TRONDHEIM-OR NARVIK

Otago Daily Times, Issue 26775, 19 May 1948, Page 5

TRONDHEIM-OR NARVIK

CHURCHILL MEMOIRS

Where to Strike the Blow?

By WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

It seemed that we could certainly bring forces and supplies to the scene across the open sea through Trondheim far quicker than the Germans could fight their way up the single road and railway line from Oslo, both of which might be cut behind them by bombs, or parties dropped from the air. The only question was: Could ! we lake Trondheim in time? Could we get there before the main i enemy army arrived from the south, and for this purpose, could we obtain even a passing relief from their present unchallenged air domination? There was a surge of opinion in favour of Trondheim which extended far beyond Cabinet circles. The advantages were so obvious that all could see thorn. The public, the clubs, the newspapers and their military correspondents had, for some days past, been discussing such a policy freely. My great friend, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, champion of forcing the Dardanelles, hero and victor of Zeebrugge, passionately longed to lead the fleet or any portion of it past the batteries into the Trondheim Fiord and storm the town by landings from the sea. He spoke and wrote to me repeatedly with vehemence, reminding me of the Dardanelles, and how easily the straits could have been forced if we had not been stopped by timid obstructionists. I also pondered a good deal upon the lessons of the Dardanelles. Certainly the Trondheim batteries and any minefields that might have been laid were trivial compared to those we had then had to face. On the other hand, there was the airplane, capable of dropping its bombs on the unprotected decks of the very few great ships which now constituted the naval power of Britain on the oceans. Scheme Approved At the Admiralty the First Sea Lord and the naval staff generally did no shrink from the venture. On April 13 the Admiralty had officially informed the Commander-in-Chief of the Supreme Council’s decision to allot troops for the capture of Trondheim and had raised with him in a positive manner the question whether the Home Fleet should not force the passage. “ Do you consider,” the message ran, “that the shore batteries could be either destroyed or dominated to such an extent as to permit transports to enter? If so. how many ships and what type would you propose? ” On this Admiral Forbes asked.for details about the Trondheim defences. He agreed that the shore batteries might be destroyed or dominated in daylight by battleships provided with suitable ammunition. None was carried at that moment in Home Fleet ships. The first and most important-task, he said, was to protect troopships from heavy air attack over the 30-mile approach through narrow waters, and the next to carry out an opposed landing of which ample warning had been given. In the circumstances he did not consider the operation feasible. The naval staff persisted in their view, and the Admiralty, with my full agreement, replied on April 15: “ Pray, therefore, consider this important project further.” Admiral Forbes, although not fully convinced of its soundness, therefore addressed himself to the project in a more favourable mood. In a further reply, he said that he did not anticipate great difficulty from the naval side, except that he could not provide air defence for the transports while carrying out the landing. The naval force required would be the Valiant and Renown to give air defence to the Glorious, the Warspite to bombard, at least four AA cruisers and about 20 destroyers. Preparations Advanced While plans for the frontal attack on Trondheim from the sea were being advanced with all speed, two subsidiary landings were already in progress designed to envelop the town from the landward side. Of these the first was a hundred miles to the north, at Namsos, where Major-general Carton de Wiart, V.C., had been chosen to command the troops with orders “to secure the Trondheim area.” He was informed that the navy were making a preliminary lodgment with a party about 300 strong in order to take and hold points for his disembarkation. The idea was that two infantry brigades and a light division of Chasseurs Alpins should land hereabouts in conjunction with t'h.e main attack by the navy upon Trondheim, “Operation Hammer.” For this purpose the 146th Brigade and the Chasseurs Alpins were being diverted from Narvik. Carton de Wiart started forthwith in a flying boat, and reached Namsos under heavy air attack on the evening of the 15th. His staff officer was wounded, but he took effective charge on the spot. The second landing was at Andalsnes, about a hundred and fifty miles by road to the south-west of Trondheim. Here also the navy had made a lodgment, and on April 18 Brigadier Morgan with a military force arrived and took command. Lieutenant-general Massy was appointed commander-in-chief of all the forces operating in Central Norway. This officer had to exercise his command from the War Office because there was at yet no place for his headquarters on the other side. On April 17 I explained in outline to the War Cabinet the plan which the Staffs were making for the main landing at Trondheim. The forces immediately available were one regular brigade from France (2500 strong). 1000 Canadians, and about 1000 men of a Territorial brigade as a reserve. I The operation would be supported i by the full strength of the Fleet, and j two carriers would be available with ! a total of about 100 aircraft, including j 45 fighters. The provisional date for 1 the landing was April 22. The second : demi-brigade of Chasseurs. Alpins ! would not reach Trondheim until April ! 25, when it was hoped they would j be able to disembark at the quays in Trondheim. ! Up to this point all the Staffs and | their Chiefs had seemed resolved upon ! the central thrust at Trondheim, “ Operation Hammer.” Admiral Forbes was actively preparing to strike, and there seemed no reason why the date of the 22nd should not be kept. Last-minute Opposition During the 18th, a vehement and decisive change in the opinions of the Chiefs of Stall' and of the Admiralty occurred. This change was brought about first by increasing realisation of the magnitude of the naval stake in hazarding so many of our finest capital ships, and also by War Office arguments that even if the Fleet got in and got out again, the opposed landing of the troops in the face of the German air power would be perilous. On the other hand the landings which were already being successfully carried out both north and south of Trondheim seemed to all these authorities to offer a far less dangerous solution. The Chiefs of Staff drew up a long paper opposing “ Operation Hammer.” This began with a reminder that a combined operation involving an opposed landing was one of the most difficult and hazardous, operations of war, requiring the most careful and detailed preparations.

The Chiefs of Staff had always realised that this particular operation would involve very serious risks: for, pwine to the urgency of the situation, there had not been lime for the detailed and meticulous preparation which should have been given and, as there had been no reconnaissance or air photographs, the plan had been worked out from maps and charts. The plan had the further disadvantage that it would involve concentrating almost the whole of the Home Fleet in an area where it could be subjected to heavy attack from the air. There were also new factors in the situation which should be taken into account. We had seized the landing places at Namsos and' Andalsnes and established forces ashore there; there were reliable reports that the Germans were improving the defences at Trondheim: and reports of our intention to make a direct landing at Trondheim had appeared in the press. On reconsidering the original project in the light of these new factors, the Chiefs of Staff unanimously recommended a change of plan. They still thought it essential that we should seize Trondheim and use it as a base for subsequent operations in Scandinavia: but they urged that, instead of the direct frontal assault, we should take advantage of our unexpected success in landing forces at Namsos and Andalsnes and develop a pincer movement on Trondheim from north and south. By this means, they declared, we could turn a venture which was attended by grave hazards into one which could achieve the same result with much less risk. By this change of plan the press reports of our intentions could also be turned to our advantage; for by judicious leakages we could hope to leave the enemy under the impression that we still intended to persist in our original plan. The chiefs of staff therefore recommended that we should push in the maximum forces possible at Namsos and Andalsnes, seize control of the road and rail communications running through Dombas and envelop Trondheim from the north and south. Shortly before the main landings at Namsos and Andalsnes the outer forts at Trondheim should be bombarded from the sea with a view to leading the eftemy to suppose that a direct assault was about to take place. We should thus invest Trondheim by land and blockade it by sea; and. although its capture would take longer than originally contemplated, our main forces' might be put ashore at a slightly earlier date. Finally the chiefs of staff pointed out that such an enveloping operation. as opposed to a direct assault, would release a large number of valuable units of the fleet for operations in other areas, e.g., at Narvik. A Decisive Stopper These powerful recommendations were put forward with the authority, not only of the three chiefs of staff, but of their three able vice-chiefs, including Admiral Tom Phillips and Sir John Dill, newly appointed. No more decisive stopper on a positive amphibious plan can be imagined, nor have I seen a Government or Minister who would have over-ridden it. t When I became aware of this right-about-turn, I was indignant, and questioned searchingly the officers concerned. It was soon plain to me that all professional opinion was now adverse to the operation which only a few days before it had spontaneously espoused. Of course, there was at hand, in passionate ardour for action and glory,. Sir Roger Keyes. He was scornful of these belated fears and second thoughts. He volunteered to lead a handful of older ships with the necessary transports into Trondheim Fiord, land the troops and storm the place, before the Germans got any stronger. Roger Keyes had formidable credentials of achievement. In him there burned a flame. It was suggested in the May debates that “ the iron of the Dardanelles had entered into my soul.” meaning that on account of my downfall on that occasion I had no longer the capacity to dare; but this was really not true. The difficulties of acting from a subordinate position in the violent manner required are of the first magnitude. Moreover, the personal relations of the high naval figures involved were peculiar. Roger Keyes, like Lord Cork, was senior to the Commander-in-Chief and the First Sea Lord. Admiral Pound had been for two years’ Keyes's staff officer in the Mediterranean. For me to take Roger Keyes’s advice against his would have entailed his resignation, and Admiral Forbes might well have asked to be relieved of his command. It was certainly not my duty m the position I held to confront the Prime Minister and my War Cabinet colleagues with these personal dramas at sucli a time and upon an operation which, for all its attractiveness and interest, was essentially minor even in relation to the Norwegian campaign, to say nothing of the general war. I therefore had no doubt that we must accept the staff view in spite of their change of mind, and the obvious objections that could be raised against their mutilated planNarvik Again Accordingly submitted to the abandonment of “ Hammer,” I reported the facts to the Prime Minister on the afternoon of the 18th,. and though bitterly disappointed he. like me, had no choice but to accept the new position. In war, as in life, it is often necessary when some cherished scheme has failed, to take up the best alternative open, and if so, it is folly not to work for it with all your might. I therefore turned my guns round too. Of course it may be said that all Norwegian enterprises. however locallv successful, to which we might have committed ourselves would have been swept away by the results of the fearful battle in France which was now so near. Within a month the main Allied Armies were to be shattered or driven into the sea. Everything we had would have been drawn into the struggle for life. It was therefore lucky for us that we were not able to build up a substantial army and air force round Trondheim. The veils of the future are lifted one by one, and mortals must act from day to day. On the knowledge we had in the middle of April, I remain of (he opinion that having gone so far. we ought to have persisted in carrying but Operation “ Hammer ” and the three-fold attack on Trondheim on which all had been agreed; but I accept my full share of responsibility for not enforcing this upon our expert advisers when they became so decidedly averse to it and presented us with serious objections. In that case, however, it would have been better to abandon the whole enterprise against Trondheim and concentrate all upon Narvik. But for this it was now too late. Many of the troops were ashore, and the Norwegians were crying for help. (World Copyright Reserved)