DEFENCE OF HONGKONG

Otago Daily Times, Issue 27082, 17 May 1949, Page 5

DEFENCE OF HONGKONG

Full-scale Communist Attack BRITAIN’S PLAN QUESTIONED

New Zealand Press Association Special Correspondent Rec 11.10 p.m. LONDON, May 16. “The British Government would be guilty of criminal stupidity if it really imagined it could defend Hongkong against a full-scale Communist attack by reinforcing the garrison with 6000 troops backed by a squadron of Spitfires from Malaya,” says the New Statesman and Nation. “ The defence of the island of Hongkong involves maintaining a 100mile frontier covering the leased territories on the mainland which contain the deep-water port and from which Hongkong draws its water supply. “In December, 1941, the defence force numbered 15,000 British regulars, Indians, Canadians, and Hongkong Volunteers. The Japanese with 50,000 troops, captured the leased territories and Kowloon in three days, and a fortnight later the island, deprived of water, itself surrendered. In short, even if the population within the city were solidly British—an impossible assumption—Hongkong would not be militarily defensible against a large armed force carrying out an organised operation from the mainland.” . »

“The 6000 troops are, we take it, sent to deal with the danger of trouble from ex-Malayan Chinese deportees or accidental * incidents.’ Whether they are sufficient for this limited purpose depends upon the attitude of the people who live in Hongkong.’’ Discussing the attitude of the colony’s civilian population, the New Statesman points out that a considerable number of them are refugees from Kuomintang rule, and, therefore, will be very ready to take orders from the Communists. The bulk of the population are'coolies who have nothing to fear from the Communists and who could quite easily be led against the British if it became Chinese Communist policy to throw the British out of China. A third section of the population, which comprises Kuomintang refugees, has no stomach for fighting and is already seeking a safer haven in Formosa. The only really dependable element from the British point of view are fhe Eurasians, who have no other home but they are too few to strengthen the security forces. Educated s and professional Chinese want the British to stay, but have never taken any serious part in the job of defence. In conclusion, the article emphasises that if the British want to stay in Hongkong their only hope lies in making some arrangement with the Chinese Communists. This can only be done by making immediate approaches to the Communist leaders through trusted Unofficial sources. The Hongkong correspondent of the Economist, describing the present morale of the colony, says that the British residents remain supremely confident and that their confidence' so far is sustaining many of the Chinese. Nevertheless, anxiety has noticeably increased as the Communists approach Shanghai, and the authorities are unquestionably nervous of Communist infiltration. The correspondent adds that, although Hongkong civilians become a little uneasy when they consider the effects of an organised economic boycott against them applied from the mainland, most of them remain “ pathetically certain ” of the iyill and ability of the Home Government to come to their • aid. '•* “'Maybe it' is the knowledge' that Westminster and Whitehall and not ourselves are masters of our destiny that accounts for the comparative calm with which the colony awaits events,” he concludes.