I BECOME PRIME MINISTER

Otago Daily Times, Issue 26777, 21 May 1948, Page 5

I BECOME PRIME MINISTER

CHURCHILL MEMOIRS

Momentous Debate in House

By WINSTON S. CHURCHILL,

This instalment is the last of the present series. It marks the end of Volume One of Mr Churchill’s Memoirs. The second series will not be released for some time and the date on which publication will be commenced will be announced later.

The many disappointments and disasters of the brief campaign in Norway caused profound perturbation at home, and the currents of passion mounted even in the breasts of some of those who has been most slothful and purblind in the years before the war. The Opposition asked for a debate on the war situation, and this was arranged for May 7. The House was filled with members in a high state of irritation and distress. Mr Chamberlain’s opening statement did not stem the hostile tide. He was mockingly interrupted and reminded of his speech on April 5 when in quite another connection he had incautiously said “ Hitler missed the bus.” One speaker after another from both sides of the House attacked the Government and especially its chief with unusual bitterness and vehemence, and found themselves sustained by growing applause from all quarters. Sir Roger Keyes, burning for distinction in the new war. sharply criticised the Naval Staff for their failure to attempt the capture of Trondheim. “When 1 saw,” he said, “ how badly things were going, I never ceased importuning the Admiralty and War Cabinet to let me take all responsibility and lead the attask.” Wearing his uniform as Admiral of the Fleet, he supported the complaints of the Opposition with technical details and his own professional authority in a manner very agreeable to the mood of the House. From the benches behind the Government Mr Amery quoted amid ringing cheers Cromwell’s imperious words to the Long Parliament: “You have sat too long here for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go!” These were terrible words coming from a friend and colleague of many years, a fellow Birmingham member, and a Privy Councillor of distinction and experience. Lloyd George's Burning Words On the second day, May 8, the debate, although continuing upon an adjournment motion, assumed the character of a vote of censure, and Mr Herbert Morrison, in the name of the Opposition, declared their intention to have a vote. The Prime Minister rose again, accepted the challenge, and ini an unfortunate passage, appealed to his friends to stand by him. He had a right to do this, as these friends had sustained his action, or inaction, and thus shared his responsibility in " the years which the locusts had eaten ” before the war. But to-day they sat abashed and silenced, and some of them had joined the hostile demonstrations. This day saw the last decisive intervention of Mr Lloyd George in the House of Commons. In a speech of not more than 20 minutes he struck a deeply-wounding blow at the head of the Government. He endeavoured to exculpate me: “ I do not think that the First Lord was entirely responsible for all the things which happened in Norway.” I immediately interposed: “ I take complete responsibility for everything that has been done by the Admiralty, and I take my full share of the burden.” After warning me not to allow myself to be converted into an air raid shelter to keep the splinters from hitting my colleagues. Mr Lloyd George turned upon Mr Chamberlain: “It is not a question of who are the Prime Minister’s friends It is a far bigger issue. He had appealed for sacrifice. The nation is prepared for every sacrifice so long as it has leadership, so long as the Government show clearly what they are aiming at, and so long as the nation is confident that those who are leading it are doing their best.” He ended: “I say solemnly that the Prime Minister should give an example of sacrifice, because there is nothing which can contribute more to victory in this war than that he should sacrifice the seals of office.”

When they arrived we three Ministers sat on one side of the table and the Opposition Leaders on the other. Mr Chamberlain declared the paramount need for a National Government and sought to ascertain whether the Labour Party would serve under him. The conference of their party was in session at Bournemouth. The conversation was most polite, but it was clear that the Labour leaders would not commit themselves without consulting their people, and they hinted, not obscurely, they thought the response would be unfavourable. They then withdrew. The morning of the 10th of May dawned, and with it came tremendous news. Boxes with telegrams poured in from the Admiralty, the War Office and the Foreign Office. The Germans had struck their long-awaited blow. Holland and Belgium were both invaded. Their frontiers had been crossed at numerous points. The whole movement of the German Army upon the invasion of the Low Countries and of France had begun. At 11 o’clock I was again summoned to Downing street by the Prime Minister. There once more I found Lord Halifax. We took our seats at the table opposite Mr Chamberlain. He told us that he was satisfied that it was beyond his power to form a National Government. The response he had received from the Labour leaders left him in no doubt of this. The question therefore was whom he should advise the King to send for after his own resignation had been accepted. His demeanour was cool, unruffled, and seemingly quite detached from the personal aspect of the affair. He looked at us both across the table. Churchill on Halifax? > I have had many important interviews in my public life, and this was certainly the most important. Usually I talk a great deal, but on this occasion I was silent. Mr Chamberlain evidently had in his mind the stormy scene in the House of Commons two nights before, when I had seemed to be in such heated controversy with the Labour Party. Although this had been in his support and defence, he nevertheless felt that it might be an obstacle to my obtaining their adherence at this juncture. I do not recall ihe actual words he used, but this was the implication. His biographer, Mr Feiling, states definitely that he preferred Lord Halifax. As I remained silent, a very long pause ensued. It certainly seemed longer than the two minutes which one observed in the commemoration of Armistice Day. Then at length Halifax spoke. He said that he felt that his position as a peer, out of the House of Commons, would make it very difficult for him to discharge the duties of Prime Minister in a war like this. He would be held responsible for everything, but would not have the power to guide the assembly upon whose confidence the life of every Government depended. He spoke for some minutes in this sense, and by the time he had finished it was clear that the duty would fall upon me—had in fact fallen upon me. Then, for the first time. I spoke. I said 1 would have no communication with either of the Opposition Parties until I had the King’s Commission to form a Government. On this the momentous conversation came to an end. I then went back to the Admiralty. Dutch Appeal for Aid

As Ministers we all stood together. The Secretaries of State for War and Air had already spoken. I had volunteered to wind up the debate, which was no more than my duty, not only in loyalty to the chief under whom I served, but also because of the exceptionally prominent part I had played in the use of our inadequate forces during our forlorn attempt to succour Norway. I did my very best to regain control of the. House for the Government in the teeth of continuous interruption, coming chiefly from the Labour Opposition benches. I did this with good heart when I thought of their mistaken and dangerous pacifism in former years, and how, only four months before the outbreak of the war, they had voted solidly against conscription. I felt that I, and a few friends who had acted with me, had the right to inflict these censures, but they had not. When they broke in upon me I retorted upon them and defied them, and several times the clamour was such that I could not make myself heard. Yet all the time it was clear that their anger was not directed against me, but at the Prime Minister, whom I was defending to the utmost of my ability and without regard for any other When I sat down at 11 o’clock the House divided. The Government had a majority of 81, but over 50 Conservatives voted with the Labour and Liberal Oppositions, and there was no doubt that in effect, though not in form, both the debate and the division were a violent manifestation of want of confidence in Mr Chamberlain and his Administration After the debate was over he asked me to go to his room, and L saw at once that he took the most serious view of the sentiment of the House towards himself. He felt he could not go on. There ought to be a National Government. One Party alone could not carry the burden. Someone must form a Government in which all Parties would serve, or we could not get through. Aroused by the antagonisms of the debate, and being sure of my own past record on the issues at stake, I was strongly disposed to fight on. “This has been a damaging debate, but you have a good majority. Do not take the matter .grievously to heart. We have a better case about Norway than it has been possible to convey to the House. Strengthen your Government from every quarter, and let us go on until our majority deserts us.” To this effect I spoke. But Chamberlain was neither convinced nor comforted, and I left him about midnight with the feeling that he would persist in his resolve to sacrifice himself if there was no other way, rather than attempt to carry the war further with a one-Party Government. A National Government?

The Dutch Ministers were in my room. Haggard and worn, with horror in their eyes, they had just flown over from Amsterdam. Their country had been attacked without the slightest pretext or warning. The avalanche of fire and steel had rolled across the frontiers, and when resistance broke out and the Dutch frontier guards fired an overwhelming onslaught was made from the air. The whole country was in a state of wild confusion; the longprepared defence scheme had been put into operation; the dykes were opened; the water's spread far and wide. But the Germans had already crossed the outer lines and were now streaming across the causeway which enclosed the Zuyder Zee. Could we do anything to prevent this? Luckily, we had a' flotilla not far away, and this was immediately ordei'ed to sweep the causeway with fire and take the heavist toll possible of the swarming invaders. The Queen was still in Holland, but it did not seem she could remain there long. In the splintering crash of this vast battle the quiet conversations we had had in Downing street faded or fell back in one’s mind. However, I remember being told that Mr Chamberlain had gone, or was going, to see the King, and this was naturally to be expected. Presently a message arrived summoning me to the palace at 6 o’clock. I Receive my Orders

His Majesty received me most graciously and bade me sit down. He looked at me searchingly and quizzically for some moments, and then said: “ I suppose you don’t know why I have sent for you? ” Adopting his mood, I replied: “ Sir, I simply couldn’t imagine why.” He laughed and said: “ I want to ask you to form a Government.” I said I would certainly do so. The King had made no stipulation about the Government being National in character, and I felt that my commission was in no formal way dependent upon this point. But in view of what had happened, and the conditions which had led to Mr Chamberlain’s resignation, a Government of National character was obviously inherent in the situation. If I had found it impossible to come to terms with the Opposition Parties, I should not have been constitutionally debarred from trying to form the strongest Government possible of all. who would stand by the country in the hour of peril, provided that such a Government could command a majority in the House of Commons. I told the King that I would immediately send for the leaders of the Labour and Liberal Parties, that I proposed to form a War Cabinet of five or six Ministers, and that I hoped to let him have at least five names before midnight. On this I took my leave and returned to the Admiralty. Forrrifrig a Cabinet

I do not remember exactly how things happened during the morning of May 9, but the following occurred. Sir Kingsley Wood, Secretary of State for Air, was very dose to the Prime Minister as a colleague and a friend. They had long worked together in complete confidence. From him I learned that Mr Chamberlain was resolved upon the formation of a National Government, and, if he could not be the head, he would give way to anyone commanding his confidence who could. Thus, by the afternoon, I became aware that I might well be called upon to take the lead. The prospect neither excited nor alarmed me. I thought it would be by far the best plan. I was content to let events unfold. In the afternoon the Prime Minister summoned me to Downing street, where I found Lord Halifax, and, after a talk about the situation in general, we were told that Mr Attlee and Mr Greenwood would visit us in a few minutes for a consultation.

Between seven and eight, at my request, Mr Attlee called upon me. He brought with him Mr Greenwood. I told him of the authority I had to form a Government and asked if the Labour Party would join. He said they would. I proposed that they should take rather more than a third of the places, having two seats in the War Cabinet of five, or it might be six. and I asked Mr Attlee to let me have a list of men so that we could discuss particular offices. I mentioned Mr Bevin, Mr Alexander. Mr Morrison and Mr Dalton as men whose services in high office were immediately required. I had, of course, known both Attlee and Greenwood for a long time in the House of Commons. During the 11 years before the outbreak of war, I had in my more or less independent position come far more often into collision with the Conservative and National Governments than with the Labour and Liberal Oppositions. I invited Mr Chamberlain to lead the House of Commons as Lord President of the Council, and he replied by telephone,, that he accepted and had arranged to broadcast at 9 that- night, stating that he had resigned, and urging everyone to support and aid his successor. This he did in magnanimous terms. I asked Lord Halifax to join the War Cabinet while remaining Foreign Secretary. At about 10,'I sent the King a list of the five

games, as I had promised. The appointment of the three Service Ministers was vitally urgent. I had already made up my mind who they should be. Mr Eden should go to the War Office: Mr Alexander should come to the Admiralty; and Sir Archibald Sinclair, Leader of the Liberal Party, should take the Air Mimstiy. At the same time I assumed the office of Minister of Defence, without, however, attempting to define its scope and Thus, then, on the night of May 10, at the outset of this mighty battle, I acquired the chief power in the State, which henceforth I wielded in.evergrowing measure for five years and three months of world war, at the end of which time, all our enemies having surrendered unconditionally or beine about to do.so, I was.immediately dismissed by the British electorate from all further conduct of thenaffairs. Confidence in the Future

During these last crowded days of the political crisis my pulse had not quickened at any moment. I took it all as it came. But I cannot conceal from the reader of this truthful account that as I went to bed at about i-a m I was conscious of a profound sense of relief. At last I had the authority to give directions over the whole scene. I felt as if I were walking with destiny, and that all my past life had been but a preparation for this hour and for this trial. Eleven years in the political wilderness had freed me from ordinary party antagonisms. My warnings over the last six years had been so numerous, so detailed, and were now so terribly vindicated, that no one could gainsay me. I could not be reproached either for making the war or with want of preparation for it. I thought I knew a good deal about it' all. and I was sure I should not fail. Therefore, although impatient for the morning, I _ sleot soundly and had no need for cheering drehms. Facts are better than dreams. (World Copyright Reserved.)