MR CHURCHILL’S RETORT*

Otago Daily Times, Issue 27523, 18 October 1950, Page 7

MR CHURCHILL’S RETORT*

“The Hinge Of Fate”

“Further Grievous Punishment”

By Winston S. Churchill

No. 4,

The exchanges between the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Australia about the defence of Singapore are continued in today’s instalment. Mr Churchill surveys this problem in relation to the overall picture of the war, whereas Mr Curtin’s eyes are fixed upon the “ near North ” with increasing apprehension that will not be allayed.

Prime Minister to Mr Curtin Jan. 19, 1942.

I thank you for your frank expression of views. I have no responsibility for the neglect of our defences and policy of appeasement which preceded the outbreak of the war. I had been for 11 years out of office, and had given ceaseless warnings for six years before the war began. On the other hand, I accept the fullest responsibility for the main priorities and general distribution of our resources since I became Prime Minister in May, 1940. The eastward flow of reinforcements and aircraft from this island has been maintained from that date forward to the utmost limit of our shipping capacity and other means of moving aircraft and tanks. I deemed the Middle East a more urgent theatre than the new christened ABDA area. We had also to keep our promises to Russia of munitions deliveries. No one could tell what Japan would do, but I was sure that if she attacked us and you the United States would enter the war and that the safety of Australia and ultimate victory would be assured. 2. It must be remembered that only three months ago we faced in the Middle East, where the Australian Imperial Force lay, the threat of a double attack by Rommel from the west and the over-running of the Caucasus, Persia, Syria, and Iraq from the north. In such a plight all the teachings of war show that everything should be concentrated on destroying one of the attacking forces. I thought it best to make a job of Rommel while forming with the rest of our resources the best Levant-Caspian front possible. This latter was largely beyond our resources. Since then two-thirds of Rommel’s army has been destroyed, and Cyrenaica cleared, but only by a very narrow margin. In fact, it hung in the balance at the moment when Auchinleck superseded Cunningham. 3. Although I cannot promise total destruction of Rommel, we have at least gained a very substantial success, which has already rid us of one serious danger and liberated important forces. At The same time the tremendous, unexpected resistance of Russia has given a considerable breathing space, and it may be more, on the LevantCaspian front. Thus we are able to move the 17th Indian Division and soon several other Indian infantry divisions previously assigned to the Levant-Caspian front, together with the 18th British and the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions, with substantial aircraft and some armoured forces, from the middle to the Far Eastern theatre. This we are doing with all speed. You may judge how melancholy our position would have been if we had been beaten by Rommel, and if (besides) the Caucasus, the Baku oil wells and Persia had been over-run by the enemy. I am sure it would have been wrong to send forces needed to beat Rommel to reinforce the Malay Peninsula while Japan was still at peace. To try to be safe everywhere is to be strong nowhere. 4. We have to be thankful first, for the Russian victories, secondly, for our good success against Rommel, and, thirdly, that the United States was attacked by Japan at the same time as ourselves. The blame for the frightful risks we have had to run, and will have to run, rests with all those who, in or out of office, failed to discern the Nazi menace and to crush it while it was weak. 5. No one could foresee the series of major naval disasters which befell us and the United States around the turn of the year 1941-42. In an hour the American naval superiority in the Pacific was for the time being swept away. In another hour the Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk. Thus the Japanese gained the temporary command of the Pacific waters, and no doubt we have further grievous punishment to face in the Far East. In this new crisis affecting you I should have approved the sending of the three fast Mediterranean battleships to form, with the four “R’s” and the Warspite, just repaired, a new fleet in the Indian Ocean, to move to your protection as might be most helpful.

proposed to set up in London for securing full and continuous association of the Australian, New Zealand, and Netherlands Governments in the whole conduct of the war against Japan.

The Pacific Command Prime Minister to Mr Curtin Jan. 19, 1942.

A Far Eastern Council (should) be, established on the Ministerial plane.I would preside, and other members, would be Lord Privy Seal (who is my Deputy on the Defence Commit-* tee), Duff Cooper, and representativesof Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands. Australian member, would presumably be Earle Page, and the New Zealand representative might be the High Commissioner to begin with. There would also be a Dutch Cabinet Minister. Council would be. assisted by a staff group of dominions’ liaison officers in consultation with' United Kingdom Joint Planners. Duties of Council (would) be to focus and formulate views of represented Powers, to the President, whose views (would), also be brought before the Council/ This (would) not, of course, interfere; with Earle Page’s attending Cabinetas at present when Australian affairs, are affected. Do you agree? Am also' consulting Fraser and Netherlands'; Government. 'K

The first meeting of the Pacific War Council was held on February 10. I presided, and others present were the Lord Privy Seal, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Prime, Minister of the Netherlands, Dr P. Gerbrandy, the Netherlands Minister.,, Jonkheer E. Michiels Van Verduynen, Sir Earl Page (representing Aus-» tralia). Mr W. J. Jordan (representing ; New Zealand), Mr Amery (represent-, ing India and Burma), and the Chiefs of Staff. At subsequent meetings 1 China was also represented. The main. function of the council “was to review the broad fundamental policies to be followed in the war against Japan throughout the Pacific area.” ’ A Pacific War Council was also set up in Washington, under President Roosevelt, .and the two councils kept in close touch with each other. The' last meeting of the council in London was held in August. 1943. The war continued to be run by the old machinery, but meetings of the Pacific War Councils enabled those countries which were not represented in this, permanent machinery to be consulted about what was going on. All this was soon to be swept away by disastrous events.

6. I have already told you of the Barham being sunk. I must now inform you that the Queen Elizabeth and Valiant have both sustained underwater damage from a “human torpedo,” which put them out of action, one for three and the other for six months. As the enemy do not know yet about these three last mentioned ships, you will see that we have no need to enlighten them, and I must ask you to keep this last deadly secret to yourself alone. 7. However, these evil conditions will pass. By May the United States will have a superior fleet at Hawaii. We have encouraged them to take their two new battleships out of the Atlantic, if they need them, thus taking more burden upon ourselves. We are sending two, and possibly three, out of four modern aircraft carriers to the Indian Ocean. Warspite will soon be there, and thereafter Valiant. Thus the balance of sea-power in the Indian and Pacific Oceans will, in the absence of further misfortunes, turn decisively in our favour, and all Japanese oversea operations will be deprived of their present assurance. Meanwhile, we are trying to make up by air-power in the Mediterranean our lack of a battle fleet, and the impending arrival of Anson (our latest battleship) and complete working up of Duke of York enable us to face large reductions in American strength in the Atlantic for the sake of the Pacific.

8. We must not be dismayed or get into recrimination, but remain united in true comradeship. Do not doubt my loyalty to Australia and New Zealand. I cannot offer any guarantees for the future, and I am sure great ordeals lie before us, but I feel hopeful as never before that we shall emerge safely, and also gloriously, from the dark valley. * * * *

The following answer was received.

Prime Minister, Australia, to Prime Minister Jan. 22, 1942. I appreciate your full reply and reciprocate your sentiments on the unity of our efforts.

2. Just as you foresaw events in Europe, so we feel that we saw the trend of the Pacific situation more clearly than was realised in London. 3. Events have unfortunately justified our views regarding Malaya, and I am very disturbed by reports from Gordon Bennett as to the seriousness of the position. 4. The long-distance programme you outline is encouraging, but the great need is in the immediate future. The Japanese are going to take a lot of repelling, and in the meantime may do very vital damage to our capacity to eject them from the areas they are capturing. * * * *

The Australians’ claim that they had understood and foreseen the dangers in the Far East and from Japan better than I had done in London can only be judged in relation to the a whole. It was their duty to'study their own position with concentrated attention. We had to try to think for all. I reported to the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand on the final form of machinery that it was

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