case we shall be grateful for an early report. Action on the remainder should be initiated without delay and all possible steps taken to prepare for protracted defence. Preparing for the Worst Meanwhile I had telegraphed to General Wavell: Jan. 20, 1942. Now that you have become Supreme Commander of the ABDA nations in / the South-Western Pacific, I cannot of course send you any direct instructions. All your operative orders, which I hope will be as few as possible, will come through the combined COS Committee from the President at Washing-, ton. Nevertheless, I propose to continue our correspondence whenever I have suggestions to make or questions to ask. This will be especially the case where the local defence of a fortress like Singapore is involved. It is in this light that you must view the telegram sent you to-day by the COS Committee about the landward defences of Singapore Island. I was greatly distressed by your telegrams and I want to make it , absolutely clear that I expect every inch of ground to be defended, every scrap of material or defences to be blown to pieces to prevent capture by the enemy, and no question of surrender to be entertained until after protracted fighting among the ruins of Singapore City. I also minuted to the Chiefs of Staff: Prime Minister to General Ismay, for COS Committee. Jan. 20, 1942. This (the reinforcement of Burma) is surely a matter for the Supreme Commander, but an opinion should be expressed by the Chiefs of Staff. Obviously nothing should distract us from the Battle of Singapore, but should Singapore fall quick transference of forces to Burma might be possible, As a strategic object, I regard keeping the Burma road open as more important than the retention of Singapore. Chiefs of Staff to General Percival (Singapore) i , Jan. 21, 1942. War Cabinet discussed recent developments in Malaya.

They .were disturbed by the reports of continued Japanese landings behind our lines on the west coast of Malaya. It had been hoped that local naval forces could have been improvised to deal effectively with these incursions by presumably unarmed enemy vessels. Please report fully what has been done and what you hope to do in this matter.

ists. (b) By mining and obstructing the landing-places where any considerable force could gather. . (c) By wiring and laying booby-traps in mangrove swamps and other places. (d) By constructing field works and strong points, with field artillery and machine-gun cross-fire. (e) By collecting and taking under our control every conceivable small boat that is found in the Johore Straits or anywhere else within

Another question which came under discussion was the water supply in Singapore Island. Bearing in mind that Hongkong had to surrender through shortage of water, are you satisfied that Singapore could carry on. even if cut off from the mainland? The Governor was instructed over a month ago to evacuate as many bouches inutiles as, possible from Singapore. Please telegraph numbers already evacuated and future plans. When I awoke on the morning of the 21st a most pessimistic telegram from General Wavell about the prospects of holding Singapore lay at the top of my box.

reach. (f) By planting field batteries at each end of the straits, carefully masked and with searchlights, so as to destroy any enemy boat that may

seek to enter the straits. (g) By forming the nuclei of three or four mobile counter-attack reserve colfimns upon which the troops when driven out of Johore can be formed. (h) The entire male populatiop should be employed upon constructing defence works. The most rigorous compulsion is to be used, up to. the limit where picks and • shovels are available.

(i) Not only must the defence of Singapore Island be maintained by every means, but the whole Island must be fought for until every single unit and every single strong point has been separately destroyed. (j) Finally, the city of Singapore must be converted into a citadel and defended to the death. Instructions to Wavell On this the Chiefs of Staff sent the following instructions:— Chief of Staff to General Wavell. Jan. 20, 1942. Your Telegram to Prime Minister. The eventuality of the Battle of Johore going against you should be taken into account,' and all preparations should be made for the utmost possible defence of the island. Following are some particular points:—

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