UNFORTUNATE STATEMENT

Otago Daily Times, Issue 27521, 16 October 1950, Page 5

UNFORTUNATE STATEMENT

By Winston S. Churchill No. 2.

“ The Hinge Of Fate ”

Mr Curtin Commits A Faux Pas

Three days after Mr Churchill had explicitly stated the British view of the situation in Malaya to Mr Curtin, the Australian Prime Minister permitted an article to be published under his own nanie which unfortunately created. a very bad impression. Today Mr Churchill recalls that article and the correspondence it provoked.

On December 27 Mr Curtin wrote a signed article in the Melbourne Herald which was flaunted round the world by our enemies. Among other things he said: “. . . We refuse to accept the dictum that the Pacific struggle must be treated as a subordinate segment of the general conflict. By that it is not meant that any one of the other theatres of war is of less importance than the Pacific, but that Australia asks for a concerted plan evoking the greatest strength at the democracies’ disposal, determined upon hurling Japan back. “ The Australian Government therefore regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the United States and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the democracies’ fighting plan. ‘Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free from any pangs as to our traditional links with the United Kingdom. “ We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces. We know the constant threat of invasion. We know the dangers of dispersal of strength. But we know too that n Australia can go, and Britain can u 1 still hold on.

Prime Minister to Mr Curtin

8 Jan., 42. I fully sympathise [with] your feelings and largely share your views. When Japan attacked United States and British Empire immediate war danger confronted Australia. However, the accession of the United States to full warfare most favourably affected issue of final struggle. Indeed, it probably decides it. I therefore came here. 2. First step which President and I arranged was putting Supreme Commander with adequate representative staff over actual area of operation. This area is defined by General Wavell’s command. Into this area we and United States are trying to press naval, air, and military forces as far as possible. In our case regard must be paid to other commitments. 3. The second step is the organisation of the approaches [to Australia]. That has not yet been settled; but I have very little doubt United States will take over communications between themselves 'and Australia, taking command of any Australian naval forces which you may be willing to place at their disposal. The above covers case of New Zealand as well. The staffs are working hard, and I hope before I leave to reassure you upon this aspect.

“We are therefore determined that Australia shall not go, and we shall exert all our energies toward the shaping of a plan, with the United States as its keystone, which will give to our country some confidence of being able to hold out until the tide of battle swings against the enemy. “ Summed up, Australian external policy will be shaped toward obtaining Russian aid, and working out, with the United States, as the major factor, a- plan 6f Pacific strategy, along with British, Chinese and Dutch forces.” This produced the worst impression both in high American circles and in Canada. I was sure that these outpourings of anxiety, however understandable. did not represent Australian feeling. Mr W. M. Hughes, Australian Prime Minister in the First World War and Leader of the Federal United Australia Party, (the famous “Billy Hughes”), immediately said that it would be “suicidal and a false and dangerous policy for Australia to regard Britain’s support as being less important than that of other great associated countries.” There was a keen controversy in Australia. I from Washington to Mr Attlee: “ I hope there will be no pandering to this, while at the same time we do all in human power to come to their aid ...” I weighed painfully in my mind the idea of making a broadcast direct to the Australian people. At the same time I fully accepted the responsibility which fell on me. “I hope you will endeavour to let all issues stand over until I return, so that I may face any opposition myself. ... If the Malay peninsula has been starved for the sake of Libya and Russia, no one is more responsible than I, and I would do exactly the same again. Should any questions be asked in Parliament I should be glad if it could be stated that I particularly desire to answer them myself on my return.” Mr Churchill Replies

4. There remains of course the defence of Australian soil. This rests primarily with you, and I thought you would prefer it to be in the hands of an Australian com-mander-in-chief. United States would be quite willing, I believe, to reinforce your home defence troops with 40.000 or 50,000 Americans.—The limiting factor is not so much escort as actual shipping. Do you think you are in immediate danger of invasion in force? It is quite true you may have air attacks, but we have had a good dose already in England without mortal harm resulting. 5. I contemplated these three commands:— (a) The South-western Pacific under Wavell. (b) The communications between United States and Australasia, under an American commander; and (c) Defence of mainland of Australia under your own commander-in-chief.

I replied at once to Mr Curtin on the military position: ' Prime Minister to Mr Curtin, Jan. 3, 1942.

General Wavell’s command area is limited to the fighting zone where active operations are. now proceeding. Henceforward it does not include Australia, New Zealand and communications between the United States and Australia, or indeed, any other ofcean communications. This does not, of course, mean that these vital regions and communications are to be left without protection so far as our resources admit. In our view, the American Navy should assume the responsibility for the communications, including the islands right up to the Australian or New Zealand coast. This is what we are pressing for. Admiral King has only just been given full powers over the whole of the American Navy, and he has not yet accepted our views. Obviously, if I can not persuade the Americans to take over, we shall to fill the gap as best we can, but I still hope our views will be accepted, in which case, of course, any vessels we or you have in that area will come under United States direction while operating there. There never has been any intention to make the main Allied concentration in the newly-defined Southwest Pacific theatre, and I do not know where you got this from.

Surely that is a reasonable lay-out 6. Now as to machinery of control. Once a supreme commander has been appointed, it is hoped he will be' given free hand to use all forces given him and not b 6 worried by endless reference to [several] councils of five States and three arms—total 15 [in each case]. Nothing would be easier than to set bunches of this kind at various nodal points, and nothing would be more paralysing to warfare direction. One thing is certain, we cannot have a control of United States, Great Britain, Australian, New Zealand and Dutch land, air and navy both in London and in Washington. 11. I advise, therefore, subject to your concurrence, the representation of Australia in London, where the Dutch Government is located and where New Zealand is content to lie. You have sent Sir Earle Page as an envoy of the Commonwealth Government. He has been invited to every Cabinet where Australian affairs have been concerned. He will certainly have all opportunities of presenting Australian views as you propose continuously. However, it is not possible to promise that nothing will ever be said or done which has not previously received full approval after consultation of all five Governments concerned. I may have to speak to the President on the telephone on matters of great urgency. These occasions should arise only rarely, since the Supreme Commander will be doing the fighting, and there will probably be time to discuss larger strategic and supply issues among ourselves before decisions.

12. I must beg you to realise these matters of organisation, where so many partners and factors are involved, take time to shape. Belfeve me, I am thinking of your interests at every moment Within a week I hope to present you with the entire draft which you will be able to criticise or, if you wilL reject. I am sure no other method or making a good scheme for your approval could have been found than the one I have adopted. I hope therefore you will accord me the week for which I ask, remembering all operational measures are proceeding at highest speed and that much has been achieved already.

4. Night and day I am labouring here to make the best arrangements possible in your interests and for your safety, having regard to the other theatres and the other dangers which have to be met from our limited resources. It is only a little while ago that you were most strongly urging the highest state of equipment for the Australian Army in the Middle East. The battle there is still not finished, though the prospects are good. It would have been folly to spoil Auchinleck’s battle by diverting aircraft, tanks, etc., to the Malay peninsula at a time when there was no certainty that Japan would enter the war. The ease-up of the Caucasian danger through the Russian victories and the Auchinleck successes have made possible the considerable reinforcements, at the temporary expense of the Middle East, of which you have been advised, and which are also justified because Malaya has now become a war theatre. The Pacific Command

And to New Zealand: Prime Minister to Prime Minister of New Zealand.. January 7, 1942. You will see that we have been able to make up a fairly good instalment, and will try to do more as soon as we can.

It was not possible to consult you more fully about the South-west Pacific Supreme Command, as speed of execution was essential, but I hope results are satisfactory to you. I am trying hard to get the Americans to assume naval responsibility for the area south of the equator and west of 180 deg up to the east coast of Australia, and I think they will probably agree. Australian and New Zealand naval forces in the area would, of course, come under American operational command.

I continued to reassure the Australian Government and explain more fully our motives in the policy of the united command of the South-east Asia theatre.

I am doing my utmost to build up and restore the Allied position in the Far East as soon as possible. We are all deeply grateful for the . splendid courage and loyalty to the Mother Country shown by New, Zealand under stress of danger. [Copyright 1950 in USA by the New York Times Company and Times. Inc. (publishers of Time and Life): in the British Empire by the Daily Telegraph, Ltd.; elsewhere by International Cooperation Press Service. Inc. World rights reserved. Reproduction in full or in any part in any language strictly prohibited.]