CAMPAIGNS IN NORWAY

Otago Daily Times, Issue 26776, 20 May 1948, Page 5

CAMPAIGNS IN NORWAY

CHURCHILL MEMOIRS

German Superiority Admitted

By WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

On April 20 I had procured agreement to the appointment of Lord Cork as sole commander of the naval, military and air forces in the Narvik area, thus bringing General Mackesy directly under his authority. There was never any doubt of Lord Cork's vigorously offensive spirit. He realised acutely the danger of delay; but the physical and administrative difficulties were far greater on the spot than we could measure them at home. Moreover, naval officers, even when granted the fullest authority, are chary of giving orders to the army about purely military matters. This would be even more true if the positions were reversed. We had hoped that by relieving General Mackesy from direct major responsibility we should make him feel more free to adopt bold tactics, ’ The result was contrary to this expectation. He continued to use evei-y argument, and there was no lack of them, to prevent drastic action. Battle for Trondheim

It is now necessary to recount the actual course of the fighting for Trondheim. Our northern force from Namsos was 80 miles from the town; and our southern force from Andalsnes was 150 miles away. The central attack through the fiord (“Hammer”) had been abandoned partly through fear of its cost and partly through hopes of the flanking movements.

Both these movements now failed utterly. The Namsos .force, commanded by Carton .de WiaVt, hastened forward in accordance with his instructions against the Norwegian snow and the German air. A brigade reached Verdal, 50 miles from Trondheim, at the head of the fiord, on the 19th. It was evident to me, and I warned the staffs, that the Germans could send in a single night a stronger force by water from Trondheim to chop them. This occurred two days later. Our troops were forced to withdraw some miles to where they could hold the enemy.

The intolerable snow conditions, now sometimes in thaw, and the fact that the Germans who had come across the inner fiord were like us destitute of wheeled transport, prevented any serious fighting on the ground; and the small number of scattered troops plodding along the road offered little target to the unresisted air power. Had Carton de Wiart known how limited were the forces he would have, or that the central attack on Trondheim had been abandoned—a vital point of which our staff machinery did not inform him—he would no doubt have made a more methodical advance. He acted in relation to the main objective -as it had been imparted to him. In the end nearly everybody got back exhausted, chilled and resentful to Namsos, where the French Chasseur Brigade had remained; and Carton de Wiart, whose opinion on such issues commanded respect, declared that there was nothing for it but evacuation. Preparations for this were at once made by the Admiralty. On April 28 the evacuation of Namsos was ordered. All the troops were re-embarked on the night of the 3rd (of May) and were well out to sea when they were sighted by the German air reconnaissance at dawn. From 8 o’clock in the morning to 3 in the afternoon wave after wave of enemy bombers attacked the warships and the transports. As no British air forces were available to protect the convoy, we were lucky that no transport was hit. The French destroyer Bison, and H.M-S. Afridi, which carried our rearguard, were “ sunk fighting to the end.” Further Misfortunes

A different series of misfortunes befell the troops landed at Andalsnes: but here at least we took our toll of the enemy. In response to urgent appeals from General Ruge, the Norwegian Commander-in-Chief, Brigadier Morgan’s 148th Infantry Brigade had hastened forward as far as Lillehammer. Here it joined the tired-out battered Norwegian forces whom the Germans, in the overwhelming strength of three fully-equipped divisions, were driving before them along the road and railway from Oslo towards Dombas, and Trondheim. Severe fighting began. The ship carrying Brigadier Morgan’s vehicles, including all artillery and mortars, had been sunk, but his young territorials fought well with • their rifles and machine guns against the German vanguards, who were armed not only with 5.9 howitzers, but many heavy mortars and some tanks. On April 24 the leading battalion of the 15th Brigade arriving from France reached the crumbling front. General Paget, who commanded these regular troops, learned from General Ruge that the Norwegian forces were exhausted and could fight no more until they had been-thoroughly rested and re-equipped. He therefore assumed control, brought the rest of this brigade into action as fast as they arrived, and faced the Germans with determination in a series of spirited engagements. By the adroit use of the railway, which fortunately remained unbroken, Paget extricated his own troops. Morgan’s brigade, which had lost 700 men, and some Norwegian units. For one whole day the bulk of the British force hid in a long railway tunnel fed by their precious supply train, and were thus completely lost to the enemy and his all-seeing air. After fighting five rearguard actions, in several of which the Germans were heavily mauled, artd having covered over 100 miles, he reached the sea again at Andalsnes. This small place, like Namsos, had been flattened out by bombing; but by the night of May 1 the 15th Brigade, with what remained of Morgan s 148th Brigade had been taken on board British cruisers and destroyers and reached home without further trouble. General Paget’s skill and resolution during these days opened his path to high command as the war developed. In order to delay to the utmost the northward advance of the enemy towards Narvik, we were now sending special companies raised in what was afterwards called “ Commando ” style under an enterprising officer. Colonel Gubbins, to Mosjoen, 100 miles farther up the coast. , ~ , .. I was most anxious that a small part of the Namsos force shmild make their way in whatever vehicles were available alopg the road to Grong. Even a couple of hundred would have sufficed to fight small rearguard actions. ~ , From Grong they would have to find their way out on foot to Mosjoen. I hoped by this means to gain the time for Gubbins to establish himself so that a stand could be made against the very small numbers which the enemy could as yet send there'. I was repeatedly assured that the road was impassable. General Massey from London sent insistent requests. It was replied that even a small party of French Chasseurs, with their skis, could not traverse this route. ‘‘lt was tseemedl evident,” wrote General Massey a few days later in his despatch, “that if the French Chasseurs could not. retire along this route, the Germans could not advance along it. This was an error, as the Germans have since made full use of it and have advanced 'so rapidly along it that our troops in Mosjoen have not had time to get properly established, and it is more likely that we shall not be able to hold the place.” This proved, true. The destroyer Janus took 100 Chasseurs Alpins and Uvo light A A guns round by sea, butthey left again before the Germans came.

German Superiority We have now pursued the Norwegian campaign to the point where it was overwhelmed by gigantic events. The superiority of the Germans in design, management and energy was plain. They put into ruthless execution a carefully prepared plan of action. They comprehended perfectly the use of the air arm on a great scale in all its aspects. Moreover their individual ascendency was marked, especially in small parties. At Narvik a mixed and improvised German force barely 6000 strong held at bay for six weeks some 20,000 Allied troops, and, though driven out of the town, lived to see them depart. The Narvik attack, so brilliantly opened by the navy, was paralysed by the refusal of the military commander to run what was admittedly a desperate risk. The division of our resources between Narvik and Trondheim was injurious to both our plans. The abandonment of the central thrust on Trondheim wears an aspect of vacillation in the British High Command for which not only the experts, but the political chiefs who yielded too easily to their advice, must bear a burden. At Namsos there was a muddy waddle forward and back. Only in the Andalsnes expedition did we bite. The Germans traversed in seven days the road from Namsos to Mosjoen, which the British and French had declared impassable. At Bodo and Mo during the retreat of Gubbins's force to the north we were each time just too late, and the enemy, although they had to overcome hundreds of miles of rugged, snow l clogged country, drove us back in spite of gallant episodes. We, who had the command of the sea and could pounce anywhere on an undefended coast, were outpaced by the enemy moving by land across very large distances in the face of every obstacle. In this Norwegian encounter our finest troops, the Scots and Irish Guards, were baffled by the vigour, enterprise and training of Hitler's young men. We tried hard at the call of duty to entangle and embed ourselves in Norway, we thought Fortune had been cruelly against us. We can now see that we wpre well out of it. Meanwhile, we had to comfort ourselves as best we might by a series of successful evacuations. Failure at Trondheim! Stalemate at Narvik! Such in the first week of May were the only results we could show to the British nation, to our Allies, and to the neutral world, friendly or hostile. Considering the prominent part I played in these events and the impossibility of explaining the difficulties by which we had been overcome, or the defects of our staff and governmental organisation and our methods of conducting war, it was a marvel that I survived and maintained my position in public esteem and parliamentary confidence. This was due to the fact that for six or seven years I had predicted with truth the course of events, and had given ceaseless warnings, then unheeded, but now remembered. The End in Norway In defiance of chronology, it is well to set forth here the end of the Norwegian episode. After April 16 Lord Cork was compelled to abandon the idea of an immediate assault. A three hours’ bombardment on April 24, carried out by the battleship- Warspite and three cruisers, was not effective in dislodging the garrison. I had asked Jhe First Sea Lord to arrange for the replacement of the Warspite by the less valuable Resolution, which was equally useful for bombarding purposes. Meanwhile the arrival of French and Polish troops, and still more the thaw, encouraged Lord Cork to press his attack on the town. The new plan was to land at the head of the fiord beyond Narvik and thereafter to attack Narvik across Rombaks fiord. ' The 24th Guards’ Brigade had been drawn off to stem the German advance from Trondheim; but by the beginning of May three battalions of Chasseurs Alpins, two battalions of the French Foreign Legion, four Polish battalions, and a Norwegian force of about 3500 men were available. The enemy had for their* part been reinforced by portions of the 3rd Mountain Division, which had either been brought by air from- Southern Norway or smuggled in by rail from Sweden. „ The first landing under General Bethouart, the Commander of the French contingent, took place on the night of May 12-13 at Bjerkvik with very little loss. General Auchinleck, whom I had sent to command all the troops in Northern Norway, was present and took charge next day. But now tremendous events became dominant. On May 24, in the crisis of shattering defeat, it was decided with almost universal agreement, that we must concentrate all we had in France and at home. The capture of Narvik had, however, to be achieved both to ensure the destruction of the port and to cover our withdrawal. The main attack across Rombaks fiord was begun on May 27 by two ‘ battalions of the Foreign Legion and one Norwegian battalion under the able leadership of General Bethouart. It was entirely successful. The landing was effected with practically no loss and' the coun-ter-attack beaten off. Narvik was taken on May 28. The Germans who had so long resisted forces four times their strength retreated into the mountains, leaving 400 prisoners in our hands. We now had to relinquish all that we had won after such painful exertions. The withdrawal was in itself a considerable operation, imposing a heavy burden on the fleet, already fully extended by the fighting both in Norway and in the Narrow Seas, Dunkirk was upon us, and all available light forces were drawn to the south. The battle fleet must itself be held in readiness to resist invasion. Many of the cruisers and destroyers had already been sent south for antiinvasion duties. The commander-in-chief had at his disposal at Scapa the capital ships Rodney, Valiant, Renown and Repulse. These had to cover all contingencies. Good progress in evacuation was made at Narvik, and by June 8 all the troops, French and British, amounting to 24,000 men, together with large quantities of stores and equipment, were embarked and sailed in four convoys without hindrance from the enemy, who indeed no.w amounted on shore to no more than* a few thousand scattered, disorganised, but victorious individuals. During these last days valuable protection, was afforded against the German Air Force, not only by naval aircraft, but by a shore-based squadron of Hurricanes. This squadron had been ordered to keep in action till the end, destroying their aircraft if necessary. However, by their skill and daring, these pilots performed the unprecedented feat—their last—of flying their Hurricanes on board the carrier Glorious, which sailed with the Ark Royal and the main body. The battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau with the cruiser Hipper and four destroyers left Kiel on June 4, with the object of attacking shipping and bases in the Narvik area and thus providing relief for what was left of their landed forces. No hint of our intended withdrawal reached them till June 7. Loss of The Glorious On the news that British convoys were, at sea. the German Admiral decided to attack them. Early the following morning, the Bth, he caught a tanker with a trawler escort, an empty troopship, Orama, and the hospital ship

Atlantis. He respected the immunity of the Atlantis. All the rest were sunk. That afternoon the Hipper and the destroyers returned to Trondheim, but the battle cruisers, continuing their search for prey, were rewarded when at 4 p.m. they sighted the smoke of the aircraft-carrier Glorious, with her two escorting destroyers, the Acasta and Ardent. The Glorious had. been detached early that morning to proceed home independently owing to shortage of fuel, and by now was nearly 200 miles ahead of the main convoy. This explanation is not convincing. The Glorious presumably had enough fuel to steam at the speed of the convoy. All should have, kept together. The action began about 4.30 p.m. at over 27,000 yards. At this range the Glorious with her four-inch guns was helpless. Efforts were made to get her torpedo-bombers into the air, but before this could be done she was hit in the forward hangar, and a fire began which destroyed the Hurricanes and prevented torpedoes being got up from below for the, bombers. In the next half-hour she received staggering blows which deprived her of all chance of escape. By 5.20 she was listing heavily, and the order was given to abandon ship. She sank about 20 minutes later. Meanwhile her two destroyers behaved nobly. Both made smoke in an endeavour to screen the Glorious, and both fired their torpedoes at the enemy before being overwhelmed. On the 10th Admiral Forbes ordered the Ark Royal to join him. Reports showed that, enemy ships were in Trondheim, and he hoped to make an air attack. This was delivered by R.A.F. bombers on the 11th without effect. ■ On the following morning 15 Skuas from the Ark Royal made a dive-bomb-ing attack. Enemy reconnaissance gave warning of their approach, and no fewer than eight were lost. To add one last mistfortune to our tale, it is now known that one bomb from a Skua struck the Scharnhorst but failed to explode. Whilst these tragedies were in progress the Narvik convoys passed on safely to their destinations, and the British campaign in Norway came to an end. From all this wreckage and confusion there emerged one fact of major importance potentially affecting the future of the war. In their desperate grapple with the British Navy the Germans ruined their own, such as it was, for the impending climax. •The Allied losses in the continuous seafighting off Norway amounted to one aircraft-carrier, two cruisers, one sloop-and nine destroyers. Six cruisers, two sloops and eight destroyers were disabled, but could be repaired within our margin of sea power. On the other hand, at the end of June, 1940, a momentous date, the effective German Fleet consisted of no more than one 8-inch cruiser, two light cruisers and four destroyers. Although many of their damaged ships, like ours, could be repaired, the German Navy was no factor in the supreme issue of the invasion of Britain. (World Copyright Reserved.)