BRITISH OFFENSIVE PLANS

Otago Daily Times, Issue 26772, 15 May 1948, Page 7

BRITISH OFFENSIVE PLANS

By WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

CHURCHILL MEMOIRS

Although, as we know. May 10 was already chosen for the invasion of France and the Low Countries, Hitler had not yet fixed the actual date of the prior Norway onslaught. Much was to precede it. There was a hum of activity in the planning sections of the German war machine. Preparations both for the attack on Norway and the invasion of France continued simultaneously and efficiently. On March 20 Falkenhorst reported that his side of the “Weser operation plan (for the invasion of Norway) was ready. The Fuhrer held a military conference on the afternoon of March 16, and D-Day was provisionally fixed, apparently for April 9. Admiral von Raeder reported to the conference: “. . .In my opinion, the danger of a British landing in Norway is no longer acute at present. . . - The question of what the British will do in the north in the near future can be answered as follows: —They will make further attempts to disrupt German trade in neutral waters and to cause incidents in order perhaps to create a pretext for action against Norway. One object has been, and still is, to cut oft Germany’s imports from Narvik. These will be cut off at least for a time, however, even if the ‘Weser operation’ is carried out.

“Sooner or later Germany will be faced with the necessity of carrying out the ‘ Weser operation.’ Therefore, it is advisable to do so as soon as possible, by April 15 at the latest, since after that date the nights are too short; there will be a new moon on April 7. The onerational possibilities of the navy will be restricted too much if the ‘Weser operation’ is postponed any longer.”

“ The submarines can remain in position only for two to three weeks more. Weather of the type favourable for operation “ GELB ” (Yellow —the invasion of France and the Low Countries) is not to be waited for in the case of the ‘Weser operation’; overcast, foggy weather is more satisfactory for the latter. The general state of preparedness of the naval forces and ships is at present good.” From the beginning of the year the Soviets had brought their main power to bear on the Finns. They redoubled their efforts to pierce the Mannerheim Line before the melting of the snows. Alas, this year the spring and its thaw, on which the hard-pressed Finns based their hopes, came nearly six weeks late. The great Soviet offensive on the isthmus, which was to last 42 days, opened on February 1, combined with heavy air bombing of base depots and railway junctions behind the lines. Ten days of heavy bombardment from Soviet guns, massed wheel to wheel, heralded the main infantry attack. After a fortnight’s fighting the line was breached. The air attacks on the key fort and base of Viipuri increased in intensity. By the end of the month the Mannerheim defence system had been disorganised and the Russians were able to concentrate against the Gulf of Viipuri. The Finns were short of ammunition and their troops exhausted. -innish Armistice

On March 7, Mr Paasikivi went again to Moscow; this time to discuss armistice terms. On the 13th the Russian terms were accepted by the Finns. All our plans for military landings were again shelved, and the forces which were being collected ,were to some extent dispersed. The two divisions which had been held back in England were now allowed to proceed to France, and our striking power towards Norway was reduced to battalions.

Meanwhile operation “ Royal Marine ” (for setting mines afloat in the Rhine) had ripened. Five months of intensive effort with Admiralty priorities behind it had reached .its punctual fruition. Admiral Fitzgerald and his trained detachments of British haval officers and marines, each man aflame with the idea of a novel stroke in the war, were established on the upper reaches of the Rhine at Soufflenheim, ready to strike when permission could be obtained.

In March all preparations were perfected, and I at length appealed both to my colleagues and to the French. The War Cabinet were very ready to let me begin this carefully-prepared offensive plan, and left it to me, with Foreign Office support, to do what I could with the French. In all their wars and troubles in my lifetime 1 have been bound up with the French, and I believed that they would do as much for me as for any other foreigner alive. But in this phase of twilight war I could not move them. When I pressed very hard they used a method of refusal which I never met before or since. M. Daladier told me with an air of exceptional formality that “the President of the Republic himself had intervened, and that no aggressive action must be taken which might only draw reprisals upon France.” This idea of not irritating the enemy did not commend itself to me.

Hitler had done his best to strangle our commerce by the indiscriminate mining of our harbours. We had beaten him by defensive means alone. Good, decent, civilised people, it appeared, must never strike themselves till after they have been struck dead. In these days the fearful German volcano and all its subterranean fires drew near to their explosion point. There were still months of pretended war. On the one side endless discussions about trivial points, no decisions taken, or if taken rescinded, and the rule “ don’t be unkind to the enemy, you will only make him 'angry.” On the other, doom preparing—a vast machine grinding forward ready to break upon us! The defeat of Finland was fatal to the Daladier Government, whose chief had taken so marked, if tardy, action, and who had personally given disproportionate prominence to this part of our anxieties. On March 21 a new Cabinet was formed under M. Reynaud. pledged to an increasingly vigorous conduct of the war. My relations with M. Reynaud stood on a different footing from any I had established with M. Daladier. Reynaud, Mandel, and I had felt the same emotions about Munich. Daladier had been on the other side. I. therefore welcomed the change in the French Government, and I also hoped that my fluvial mines would now have a better chance of acceptance. Chamberlain Resolute

The French Ministers came to London for a meeting of the Supreme War Council on March 28. Mr Chamberlain opened with a full and clear description of the scene as he saw it. To my great satisfaction, he said his first proposal was that “a certain operation, generally known as the ‘ Royal Marine,’ should be put into operation immediately.” He urged that surprise depended upon speed. Secrecy would be endangered by delay, and the river conditons were about to be particularly favourable. As to German retaliation, he said that if Germany thought it worth while to bomb French or British cities, she would not wait for a pretext. Everything was ready. It was only necessary for the French High Command to give the order. I had not realised how fully Mr Chamberlain and I were agreed. It was at last decided that, after addressing communications in general terms to Norway and Sweden, we should lay minefields in Norwegian territorial waters on April 5, and that subject to the concurrence of the French War Committee, “Royal Marine ” should be begun on April 4 by launching the fluvial mines in the Rhine, and on April 15 upon the Ger-

France Reluctant to Act

He who’ will not when he may,

man canals from the air. It was also agreed that if Germany invaded Belgium the Allies should immediately move into that country without waiting for a formal invitation; that if Germany invaded Holland, and Belgium did not go to her assistance, the Allies should consider themselves free to enter Belgium for the purpose of helping Holland.

Finally, as an obvious point on which all were at one, the communique stated that the British and French Governments had agreed on the following solemn declaration:— That during the present war they would neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement. This pact later acquired high importance. On April 3 the British Cabinet implemented the resolve of the Supreme War Council, and the Admiralty was authorised to mine the Norwegian “ Leads ” on April 2. I called the actual mining operation “ Wilfred,” because by itself it was so small and innocent. As our mining of Norwegian waters might provoke a German retort it was also agreed that a British brigade and a French contingent should be sent to Narvik to clear the port and advance to the Swedish frontier. Other forces should be dispatched to Stavanger, Bergen, and Trondheim, in order to deny these bases to the enemy. Vexatious Delay

It is worth while looking back on the stages by which at last the decision to mine the Leads was reached. I had asked for it on September 29, 1939, Nothing relevant had altered in the meanwhile. The moral and technical objections on the score of neutrality, the possibility of German retaliation against Norway, the importance of stopping the now of iron ore from Narvik to Germany, the effect on neutral and world-wide opinion—all were exactly the same. But at last the Supreme .War Council was convinced, and at# last the War Cabinet were reconciled to the scheme, and indeed resolved upon it. One can hardly find a more perfect example of the impotence and fatuity of waging war by committee or rather by groups of committees. It fell to my lot in the weeks which followed to bear much of the burden and some of the odium of the ill-starred Norwegian campaign, the course of which will presently be described. Had I beep allowed to act with freedom and design when I first demanded permission, a far more agreeable conclusion might have been reached in this key theatre, with favourable consequences in every directioh. But now all was to be disaster.

When he will, he shall have Nay. French Resistance Soon we learnt that the French War Committee would not agree to the launching of Royal Marine. They were in favour of mining the Norwegian Leads, but opposed to anything that might draw retaliation on France. Though the French Ambassador, Reynaud, expressed his regret, Mr Chamberlain, who was much inclined to aggressive action of some kind at this stage, was vexed at this refusal, and in a conversation with M. Corbin he linked the two operations together. The British would cut off the ore supplies of Germany, as the French desired, provided that at the same time the French allowed us to retaliate by means of Royal Marine for all the injuries we had suffered and were enduring from the magnetic mine. Keen as I was on Royal- Marine, I had not expected him to go so far as this. Both operations were methods of making offensive war upon the enemy and bringing to an end the twilight period from the prolongation of which I now believed Germany was the gainer.

However, if a few days would enable us to bring the French into agreement: upon the punctual execution of the two projects. I was agreeable to postponing Wilfred for a few days. The Prime Minister was so favourable to my views at this juncture that we seemed almost to think as one. He asked me to go over to Paris and see what I could do to persuade M. Daladier. who was evidently the stumbling block. I met M. Reynaud and several others of his Ministers at dinner on the night of the 4th at the British Embassy, and we seemed in pretty good agreement. Daladier had been invited to attend, but professed a previous engagement. It was arranged that I should see him the next morning. While meaning to do my utmost to persuade Daladier, I asked permission from Cabinet to make it clear that we would go forward with Wilfred even if Royal Marine was vetoed. I visited Daladier at the Rue Dominique at noon on the sth, and had a serious talk with him. I commented on his absence from our dinner the night before He pleaded his previous engagement. It was evident to me that a considerable gulf existed between the new and former Premier. Daladier argued that in three months’ time the French aviation would be sufficently improved for the necessary measures' to be taken to meet German reactions to “Royal Marine." For this he was prepared to give a firm date in writing. He made a strong case about the defenceless French factories. Finally he assured me that the period of political crises in France was over, and that he would work in harmony with M. Reynaud. On this we parted. Misplaced Optimism

On Friday. April 5, 1940, the Prime Minister addressed the Central Council for the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations in a spirit of unusual optimism: “After seven months of war I feel 10 times as confident of victory as I did at the beginning. ... I feel that during the seven months our relative position towards the enemy has become a great deal stronger than it was.

“ When war did break out German preparations were far ahead of our own, and it was natural then to expect that the enemv would take advantage of his initial superiority to make an endeavour to overwhelm us and France before we had time to make good our deficiencies. Is it not a very extraordinary thing that no such attempt was made? Whatever may be the reason—whether it was that Hitler thought he might get away with what he had got without fighting for it, or whether it was that after all the preparations were not sufficiently complete—however, one thing is certain: he missed the bus.”

This proved an ill-judged utterance. Its main assumption that we and the French were relatively stronger than at the beginning of the war was not reasonable. The Germans were now in the fourth year of vehement munition manufacture, whereas we were at a much earlier stage, probably comparable in fi'uitfulness to the second year. Moreover, with evhry month that had passed, the German Army, now four years old, was becoming a mature^and perfected weapon, and the former advantage of the French Army in training and cohesion was steadily passing away. The Prime Minister showed no \ premonition that we were on the eve of great events, whereas it seemed almost certain to me that the land war was about to begin. Above all, the expression, “Hitler missed the bus,” was unlucky. All lay in suspense. The various minor expedients I had been able to suggest had gained acceptance; but nothing of a major character had been done by either side. Our plans, such as they were, rested upon enforcing the blockade by the mining of the Norwegian corridor in the north, and by hampering German oil supplies

from the south-east. Complete immobility and silence reigned behind the German front. Suddenly, the passive or small-scale policy of the Allies was swept away by a cataract of violent surprises. We were to learn what total war means. (World Copyright Reserved.)